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“Those who tell the stories rule society.”
– Plato, Politeia
Populism is on the rise and offers a different narrative than liberal democracy: unmitigated
majority rule without liberal protection for minorities (Mudde, 2007a). Its rapid rise across most
of the developed world in recent years is remarkable. Donald Trump has been elected President of
the United States, people in Great Britain have voted to leave the European Union, Victor Orbán
has suspended democratic rule in Hungary, and a right-wing nativist party has become the third
largest force in the German parliament. Liberal democracy, once seen as set in stone in western
societies, is now starting to appear fragile (Mounk, 2018). This baffling political transformation
poses several questions at many levels. The objective of the chapters in this thesis is to contribute
to a better understanding of populism. In particular, the aim is to address the following three
issues. First, what explains the success of populist parties in recent years? Second, what are the
consequences of the success of populist parties, in particular regarding far-right extremism? Third,
if populism is cause for concern, what are potential remedies?
A rapidly growing literature on populism, on which Guriev and Papaioannou (2020) provide a
thorough literature overview, proposes several answers to these questions. On the one hand, secular
factors such as shocks from globalisation, automation, and trade as well as austerity measures and
economic consequences of the financial crisis (Fetzer, 2019; Dal Bó et al., 2018; Dehdari, 2018), have
been found to increase populists’ vote shares (Rodrik, 2018; Autor et al., 2016). On the other hand,
a second strand of literature emphasizes the role of non-economic factors has played in the rise of
populism. As argued by Norris and Inglehart (2019), a cultural backlash to the politics of ethnic,
racial, and gender-based non-discrimination might explain why right-wing populists have gained
a larger vote share in the recent past. Gennaioli and Tabellini (2019) show that, indeed, salience
of identity rather than economic concerns can have wide-ranging impacts. However, since cultural
traits typically remain stable over long periods of time (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Becker et al.,
2016; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2016), a valid question is why and how these traits suddenly
become activated. The first chapter of this thesis, joint work with Davide Cantoni and Mark
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Westcott, investigates how persistent right-wing attitudes in Germany, dormant for many decades,
have both been activated and led to the rise of the first successful right-wing populist party in
Germany since the end of World War II.
Given the growing presence of populism, important questions revolve around its implications.
Experimental research by Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (2019) was able to document a link between
populist success and xenophobic behaviour. The second chapter of this thesis aims to shed light
on the mechanism behind this link in a non-experimental context. Adding to studies on the link
between populist success and hate crimes (Schilter, 2018; Müller and Schwarz, 2018; 2019; Kuipers,
Nellis, and Weaver, 2019), I examine how information shocks from state elections can propagate
far-right extremist protest marches in Germany. In particular, I provide new insights on an element
of surprise which the propagation effect depends upon.
The third chapter, joint work with Daniela Miehling, has the most indirect, but maybe the
most important link to the political economy of populism. The chapter starts from the observation
that the rise of populism goes hand in hand with eroding levels of trust in democratic institutions
(Dustmann et al., 2017; Algan et al., 2017). We document that – unexpectedly – one major reform
to schools in Germany is associated with higher levels of trust in the EU institutions. We argue
that the most likely explanation is that high school graduates earn international experience during
the “extra year” they gained from the reform. Going abroad after high school graduation might
thus be seen as a potential remedy to the phenomenon of populism.
In what follows I provide a brief summary of all three chapters. Each chapter is self-contained
and can be read independently. A consolidated bibliography is presented at the end of the thesis.
In chapter 1, joint work with Davide Cantoni and Mark Westcott, we argue that alongside other
determinants, the persistence of right-wing ideology can explain the recent rise of populism. Our
explanation addresses the puzzle of why populist parties were able to gain substantial support so
quickly despite no major shift in underlying attitudes. Our answer is that changes in the supply
of political party options can enable populist parties to tap into existing demand for right-wing
policies, and thus “activate” dormant cultural traits.
Focusing on Germany, we document how the recently established AfD party turned from a
monothematic anti-Euro party into an openly xenophobic right-wing populist party. This turn
enabled the party to sidestep social problems of social acceptability which usually deter Germans
from voting for the extreme right. We find that municipalities that expressed strong support for the
Nazi party (the NSDAP) in 1933 have a stronger vote base for the AfD after the right-wing shift of
the AfD. In our baseline specification, a one standard deviation increase in Nazi party support is
associated with 0.06 standard deviations more of support for the AfD in the 2017 federal election.
This association should not be seen as causal, but remains robust to controlling for factors usually
associated with the rise of right-wing populist parties. We interpret this finding as an activation
of a deep-seated cultural trait which is distinct from antisemitism. Consistent with theories of
vertical transmission of cultural traits, we find that the influx of ethnic German refugees after
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WWII breaks the historical persistence and considerably reduces the correlation. We can rule out
that our findings are driven by a concurrent shift in attitudes using survey data.
In chapter 2, I study the nexus of populism and right-wing extremism. Previous literature has
shown that key to understanding the link between populism and right-wing actions are changes
in social acceptability (Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin, 2019). These changes can be induced by
information shocks, for example a surprising outcome of an election, and can give rise to an em-
powerment effect: when social norms surrounding far-right actions change, xenophobes might be
more likely to take to the streets. I contribute to the understanding of this empowerment effect
in two ways. First, I document that unexpectedly high populist vote shares at state elections in
Germany increase the number of far-right protests in more liberal areas. Second, I show how the
empowerment effect depends on an element of surprise. When success of the populist party is
severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share 10 percentage points below the
state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood of an additional far-right
protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD and vanishes when polling
institutions correctly estimate the populist party’s success. Bottom-up far-right protests initiated
by non-formal organizers respond more heavily to the information shock, suggesting that the effect
is not due to strategic targeting. The results are robust to demographic controls, unemployment
or refugee influx, as well as a placebo test.
In chapter 3, which is joint work with Daniela Miehling, we examine an unintended side-effect
of a major educational reform in Germany on trust in the EU institutions. The so-called G8 reform
reduced the total years of schooling from nine to eight years for academic-track high school students.
We find that, on average, individuals who thus had eight years of schooling display higher levels of
trust in EU institutions than those who had nine years of schooling. We argue that the increase
in trust is connected to treated individuals using their “extra” year after graduation to take a
gap-year, for example, to volunteer abroad. Although the aim of the policy was to allow for earlier
job market entry, we show that the reform significantly increased the probability of an individual
taking time off after graduation and before continuing either with university, an apprenticeship,
or employment. We show that the increase in trust in EU institutions is not due to an increase
in general trust or specifically trust in politics amongst treated individuals. As low levels of trust
seem to engender the rise of populist parties (Algan et al., 2017), international experience might
point to a potential counterweight to increasing populist success.
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Chapter 1
Persistence and Activation of
Right-Wing Political Ideology
1.1 Introduction
Throughout Western democracies, the recent rise of right-wing populism has been swift and re-
markable — from Orbán to Salvini, from Le Pen to Wilders, from Trump to Bolsonaro. Social
scientists have been grappling with its causes since. Several explanatory factors have been brought
forward and tested in different settings: from the rise in unemployment following the great reces-
sion, to “import competition” from China and increasing insecurity among manufacturing workers,
to immigration and especially the refugee crisis of 2015.1 And yet, each one of these factors can
only account for some of the variation in success of right-wing populists across time, countries, and
regions. We propose cultural persistence of right-wing political ideology as a further determinant of
electoral outcomes. If such a persistent demand for right-wing ideology is combined with a shift in
the supply of political platforms, sharp changes in electoral support may result even in the absence
of underlying sharp changes in the demand for right-wing policy.
In this paper, we study the rise of a new right-wing party, the “Alternative for Germany” (Al-
ternative für Deutschland, henceforth AfD). Its recent emergence in the German political landscape
has offered a new political platform on the far right: conservative, nationalistic, and at times out-
right xenophobic. We show that municipalities that expressed strong support for the Nazi party
(the NSDAP) in 1933 now have a stronger vote base for the AfD. In our baseline specification, a
one standard deviation increase in Nazi support is associated with 0.06 standard deviations more
support for the AfD in the 2017 federal election. This result is not confounded by other factors
often associated with the rise of right-wing populist parties, such as unemployment, exposure to
1. Studying the rise of right-wing populism has given rise to a burgeoning literature: e.g., on unemployment, see
Dehdari (2019). On the loss of manufacturing jobs, see Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig (2019). On the consequences of
trade exposure, see Autor et al. (2016), Dippel, Gold, and Heblich (2016), Malgouyres (2017), Colantone and Stanig
(2018). On immigration, see Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller (2016) Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm (2016).
1
trade shocks, or the presence of refugees.
Importantly, we do not suggest that this finding should be seen as a causal effect of Nazi voting
on contemporary electoral outcomes. Rather, we see Nazi vote share in 1933 as a proxy for a
deep-seated, persistent right-wing ideology. In accordance with this interpretation, we show that
municipalities that voted for the NSDAP in 1933 consistently express more right-wing attitudes
in opinion surveys, from the 1990s until today. Moreover, surveys show that voters in these mu-
nicipalities do not turn more right-wing before the 2017 election, ruling out a demand shift as a
potential explanation.
Instead, these attitudes translate into electoral results only once the AfD is available on the
ballot: for the first time in postwar German history, as a party that identifies as firmly right-
wing, but is more socially acceptable than other, more extreme parties existing before. These
other parties — strongly right-wing or even neo-Nazi — exhibit only a much lower correlation with
Nazi vote share throughout the period considered. Our interpretation also helps understanding the
apparent disconnect between the increasing electoral success of newly founded, populist right-wing
movements across Europe and the world, while overall attitudes in the population remain broadly
constant. The successful establishment of new parties with low social stigma, which tap on an
existing demand for right-wing policies, can explain these sudden shifts in electoral outcomes.
We interpret our findings in the context of the literature on cultural persistence, which has shown
how norms and values often have roots in the distant past and are transmitted across generations.
Such norms and values — e.g., trust toward strangers, gender roles, or antisemitism — can have a
first-order impact on a wide set of social and economic outcomes.2 However, there is also a growing
understanding that not all historical shocks that shape culture and values manifest themselves up
to the present: cultural persistence may be mediated or dampened by intervening factors.3
Our research proposes an alternative interpretation to the presence, or lack, of cultural persis-
tence: we distinguish between the persistence of cultural traits, such as xenophobia or antisemitism,
and their activation, as they are turned into manifest actions. Cultural traits may be present but
dormant, because they do not result in actions: antisemitism may be persistent but not result
in pogroms; xenophobia may be persistent but not result in votes for extreme right-wing parties.
These traits would only be visible to the researcher, if at all, through opinion surveys, although the
power of such instruments may be limited by factors such as stigma and social desirability. The
persistent, but latent demand for the expression of cultural attitudes will only result in actions
once its manifestation becomes less costly.
Sharp shifts in the party landscape, such as the creation of a new political party or the rise of a
2. The recent literature in economics on deep roots and persistence of cultural values is large; see, e.g., Alesina
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Nunn and Wantchekon (2011), Jha (2013), Spolaore and Wacziarg (2013), Alesina,
Giuliano, and Nunn (2013), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016), Becker et al. (2016), Becker and Pascali (2016).
On economic and social effects of cultural norms, see Tabellini (2010).
3. Voigtländer and Voth (2012) show that in some German cities, e.g. those with a tradition of commerce, the
transmission of antisemitism is lower. Giuliano and Nunn (2017) provide a broader framework to understand cultural
transmission.
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new, charismatic leader, are examples in which the relative costs of manifesting existing attitudes
change. The specific setting of Germany allows us to observe a case in which a change in the
supply of political platforms is key in making a long-run persistence of ideological traits reemerge.
After the catastrophic experience of Nazism and World War II, the postwar legal setting severely
constrained the expression of right-wing ideology and put obstacles to the creation of parties on
the extreme right fringe. The AfD bypassed these constraints: it was founded in 2013 as a mono-
thematic platform to promote fiscally conservative principles and oppose the Greek bailout. Two
years later, in 2015, the initial leadership was ousted by a narrow margin and the party veered
strongly to the right, focusing on immigration and nationalism as main themes. As a consequence
of this sudden shift, the party could avoid the intense legal scrutiny, and public stigma, that newly
founded right-wing parties are usually subject to in Germany.
This shift was a fundamental change to the German party landscape. Arguably for the first
time in post-war German history, in 2017 electors had the viable option to vote for a party to the
right of the Christian Democrats (the mainstream conservative party). The AfD was, compared
to previously existing far-right parties, a relatively “cheap” option in terms of social image costs:
it carefully eschewed the neo-Nazi associations that characterize other parties on the right fringe,
cultivating instead a respectable, bourgeois image. Voting, mobilizing, canvassing for the AfD is
much less associated with social stigma than for other far-right parties. Moreover, voting for the
AfD in 2017 represented a viable option (not a pure protest vote), since all polls put the party
comfortably above the 5% threshold required to obtain seats in parliament.
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find only a small and insignificant correlation between
the AfD’s electoral fortunes and Nazi support in 2013, when the AfD espoused merely economic
conservatism. The correlation is strong and significant in 2017, when the party had veered to
the right. We show that, in contrast to the findings by Voigtländer and Voth (2012, 2015), who
document persistent patterns of antisemitism across space and time, antisemitism is not the reason
for this persistence of far-right voting. Measures of antisemitism in the 1930s and before are not
correlated with today’s electoral success of the AfD, while proxies for conservative attitudes are.
The same holds for the share of Protestants in a community, which is widely recognized as an
accurate predictor for conservative attitudes and Nazi vote share in the 1920s and 30s.
We also consider other major determinants of the rise of right-wing populism proposed by
the literature. While unemployment levels, changes in unemployment rates, exposure to import
competition, and educational attainments are also, to some extent, determinants of the AfD’s
electoral success, their inclusion in the regressions does not affect the estimated historical persistence
of Nazi voting. Moreover, these factors do not interact with historical Nazi voting, suggesting
that they do not play an activating role. In line with theories of vertical transmission of values,
we find that the influx of ethnic German refugees after WWII — in some communities, these
“expellees” represented up to half of the post-war population – breaks the historical persistence
and substantially reduces the correlation of voting between the 1930s and today.
3
Importantly, note that our argument does not rest on an assumption of the exogeneity of the
timing of the emergence of the AfD. As shown in Figure 1.1, the AfD’s rightward turn occurred
in the spring of 2015, culminating in the party convention in July, and thus preceded the massive
inflow of Syrian refugees that peaked in the following fall. Nevertheless, public sentiment against the
perceived threat of immigration from Islamic countries might have been mounting even beforehand,
or throughout the time period analyzed.4 Yet such a general, overall rightward shift in attitudes
would be accounted for by the comparison of elections in different years (2013 vs. 2017). For the
single municipality, the new availability of the AfD as a “respectable” populist right-wing option
in 2017 was exogenous. It represented an expansion of the political supply that affected all regions
equally, as the AfD was on the ballot in all states.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Illegal Border Crossings Support for AfD Pegida Protesters
Notes: The graph shows voting intentions for the AfD (source: Infratest dimap), illegal border crossing by refugees
along the Western Balkan route (source: European Border and Coast Guard Agency — Frontex), and attendance of
“Pegida” demonstrations (source: https://durchgezaehlt.org).
Our interpretation of the findings as a supply-side shift meeting an existing, persistent ideo-
logical demand would be spurious if, instead, a sharp rightward move in attitudes had occurred
over the same time period, only in the municipalities that had a history of past Nazi voting. Such
a localized shift in attitudes could result in the specific electoral patterns observed: in that case,
they would be the result of both a supply and a demand side shift. To exclude this possibility,
we study political attitudes through the German General Social Survey (allbus). We find that
respondents in municipalities with higher support for the Nazi party in the past expressed more
right-wing attitudes along a wide range of questions throughout all waves studied (1996–2016),
4. Figure 1.1 also shows a time series of attendance of “Pegida” (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of
the Occident) demonstrations: these are nationalistic, decidedly islamophobic, anti-immigration protests.
4
consistent with our view of a persistent right-wing ideology in these areas. Importantly, however,
we do not find a rightward shift in these municipalities between 2014 and 2016, suggesting that
there was no shift in demand that could explain the geography of electoral support of the AfD.
Our analysis speaks to several research agendas in economics and political science. First, we
contribute to the literature cited above on the long-term persistence of cultural traits and attitudes.
As in, e.g., the papers by Voigtländer and Voth (2012), Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2016), Becker
et al. (2016), we show that cultural traits — in our specific case, political attitudes — have deep
origins that are correlated spatially with analogous traits in the past, and are transmitted across
generations.
Additionally, the AfD’s electoral success shows that the historical persistence of political atti-
tudes is not always visible, and may need to be “activated” by changes in the institutional setting
or the political marketplace. This activation of historical memories has also been evidenced by two
recent papers. In Fisman, Hamao, and Wang (2014), anti-Japanese hatred is selectively stoked by
Chinese leaders for domestic policy purposes, with consequences on stock market prices. Fouka
and Voth (2016) show how sales of German cars declined, as the debt crisis of 2010–2015 mounted,
in Greek localities that witnessed massacres perpetrated by German forces in WWII.
In these papers, incidental changes in the political background have economic consequences.
Another literature has focused on the endogenous choice of politicians to selectively activate feelings
in the electorate: Glaeser (2005) and, more recently, Guiso et al. (2018) discuss how the supply
of political platforms, generated by politicians, interacts with voters’ demand for policies such as
hatred or populism. Enke (2019) studies the dynamics of supply and demand for moral values
in voting in the context of the recent U.S. elections. Recent work by Ochsner and Roesel (2017)
studies a context close to ours — the populist right-wing FPÖ party in Austria — showing that
this party is successful in unearthing a resentment against Turkish immigrants that dates back to
the Ottoman sieges of Vienna in the 16th and 17th century. While in Ochsner and Roesel (2017)
memories of Turkish massacres are not present in the population any more and are strategically
inculcated by politicians, in our setting we argue that right-wing leanings are present throughout,
and emerge incidentally as a consequence of the change in political landscape.
Second, our work is a contribution to understanding the determinants of (radical) right-wing
voting.5 Economic insecurity, spurred by increasing globalization and the demise of traditional
manufacturing, may explain part of this political shift; so do increasing levels of immigrant popu-
lation in (Western European) countries.6 Cultural factors are also discussed frequently: Inglehart
and Norris (2016) argue that the recent rise of populism can best be understood as a reactionary
response to a cultural change that is perceived as too fast and unsettling by some sectors of the
5. For an (admittedly less than comprehensive) literature review, cf. footnote 1. The literature in comparative
political science is reviewed by Golder (2016); see also the earlier works by Norris (2005), Mudde (2007b), and
Arzheimer (2008).
6. Although importantly for the context of this paper, Germany retains one of the strongest and most competitive
industrial economies in Europe, and ha maintained very low levels of unemployment throughout the period considered.
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population. To our knowledge, we are among the first to bring two new factors, and the interac-
tion thereof, to the explanation of the electoral successes of right-wing parties. On the one hand,
we shed light on the role of long-standing, deeply ingrained political beliefs — this is especially
salient in Germany, a country that experienced a most destructive instance of fascism.7 On the
other hand, we emphasize the importance of political structures in facilitating the expression of
right-wing ideology.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 provides an introduction to the political context in
Germany. We describe the entry of the AfD and explain why we interpret it as a consequential
supply shock. Section 1.3 describes the data used. Section 1.4 presents the empirical analysis
linking historical support for the NSDAP with the AfD’s electoral results. In section 1.5, we study
potential demand-side shifts through opinion surveys. Section 1.6 provides an interpretation of
the combined results and of the underlying mechanisms. Section 1.7 concludes. Supplementary
Appendices provide further results.
1.2 Historical Context
1.2.1 The Political Landscape in Germany
After the collapse of the Nazi regime and Germany’s defeat in World War II, the reconstruction
of the political party system in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany, founded in
1949) faced two major challenges. First, rebuilding a system that would supersede the structural
weaknesses of the Weimar era and ensuring that the rise of an extremist party would be avoidable.
Second, integrating large swaths of the population actively involved in the Nazi dictatorship (8.5
million former card-carrying NSDAP party members) into the new democratic system. These
challenges were met both through the creation of new parties, and through special provisions in
the post-war constitution.
On the right side of the political spectrum, the main actor was the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU). It built on the previous experience of the Catholic “Zentrum” party, but explicitly tried
to appeal also to Protestant voters, who before the war largely supported nationalist/conservative
parties. The CDU (and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU) succeeded in the endeavor of becoming
the main, “big tent” conservative party in Germany, channeling nationalists, economic liberals, and
social conservatives into one party strongly supporting democratic values.
Political parties emerging to the right of the CDU in later years were unsuccessful, enjoying
7. Despite the availability of high-quality electoral data from the Weimar era, only few researchers have tried to
correlate post-war political outcomes in the Federal Republic of Germany with early Nazi support: Liepelt (1967)
showed that in 1966 there was a strong correlation between electoral successes of the NPD (a neo-Nazi party) and
the NSDAP in 1932. See also the early contributions by Kaltefleiter (1966), Kühnl, Rilling, and Sager (1969), Sahner
(1972), and Winkler (1994). Schwander and Manow (2017) point out how areas of AfD support voted for other,
far-right parties in the years before 2017; we also document this correlation, but emphasize how the correlation has
increased by an order of magnitude after the appearance of the AfD.
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at best very temporary support.8 The NPD (National Democratic Party) was founded in 1964
and enjoyed some temporary popularity in the late 1960, and then again in the late 2000s in East
Germany; the Republikaner (Republicans) were notable for their successes in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. However, no party ever managed to break through the 5% threshold of votes required
to gain representation in the Bundestag, the federal parliament.9
Another factor constraining the emergence and success of far-right parties was a provision in
the Basic Law (the post-war constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany) that enabled the
Constitutional Court to disband extremist parties on the left and the right. Article 21.2 of the
Basic Law states that “[p]arties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents,
seek to undermine or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the
Federal Republic of Germany shall be unconstitutional.” This article was invoked twice with success:
in 1952, the Constitutional Court outlawed the SRP (Sozialistische Reichspartei, Socialist Reich
Party), a party that had an openly neo-Fascist agenda and recruited former Nazi functionaries, and
in 1956 the communist party (KPD). This provision in the Basic Law was successful in disciplining
the extremeness of right-wing political platform even when it did not result in an explicit party
ban — the mere threat of disbandment sufficed.10
1.2.2 The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD)
In September 2012 three individuals — Bernd Lucke (an economics professor from Hamburg), a
former CDU politician, and a journalist — launched a manifesto to oppose the policies pursued by
the German government to fight the Euro crisis. The manifesto called for the foundation of a party,
the “Alternative for Germany” (Alternative für Deutschland, or AfD), and explicitly ruled out that
this party should take a stance on policy concerns other than the Euro crisis and the Greek bailout.
Running on this platform, the AfD won 4.7% of the votes in the federal election of September 2013,
only narrowly missing the 5% threshold to enter the Bundestag.
Following the federal election, the AfD gained further strength, obtaining 7.1% of the votes in
the European Parliament election of May 2014. This expansion meant that the party increasingly
attracted conservatives of all sorts. The tensions between the initial group of party members — eco-
8. Smaller parties on the right appealing to specific constituencies, such as the BHE (League of Expellees), targeting
the expellees losing their ancestral homelands after WWII, and the DP (German Party), appealing especially to war
veterans and northern German conservatives, quickly disappeared and were not represented in the federal parliament
after 1957.
9. The ability of the CDU/CSU to squeeze out all margins on the right end of the political spectrum, all the while
remaining solidly grounded in democratic and liberal principles, is well summarized by the long-time leader of the
CSU, Franz Josef Strauss, who quipped in 1986 that there “shall not be a democratically legitimate party to the right
of the CSU.”
10. The NPD was twice brought to the Constitutional Court, once in the early 2000s, when the case was dismissed
on formal grounds, and once in 2016-17, when the court ruled that, while the party’s ideology is unconstitutional, its
support is too small to undermine the democratic order and thus to justify its ban. See Conradt and Langenbacher
(2013) and Collings (2015) for an introduction to the German political system, and especially the roles of the 5%
threshold and the Constitutional court.
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nomics professors and fiscal conservatives — and the newer, national-conservative, anti-immigration
members became virulent in the spring of 2015 when two leading party functionaries published the
“Erfurt Resolution,” calling for a policy of opposition to the “social experiments of the past decades
(gender mainstreaming, multiculturalism) […]” and encouraged the party leadership to embrace the
xenophobic, anti-immigrant pegida (“Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West”)
movement. At the following party congress in Essen, in July 2015, Frauke Petry, representing the
conservative, anti-immigrant wing was unexpectedly elected party leader with 60% of the vote. The
congress in Essen sanctioned the takeover of the party by its right-wing, nationalistic faction; the
fiscal conservatives rallying around Bernd Lucke left the party.
The “new” AfD quickly adopted a very different rhetoric, moving away from the fiscally conser-
vative topics centering around the Euro and the Greek bailout, and focusing instead on mainstay
themes of the European populist right: immigration, nationalism, and islamophobia.11 As a conse-
quence, the AfD enjoyed considerable successes in the state elections held in 2016, obtaining over
20% of the votes in some states. The party leadership also moved further to the right. At the
federal election of September 2017 the AfD scored 12.6%, thus becoming the third largest force in
the German Parliament: the first time that a conservative party to the right of the CDU would
gain representation in the Bundestag.
1.2.3 The AfD: Offering a Low-Stigma, Right-Wing Political Option
We view the turn of the AfD from a monothematic, anti-Euro and anti-Greek bailout party to a
more traditional xenophobic, anti-immigrant right-wing party as a policy experiment in which an
existing party changes its placement on the political spectrum, without changing the name, logo,
or most of the party structures. For the first time in post-war German history, voters could choose
a political party with a staunchly right-wing profile, without the strong social stigma attached to
previously available fringe parties.
Clearly, this change was also perceived by the voters. In surveys conducted for the German
Longitudinal Election Study (gles), potential voters are asked to place parties on an 11-point
left-right scale.12 As shown in Figure 1.2, left panel, in 2013 voters were not sure where to place
the AfD on a left-right spectrum; the modal answer is the score of 6, right in the middle of the
spectrum, and the median is 7, just to the right of the center. Over the course of the following
years, the public perception of the party shifted radically, and in 2017 most respondents placed the
party to the far right (the rightmost answer, 11, is also the modal answer).13
11. subsection 1.8.3 documents this shift of the AfD, relative to all other German parties, through a semantic
analysis of the language used in party manifestos, political speeches, tweets and Facebook posts. Appendix Figure C1
and Figure C2 show, anecdotally, how this change was reflected in party billboards.
12. We use component 8 of the gles (Long-term online tracking), studies ZA5720, ZA5726, ZA5728, ZA5732. All
studies are available through the gesis website (www.gesis.org).
13. Appendix Figure F1 and Figure F2 provide the full distribution of answers to this survey, for all years and all
parties.
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Notes: The graphs show where GLES survey respondents placed different political parties on the left-right spectrum.
The graph on the left plots the kernel density histogram for the CDU (the mainstream conservative party) and the
AfD in both 2013 and 2017 (bandwidth=1.5). The graph on the right plots means and differences in means between
2013 and 2017 for all major German political parties. See Appendix Figure F2 for more detailed results.
A popular political interpretation is that the AfD filled the void left behind on the right side
of the spectrum by the CDU, who, under the leadership of Angela Merkel, had adopted a more
centrist stance. However, the survey evidence in Figure 1.2 shows that the CDU barely moved
in the public’s perception: the two kernel densities overlap almost perfectly. The right graph of
Figure 1.2 shows, analogously, that the mean perception of the AfD shifted dramatically to the
right between 2013 and 2017, while most other mainstream parties either stayed stable or moved
only slightly.14
Importantly, much more than any other right-wing party to the right of the CDU, the AfD
could claim a certain aura of respectability. This was true even after its more moderate, fiscally
conservative founders had left in 2015. As described by Arzheimer (2015, p. 540), its “success was
only possible because the party was formed by ‘moderates’ with very high SES, considerable civic
skills, and some political experience.” This distinguishes the AfD from other right-wing parties
such as the NPD or the Republikaner, who never managed to dismiss their extremist, even neo-
Nazi image. Such parties were strongly stigmatized in the political discourse of post-war Germany
and thus, lacking endorsement from “respectable” people, had difficulties in mobilizing any existing
voter potential (Güllner, 2016). In its first years, the AfD was very careful not to accept members
that had previously been active in organizations of the extreme right, and tried to avoid controversial
statements on Germany’s Nazi past or the Holocaust.15
14. The only exception is the CSU, the Bavarian sister party of the CDU. Its leftward move seems an aberration
of the 2017 survey; in all other years, the CSU is stable and slightly to the right of the CDU, consistent with its
law-and-order appeal (cf. Appendix Figure F2).
15. Most newly-founded extreme right-wing parties in Germany are immediately scrutinized by the German domestic
intelligence agency. By developing out of an existing, “bourgeois” party, the present-day AfD managed to avoid this
fate.
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The qualitative difference between the AfD and previously existing, more extreme right-wing
parties is also visible from the divergence between expressed voting intention in polls and actual
electoral results. For other right-wing parties, voters are reluctant to express their support even
in anonymous political surveys: in the gles, in most waves zero respondents (or low single-digit
numbers) declare support for the NPD, much lower than the figures expected from projecting
electoral results to the survey sample size. By contrast, while opinion polls often underestimate
true support for the AfD, the relative scope of such social stigma in surveys is much smaller than
for other right-wing parties such as the NPD.16
A final, important dimension of the AfD as a viable political option is that the party had —
prior to the federal election of September 2017 — a realistic chance of passing the 5% threshold and
entering parliament. In all state elections between 2016 and 2017 the AfD had passed the threshold
and obtained up to 24.1% of the vote. Voters in 2017 thus had the plausible expectation that the
AfD would pass the threshold at the national level and be represented in the Bundestag. A vote
for the AfD was thus not merely an act of protest/expressive voting, but could have instrumental
motives (Fiorina, 1976). This, again, distinguishes the AfD from other parties to the right of the
CDU, which never polled close to 5% nationally.
1.3 Data Description
1.3.1 Electoral Data
Our electoral data are drawn from the official website of the Federal Returning Officer (Bun-
deswahlleiter) for the federal elections to the Bundestag in September 2013 and 2017. The data
are provided at the municipality (Gemeinde) level. Data for the federal elections prior to 2013 are
obtained from destatis, the German federal statistical office. We purchased the municipality-level
tabulations of all elections from 1998 until 2009. We harmonize all results to reflect the geography
of municipalities in 2015; when municipalities are split and assigned to neighboring units, we assign
the outcomes fractionally based on population weights.17
For the electoral results of right-wing parties during the Weimar Republic, we make use of the
pathbreaking work of Jürgen Falter and Dirk Hänisch (Falter and Hänisch, 1990), who digitized
the votes for the Reichstag elections from 1920 until 1933 as published in the series Statistik des
Deutschen Reiches. In all years, except for the two elections of 1932 (July and November), electoral
16. In Appendix Figure F3, we calculate “stigma shares” as the ratio of actual electoral support relative to declared
support in the gles. A ratio of 0 would indicate a perfect correspondence between electoral results and polls. For the
NPD, the “stigma shares” are often equal to, or close to, 1: (almost) all of the actual support declared in electoral
results exceeds the support estimated from polls. For the AfD, the share is positive, indicating a certain amount of
reluctance to express support in polls, but considerably lower than for the NPD. As a term of comparison, the ratio
is negative for the Greens, suggesting that people are more willing to declare support for the party than actually to
vote for it.
17. This algorithm is explained in Supplementary Appendix 1.8.1
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results were published at the level of counties as a whole (Kreis or Stadtkreis), and then separately
for all municipalities above 2,000 inhabitants contained in a county.18
We match present-day electoral outcomes to the Weimar era party support through a geocoding
algorithm, in two steps: in the first step, we geocode the Weimar-era electoral entities (counties and
municipalities) listed in the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset, using a combination of historical
county shapefiles,19 current geodata from OpenStreetMap, and a variety of other online sources. In
the second step, we match modern electoral geographies to these geocoded entities. Supplementary
Appendix 1.8.1 describes this algorithm in detail.20
1.3.2 Other Variables
We complement our analysis of electoral results with a range of historical and contemporary control
variables. For the Weimar era, we rely on the same dataset by Falter and Hänisch (1990), which
also contains statistics on, among others, population, unemployment, employment structure, and
religious composition in 1925 and 1933. Population and religion data are available at the municipal
level (municipalities above 2,000 inhabitants), all other statistics are measured at the county level.
We include a variety of contemporary control variables in our electoral data regressions. These
comprise the total population of the municipality, unemployment rate, change of unemployment
rates between 2007 and 2017, and a full set of indicators characterizing the degree of urbanization
of a municipality.21 These data are obtained from destatis. Moreover, we use data on educational
attainment at the county level (share of workforce with tertiary degrees); the source of these data
is the inkar database.
The most salient political event happening in this time frame is the “(Syrian) refugee crisis”,
which peaked in the fall of 2015 after Germany’s decision to suspend the Dublin agreement and
not to deport asylum seekers back to the first EU member state they entered. While most asylum
seekers enter Germany through the German-Austrian border in the south-east of the country, they
are supposed to be reallocated to the single federal states, and then again to counties, according to
18. From this disaggregation, we can easily reconstruct the aggregate votes for all municipalities contained in a
county, but below the 2,000 inhabitants threshold (the “remainder of the county”). For the elections of 1932, no
data at a level of disaggregation below the county were published. After 1933, the new regime did not consider the
publication of disaggregated electoral results from past democratic elections a priority. We therefore cannot use the
1932 electoral results in our analysis.
19. Provided through the Census Mosaic project, http://www.censusmosaic.org.
20. Based on the geographic location, a current municipality is either matched to a city-county (Stadtkreis) of
the Weimar era, or to one of the municipalities whose electoral data is known because it had more than 2,000
inhabitants. We call these municipalities “exact matches”. The remaining municipalities are then assigned, based on
their location, to the entity “remainder of the county”, i.e. to the aggregate electoral results in a historical county,
outside the municipalities with more than 2,000 inhabitants. Typically, for any Weimar-era observation relating to
the “remainder of the county”, there will be several present-day municipalities matched. We account for this by
clustering our regression analysis at the level of observation in the Weimar era (Stadtkreis, municipality above 2,000
inhabitants, or “remainder of the county”).
21. Following eurostat guidelines, destatis classifies municipalities according to its urbanization density as follows:
“densely populated” if at least 50% of the population lives in high-density clusters, “thinly populated” if more than
50% of the population lives in rural grid cells, and “intermediate density” (all other municipalities).
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a quota system which takes into account population and GDP. Within counties, asylum seekers are
further assigned to municipalities according to a variety of criteria. From the Federal Employment
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit), we obtain the number of asylum seekers in each municipality,
as of December 31, 2016.22
Another major shock often blamed for the rise of right-wing populism is the loss of qualified
manufacturing jobs over the last decades, due to import competition from China or other low-wage
countries. We capture these forces through the “trade exposure” variable (import competition
minus export competition), measured at the county level, from Dauth, Findeisen, and Südekum
(2014).
Finally, we analyze public opinion data to investigate whether a localized shift towards more
right-wing viewpoints is responsible for the AfD’s electoral success. We use the German General
Social Survey (allbus), an opinion survey conducted as a repeated cross-section every two years




How did the emergence of the AfD as a new, relatively cheap (in terms of social image costs) and
viable political option to the right of the CDU result in a realignment of the electoral geography of
Germany, reflecting older patterns of Nazi party support? In our first, baseline research design we
compare electoral results for the AfD in the elections to the federal parliament in September 2013
and 2017: i.e., before and after 2015, the watershed year in which fiscal conservatives were replaced
by right-wing populists in the party leadership. In 2013, running on a strict anti-Euro platform,
the AfD barely missed passing the 5% threshold to enter the federal parliament; in 2017, the AfD
became the third largest force in the German Parliament, scoring 12.6%.23
Our baseline regression specification is as follows:
ShareAfD𝑖𝑡 = 𝜃𝑠 + 𝛽 ⋅ NSDAP𝑖 + 𝑥1𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, (1.1)
where ShareAfD𝑖𝑡 is the share of votes cast for the AfD in municipality 𝑖 in year 𝑡. Note that, in
our baseline setting, we calculate the share of votes relative to all eligible voters, not just relative to
votes cast. We do this in order to incorporate two margins of voter mobilization towards the AfD:
22. To be precise, the data from the Federal Employment Agency refer to Erwerbsfähige Leistungsberechtigte im
Kontext von Fluchtmigration, i.e. potential transfer recipients, able to work, in the context of escape migration. This
includes, roughly, all asylum applicants who are above age 15, not disabled, excluding family members who join first
emigrants at a later stage.
23. Note that we ignore the elections in the Saarland as the Saar region did not vote for the Reichstag in the Weimar
era, being under French occupation).
12
switching from non-voting to the AfD, or from other parties to the AfD. The dependent variable is
regressed on a full set of state fixed effects, 𝜃𝑠, the (standardized) vote share of the NSDAP party
in 1933, NSDAP𝑖, and in some specifications also a set of municipal-level covariates, 𝑥1𝑖, such as
population or unemployment rates. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, all variables,
dependent and explanatory, are standardized.
To take care of municipal-level, time-invariant omitted factors that may determine a constant
inclination to vote for the AfD, the following specification takes advantage of the fact that each
municipality is observed twice and focuses on the change in vote share from 2013 to 2017:
Δ(ShareAfD𝑖,2017−2013) = 𝜃𝑠 + 𝛽 ⋅ NSDAP𝑖 + 𝑥2𝑖′𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1.2)
Even though the effect of time-invariant municipality characteristics are “differenced out” in such
a first-differences specification, one may still want to allow for time-varying effects of covariates,
or investigate changes in municipal-level covariates occurring between 2013 and 2017. For these
reasons, we may also include a vector of covariates 𝑥2𝑖, potentially different from the covariates
included in Equation 1.1.
Of the 10,963 municipalities in the sample, 2,466 are exactly matched to the same municipality
in the Weimar era; the remaining municipalities are assigned one of 259 Weimar-era “remainders of
a county”.24 To account for potential correlation between these multiple observations assigned to a
single historical electoral result, we cluster all error terms 𝜀𝑖𝑡 at the Weimar-era unit of observation
(either exactly matched municipality, or “remainder of the county”).
1.4.2 Baseline Electoral Results and Spatial Correlations
Table 1.1 report our first results. The first column shows that the historical relationship between
NSDAP votes and AfD support in 2013 is positive, but small and insignificant. However, looking
at support for the AfD in the federal election of 2017, the results are very different. The correlation
between past Nazi support and contemporary AfD support, in 2017, when the AfD represented a
populist right, xenophobic platform, is strong and significant. In the baseline result of column 2, a
one standard deviation increase in NSDAP votes in the Weimar era corresponds to a 0.056 standard
deviations higher vote share for the AfD.
The effect is very similar when the dependent variable is defined as the 2013 to 2017 change
vote share going to the AfD (column 3). To address further concerns about small municipalities
today being matched across time to a large unit representing the “remainder of a county” in 1933,
we show that results are also robust to aggregating municipal-level data to the (present-day) county
level (column 4).
24. More precisely: 2,466 municipalities are either matched to a Stadtkreis (city-county) of the Weimar era, or to
a municipality contained in a larger county, but which had more than 2,000 inhabitants in the Weimar era. The
remaining present-day municipalities cover regions for which the Weimar-era records report only aggregates at the
level of “remainder of a county”.
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Table 1.1: First Results











NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0036 0.0573∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0768∗∗∗ -0.0084
(0.0263) (0.0195) (0.0180) (0.0266) (0.0169)
NSDAP 1933 [std.]
× Soviet Zone 0.1970∗∗∗
(0.0656)
NSDAP 1933 [std.]
× UK Zone 0.0099
(0.0254)
NSDAP 1933 [std.]
× French Zone 0.1610∗∗∗
(0.0440)
Observations 10957 10957 10957 392 10957
𝑅2 0.164 0.679 0.656 0.780 0.661
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized gross vote share of the AfD, i.e. the
number of valid votes relative to eligible voters. The explanatory variable is the NSDAP
vote share in March 1933. All variables (explanatory and dependent) are standardized.
Columns 1-3 and 5 include all municipalities in all German states apart from city states
(Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the Saarland. Column 4 provides a regression on the
county level. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of historic municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
Finally, in column 5 we investigate whether the persistence effect is stronger in certain areas
than in others. Level effects, such as the much higher electoral success of the AfD in former East
Germany, are already captured by the full set of state (Bundesland) fixed effects included in all
regressions, yet there may still be differences between states in the gradient of historical correlation
between the 1930s and today. As a first take, we divide Germany into four regions, corresponding
to the post-war Allied occupation zones. The regression in column 5 shows that persistence was
essentially nil in the US occupation zone (the omitted category) and in the UK zone; that is, in the
north and in the south of (former) West Germany. At the other extreme, persistence is highest in
the former Soviet occupation zone (“East Germany”, or the former German Democratic Republic),
and is also high in the French occupation zone (in the south-west). These correlations are consistent
with historians’ take on the effectiveness of Denazification (Biddiscombe, 2007; Taylor, 2011).
How large, quantitatively, is the explanatory power of our proposed determinant of right-wing
voting? The baseline regressions suggest that our proposed channel amounts to about 6% in terms
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of standardized effect sizes. In the Appendix, we compare this result to the effect of other plausible
determinants of populist right-wing voting that have been extensively discussed in the literature:
unemployment levels, changes in unemployment levels from before the great recession until today,
increase in trade exposure, and the allocation of refugees in municipalities (see Appendix Table D1).
The beta coefficients for the correlations estimated there are in a similar range of magnitude (2–
10% in absolute terms) as the beta coefficient relating to the NSDAP vote share. A comparison
of the partial 𝑅2 values of these explanatory factors leads to similar conclusions. This simple
variance decomposition thus suggests that, while cultural persistence clearly is only one among
many factors associated with the rise of populist right-wing parties, the magnitude of the correlation
is comparable to other factors often mentioned in the literature.
Figure 1.3 provides an exemplary geographic depiction of the electoral patterns studies here.25 In
these maps, every hexagon corresponds to one municipality. Panel A shows the outcome (NSDAP
vote shares) of the 1933 election; Panel B the outcome of the 2017 election (AfD vote shares).
Some smooth, broad spatial gradients are evident, as well as apparently very idiosyncratic, highly
localized patterns of variation in party support.
Panel C combines these two spatial distributions and displays areas of historical continuity in
voting patterns. To provide a visual comparison, we divide municipalities into terciles of NSDAP
and of AfD vote shares (lower, middle and upper terciles), resulting in 9 possible combinations.
Municipalities that conform to our hypothesis were in the lower (middle, upper) tercile of NSDAP
support in 1933, and are in the lower (middle, upper) tercile of AfD support today. We color these
municipalities in shades of blue. The remaining municipalities are those in which NSDAP results in
1933 do not map into current outcomes for the AfD: e.g, municipalities with high rates of NSDAP
support historically, but low support for the AfD today. They are colored in grey. As Panel C
shows, a large number of municipalities are conforming to our hypothesis: at the high, middle, and
low end of the range of right-wing support.26
The electoral patterns visible in Figure 1.3 suggest that spatial correlation of the variables, while
present, is not very high. In recent research, Kelly (2019) points out how a large part of the literature
examining historical persistence relies on highly spatially clustered variables or “treatments”. In
fact, the spatial autocorrelation of residuals — an important diagnostic test suggested by Kelly
(2019) — is very low in our setting: for the baseline estimate of Table 1.1, column 3, the value
of Moran’s 𝐼 is 0.04. To further investigate the robustness of our findings to a varying degree of
spatial autocorrelation, we follow the advice by Colella et al. (2019) and report Conley standard
errors, allowing for varying cutoffs (from 1 to 200km). Figure 1.4 shows that the baseline point
25. Figure 1.3 focuses on a region in North/Central Germany, between Bremen, Hanover, Dortmund, and Kassel,
at the intersection of four states (Lower Saxony, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Thuringia). We provide full
maps of Germany with the electoral results in 1933, 2017, and a comparison of the two — for all 10,963 German
municipalities — in subsection 1.8.2.
26. There are also a few notable areas that do not support our hypothesis; notably, the northeastern quadrant, and
the area south of Hanover. We will discuss those exceptions further below.
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estimate of 0.611 remains significant even under very extreme assumptions about the degree of
spatial autocorrelation.
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Figure 1.3: Electoral Persistence
Notes: The map shows electoral results, at the municipal level, for a subset of Germany. The area covers a region in
the North/Center. Major cities are indicated. Every hexagon corresponds to one municipality. Panel A shows vote
shares obtained by the NSDAP in the 1933 election; Panel B shows vote shares obtained by the AfD in 2017. The
color scale corresponds to quintiles. Panel C evidences areas of historical persistence. Blue hexagons (of different
shades) indicate municipalities that were both in the upper (middle, lower) tercile of NSDAP votes in 1933, and in
the upper (middle, lower) tercile of AfD votes in 2017. Grey hexagons are municipalities in which NSDAP support
is not correlated with current AfD support. Panel D displays the spatial distribution of post-WWII expellees as a
fraction of resident population in ca. 1950.
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Figure 1.4: Varying Spatial Correlation Cutoff Distances



















Notes: Figure shows coefficients and confidence intervals from regressions of the standardized difference in AfD gross
vote share 2017-2013 on standardized historical vote share for the NSDAP in 1933. Blue, black, cyan confidence bands
represent 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence interval bounds respectively. Regressions correct for spatial autocorellation
at different cutoff distances (x-axis). A distance linear decay is imposed in the spatial correlation structure. Sample
includes all municipalities in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the
Saarland. All regressions include state fixed effects. Code from Colella et al. (2019).
1.4.3 Persistence of Conservatism or Antisemitism?
The previous tables have shown how the pattern of historical Nazi vote shares is correlated with
current AfD support. It is, however, crucial to better define this historical legacy. What exactly
constitutes this ideological complexion that shaped the electoral geography of the 1930s, and that,
in our interpretation, was manifested again in voting after 2015?
A defining feature of the NSDAP was its antisemitism, and the seminal work by Voigtländer
and Voth (2012, 2015) has shown how antisemitism is a persistent feature of certain regions in
Germany. In Table 1.2 we argue, however, that antisemitism is not what explains the success of
the AfD in more recent years. In each one of the columns, we vary the definition of the explanatory
variable, while the dependent variable remains the electoral success of the AfD (change in gross
vote share, 2017–2013). Again, all coefficients can be interpreted as standardized beta coefficients.
We first compare the correlation between AfD results and the vote shares of the NSDAP in
two other elections, 1930 and 1928.27 In 1928 the NSDAP was still a fringe party, virulently
antisemitic, obtaining only 2.6% of the votes at the national level; in 1930, after having toned
down its antisemitic rhetoric and with messages trying to appeal to a broader public, it obtained
18.3% of the votes. As the results in Table 1.2, columns 1 and 2, show, electoral support for the
27. In 1924, the NSDAP did not present a separate list for the Reichstag election, but supported the Deutschvölkische
Freiheitspartei (DVFP). The electoral results of 1932 were not published at the disaggregate level.
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Table 1.2: Right-Wing Ideology vs. Antisemitism
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.0376∗ 0.0189 -0.0401∗∗ 0.0830∗∗∗ 0.0503∗∗∗ 0.0134 -0.0771∗∗





















Cities Sample ✓ ✓ ✓
Observations 10944 10906 10740 10740 767 767 767
𝑅2 0.654 0.654 0.655 0.657 0.53 0.522 0.526
Notes: The dependent variable is the standardized 2017-2013 difference in gross vote shares of the AfD, i.e. the number of valid
votes relative to eligible voters. The column header indicates the respective explanatory variable used. All variables (explanatory
and dependent) are standardized, except the indicator variable for Black Death Pogroms in column (7), which has a mean of 0.251.
The explanatory variable in column (6) is the standardized first principal component of six measures of 1920s/30s antisemitism,
as in Voigtländer and Voth (2012). Sample includes municipalities in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg,
and Bremen), and the Saarland. Columns (5) to (7) restrict the sample to those towns used in Voigtländer and Voth (2012). All
regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of historic municipalities/counties. One, two and
three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
NSDAP in 1928 and in 1930 is also correlated with today’s successes of the AfD. However, the
largest correlation obtains with the results in 1933, when the NSDAP is less openly antisemitic
than in 1928 and 1930, and is closer to a big-tent right-wing populist party appealing to varied
constituencies, eager to take (absolute) power.
The Reichstag election of 1924 provides a convenient experiment to discriminate between per-
sistent antisemitism and persistent right-wing ideology. Two right-wing parties were on the ballot:
the Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) and the Deutschvölkische Freiheitspartei (DVFP). The
DNVP was the main conservative party of the Weimar era, before the emergence of the NSDAP:
nationalist, reactionary, monarchist. The DVFP was split off the DNVP, as some of its members
thought it should be more explicitly antisemitic. As the results in columns 3 and 4 show, the elec-
toral success of the AfD is highly correlated with the staunchly conservative party in the Weimar
era (the DNVP), but not with its antisemitic spin-off (the DVFP).
Finally, in columns 5–7 of Table 1.2 we limit the analysis to the 796 cities that are featured
both in our dataset and in the seminal work by Voigtländer and Voth (2012) on persistence of an-
tisemitism. In column 5, we first confirm that our baseline estimate of Table 1.1 can be replicated,
with broadly similar results, within those 796 cities. In column 6 we then regress the AfD’s elec-
toral fortunes on the composite measure created by Voigtländer and Voth (2012): a z-score index
encompassing six measures of antisemitism in the 1920s and 30s.28 The correlation is positive, but
28. This index included measures for: pogroms in the 1920s, the share of DVFP votes 1924, the share of NSDAP
votes 1928, letters to the Stürmer (an antisemitic newspaper), deportations per 100 Jews in 1933, and an indicator
variable for whether a synagogue was destroyed (or damaged).
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smaller and only marginally significant. Finally, in column 7 we use the indicator variable for the
occurrence of pogroms in the wake of the Black Death of 1348. The correlation between medieval
hatred of Jews and AfD support is in fact negative and significant.
These findings suggest that what persisted between the Weimar era and today, and determines
the AfD’s electoral success, is not antisemitism but rather a broadly conservative, right-wing ide-
ology.29 Rather, the common ground between the NSDAP in 1933 and the AfD in its post-2015
incarnation is more likely to be found in nationalism, outgroup hatred, and xenophobia.
This hypothesis — a deeply-seated cultural conservatism that correlates with both the electoral
success of the NSDAP and of the AfD — is corroborated by the results in Table 1.3. Here, we
examine how the baseline correlations vary depending on the inclusion of controls. We consider
both controls relating to more transient, arguably endogenous economic conditions, and controls
relating to more fundamental cultural traits.
We start with our preferred specification of Table 1.1, column 3, using the change in AfD votes
from 2013 to 2017 as the dependent variable. We then successively add covariates, measured both
historically (variables that may explain the predominance of NSDAP voters in the 1920s and 30s)
and in contemporary terms (present-day sociodemographics as correlates of electoral outcomes).
Column 1 of Table 1.3 first presents the baseline estimate (without controls) as a benchmark. In the
following columns, we add variables related to population, employment structures, and education.
In Panel A, we only include the controls relating to the Weimar era. In Panel B, we only include
the controls relating to the present day. Finally, in Panel C we repeat each regression including
both historical and contemporary controls.
Column 2 considers the domain of “population”: we control either for the (log) size of the
municipality in the 1920s/30s, or for its size today, or for all of these variables together. In
neither case is the baseline estimate modified substantially. Column 3 considers another major
set of determinants of voting behavior: the occupational structure and economic conditions. We
control for sectoral employment shares and unemployment rates (in 1933 and/or today). Across
all panels, including these controls does not affect the baseline correlation between historical Nazi
support and contemporary votes for the AfD (if anything, the correlation becomes stronger). The
same conclusion holds true when one considers controls for contemporary or past educational levels
(column 4).
As opposed to the variables presented so far, religion is arguably a deeply seated cultural
trait: the denominational map of Germany has been set in the 16th century and barely changed
since. Religion is also a well-known driver of electoral behavior (see, e.g., Spenkuch and Tillmann,
2017): Catholic regions were substantially less likely to vote for the NSDAP. Consequently, when
in column 5 we control for contemporary and/or past shares of religious groups (Catholics, Jews,
29. In fact, the AfD is so far publicly bent on keeping antisemitism out of its official policy platforms and taking an
explicitly pro-Israel stance; its religious animus is clearly more directed against Islam. At the same time, however,
several elected officials of the AfD have expressed antisemitic attitudes.
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others), the magnitude of estimated coefficients is reduced substantially, although not entirely.
Taken together, these results suggest that certain communities, often (but not exclusively) char-
acterized by a Protestant religious majority, nurture a consistently conservative social environment.
When a corresponding political option is on the electoral menu, as during the Weimar republic and
then again after 2015, this right-wing ideology is also expressed in electoral results. Importantly,
this phenomenon is ideologically and geographically distinct from the historical persistence of an-
tisemitism documented elsewhere.
1.4.4 Contextual and Mediating Factors
In the following table, we consider more closely other control variables. A common characteristic
of the factors examined here is that they can have two roles. The first concern is that some other
shocks, such as the refugee crisis of 2015, might coincidentally and spuriously give rise to similar
patterns of electoral support, confounding the interpretation of findings. A second concern is that
certain variables may have the role of mediating factors: interacting with the historical legacy of
right-wing leaning, either amplifying or dampening it.
In each of the columns of Table 1.4, we run a regression of this type
Δ(ShareAfD𝑖,2017−2013) = 𝜃𝑠 + 𝛽 ⋅ NSDAP𝑖 + 𝛾 ⋅ C𝑖 + 𝛿 ⋅ NSDAP𝑖 ⋅C𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 , (1.3)
where C𝑖 is a control variable, measured at the municipal (or county) level. 𝛾 indicates whether
this control variable has a direct effect (not necessarily with a causal interpretation) on the AfD’s
electoral success; 𝛿 measures to what extent this factor interacts with the electoral geography
of 1933. All variables are converted to z-scores, so that the coefficients can be interpreted as
standardized beta coefficients, and 𝛽 thus measures the effect of NSDAP support at average levels
of C𝑖.
Arguably the most important political event in Germany in 2015 was the sudden and dramatic
influx of refugees, mostly fleeing the Syrian civil war. Hundreds of thousands of them reached Ger-
many on foot starting in September 2015. Refugees were allocated to states and counties according
to their size and GDP; however, within counties, the allocation of refugees to municipalities was
idiosyncratic. The effect of the refugee inflow on votes for the far right is ambiguous. On the one
hand, refugees are often perceived as a threat and a potential source of crime, moving voters to
the right (Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Piil Damm, 2016); on the other hand, in line with Allport’s
(1954) “contact hypothesis”, direct acquaintance with refugees could actually increase empathy
and support for moderate parties (Steinmayr, 2017).
After presenting the baseline result again in Table 1.4, column 1, in column 2 we control for
the presence of refugees in each municipality (calculated as a share relative to total population, as
of December 2016). The effect is slightly negative but insignificant, suggesting that more refugees
led, if anything, to fewer votes for the AfD. The coefficient for the direct effect of Nazi vote
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shares is, however, hardly affected, and the interaction term is very small and not significant.
This is also consistent with the observation that the allocation of refugees across Germany was
fairly orthogonal to patterns of NSDAP support: as reported at the bottom of the table, the
partial correlation between the control variable and the NSDAP vote shares is negative and small
(correlation coefficient, conditional on state fixed effects: -0.09).
To gauge the magnitude of the interaction term, we present (just below the coefficient) estimates
of the effect of a one standard deviation increase in NSDAP support at the 25th and 75th percentile
of the control variable (in this case, refugee presence). Corresponding to a small interaction term,
this “interquartile range” of the effects is very narrow, from 6.0% to 6.5% in terms of standardized
beta coefficients.
Globalization, the decline of manufacturing, and a decrease in job security are often cited as
a cause of the far right’s recent electoral fortunes. Overall, Germany had a comparatively strong
economy in the time frame considered, and among developed countries it remains among those with
the highest shares of employment in (skilled) manufacturing, and the lowest rates of unemployment,
also among youths. In fact, across the municipalities in our dataset, between 2007 (before the great
recession) and 2017 the unemployment rate decreased by 1.52 percentage points on average.
Levels of unemployment are positively correlated with votes going to the AfD (column 3). The
corresponding interaction term is however nearly zero. In column 4, we control for the change in
unemployment (between 2007 and 2017); in column 5, we control for a likely major determinant of
changes in unemployment, the increase in trade exposure due to the opening of markets to products
from Eastern Europe and the Far East.30 In both cases, the results are somewhat surprising, as areas
with increases in unemployment (or trade competition) are associated with higher AfD vote shares.
Yet the interaction term is very small, and thus the effect of NSDAP voting largely unaffected.
Columns 6 and 7 consider possible mitigating factors that, over the decades since the end of the
Nazi regime, might have reduced the vertical transmission of right-wing ideology. First, we look
at population growth of municipalities, from the 1930s until today (column 6). Here, neither the
direct effect, nor the interaction term are economically large or significant.
Finally, column 7 looks at one major historical event that had the potential of substantially
altering the social structure of communities between the 1930s and today: the influx into post-
war Germany of over 12 million ethnic German refugees (called Heimatvertriebene, or “expellees”)
from the areas ceded to other countries after 1945 (Poland, Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia). These
people, having left their homes and fleeing without possessions, were distributed across Germany
following idiosyncratic patterns, based on their ports of entry, but also on the availability of housing
stock. They brought their values and traditions from their home regions — Silesia, Pomerania,
East Prussia, Sudeten — into present-day Germany, partly maintaining their identities but also
30. We follow the definition of our data source (Dauth, Findeisen, and Südekum, 2014) and capture trade exposure
as the difference between import competition and export competition. As an example, regions of Germany specializing
in the garment industry score very high on this measure, whereas regions with car factories score low.
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integrating rapidly (Bauer, Braun, and Kvasnicka, 2013). As such, one would expect areas with a
stronger influx of refugees to exhibit less historical persistence, as the vertical transmission of values
will be affected by this massive reshuffling of populations. Moreover, the experience of having to
integrate and give housing to expellees might have turned the local populations more sympathetic
to the plight of refugees and more open to outsiders
In fact, the direct effect of the presence of expellees is positive and significant. This is consistent
with the observation that there is a positive correlation (0.224) between areas of historical Nazi
support and areas where expellees are allocated, but also that expellees have traditionally supported
more conservative parties. However, we estimate also a large, negative and significant interaction
term, suggesting that more expellees weaken the historical persistence of right-wing voting. This
effect is also quantitatively important. Communities at the 75th percentile of the distribution of
expellees presence witness almost no effect of NSDAP voting on AfD results (point estimate: -
0.0293). Figure 1.5 displays the marginal effect of historical NSDAP support at different levels of
expellees presence.
The presence of expellees also helps explaining the areas of the electoral map of Germany in
which little or no persistence occurred. Areas with a very strong influx of expellees, especially the
North (Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg) and Bavaria, where many of the Sudeten
Germans were relocated, display the lowest degree of persistence (see Appendix Figure B3). This
is also visible in Figure 1.3, Panel D: the areas northeast and south of Hanover, where electoral
results are not correlated across time (grey hexagons in Panel C), are also the ones with the highes
shares of expellees among post-war population.
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Figure 1.5: Persistence, Depending on 1950s Expellees Share











0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .45
Share Expellees 1950s
Notes: The graph shows a marginal effect plot of the (standardized) NSDAP 1933 vote share on the (standardized)
2017–13 difference in AfD gross vote shares for different shares of 1950s expellees. Code courtesy of Matt Golder.
24
Table 1.3: Results Including Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Population Employment Education Religion
Panel A: With historical controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0553∗∗∗ 0.0752∗∗∗ 0.0551∗∗ 0.0129
(0.0180) (0.0188) (0.0261) (0.0244) (0.0176)
Observations 10957 10889 8080 9416 10263
Panel B: With contemporary controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0470∗∗ 0.0605∗∗∗ 0.0557∗∗∗ 0.0233
(0.0180) (0.0204) (0.0175) (0.0190) (0.0176)
Observations 10957 10957 10847 10957 10143
Panel C: With historical and contemporary controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.0457∗∗ 0.0666∗∗∗ 0.0541∗∗ 0.0046
(0.0180) (0.0206) (0.0252) (0.0249) (0.0195)
Observations 10957 10889 7996 9416 9809
Notes: The dependent variable is the (standardized) change in vote share for the AfD (relative to eligi-
ble voters) from 2013 to 2017. Each column adds a different set of control variables. The explanatory
variable across all columns is the 1933 NSDAP vote share (standardized). Population controls are:
[historical] log population size (1933); [contemporary] log population size in 2015 and urbanization
code dummies (3 categories). Employment controls are: [historical] shares of employed in industry
and manufacturing, employed in trade and commerce, and employed in administration (agriculture
and “other sectors” is the omitted category), all measured in 1925, as well as the unemployment share
in 1933; [contemporary] the unemployment rate in 2015. Education controls are: [historical] share
of white collar workers (“Angestellte und Beamte”); [contemporary] share of workers with university
degree in 2015. Religion controls are: [historical] the share of Catholics and Jews; [contemporary]
the share of Catholics and “Others” (i.e., Muslims, other religions, and no religion). Sample includes
municipalities in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the
Saarland. All regressions include state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the level of





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.4.5 A Long-Term Perspective
Thus far, we have compared the electoral results of the AfD in 2013 vs. 2017. Our interpretation
rested on the premise that the “reinvention” of the AfD as a populist right-wing party in 2015
represented a shift in the supply of political platforms in Germany: for the first time, a rather
respectable and plausibly effective right-wing party was available in the electoral menu. Yet even
before 2015, German voters had the option of choosing one of the other far-right parties on the
ballot, such as the NPD or the Republikaner. These parties, however, had a more extreme image
than the AfD, with clear neo-Nazi fringes. Moreover, none of these parties had a realistic chance of
passing the 5% threshold required to enter the federal parliament, so that a vote for those parties
was purely expressive, protest voting. Voting for these parties thus was very “costly:” in terms of
social image, and in terms of an arguably lost vote.
We analyze the correlation between historical Nazi vote shares and the electoral results of these
parties in all federal elections from 1998 until today. For every election, we calculate the share
of votes going to all parties explicitly to the right of the CDU: NPD, DVU, Republikaner, and
Die Rechte. In 2017, we add the vote share of the AfD as well. We then study the correlation of
aggregate far-right vote share with the historical vote share of the NSDAP in 1933, following the
baseline regression setup of equation (1.1), only using this more encompassing measure of right-wing
support as the dependent variable.
Figure 1.6 displays point estimates and 95% confidence intervals for these regressions, run
separately for every election year. The upper graph uses absolute vote shares as the dependent
variable. The correlation between NSDAP vote share and far-right vote shares is positive and
significant in all years, but experiences a major jump in the election of 2017, when the AfD is
included. In 2013 and prior years, one standard deviation higher NSDAP vote is associated with
approximately 0.1 percentage points higher vote shares for far right parties, whereas this coefficient
rises to 0.65 in 2017.
Part of this increased correlation may simply be mechanical, as the total number of votes going
to far-right parties increases considerably once the AfD is added to the camp.31 For this reason,
the lower panel of Figure 1.6 uses standardized vote shares for every year. By doing this, we take
care of the large level jump in absolute votes, and focus only on the spatial variation irrespective of
levels. The results, however, are qualitatively identical. There is a small, positive, and significant
correlation in all years, but the magnitude of the correlation increases fourfold once the AfD is in
the choice set of voters.32
31. The highest vote shares obtained by far-right parties prior to 2017 were 1.8% for the Republikaner in 1998, and
1.6% for the NPD in 2005, much less than the 12.6% of votes going to the AfD in 2017.
32. Appendix Table D4 shows the results of running the analysis in a panel setting, pooling all electoral years and
testing whether the effect of past NSDAP support changes in 2017. Figure D1 shows that this jump between 2017
and all previous years is unique to the far-right parties; no other major party experienced a similar discontinuity. Our
analyses so far are limited to the elections from 1998 onwards. Electoral data for elections back to 1980 are available
from destatis, however no digital maps of municipal borders and electoral constituencies for the years before 1998
exist. We can however limit ourselves to the subset of municipalities that could be matched manually, through their
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Figure 1.6: Persistence of (Generic) Far-Right Voting
Notes: The graphs show coefficients and confidence intervals of regressions of far right vote shares (NPD, DVU,
Republikaner, Die Rechte, and AfD in 2017) on the standardized NSDAP vote share in March 1933. In the first
graph, the dependent variable is the absolute vote share; in the second graph, the standardized vote share for far-right
parties. The sample includes modern municipalities in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and
Bremen), and the Saarland. Municipalities are projected to 2015 borders using population-weighted raster techniques
(see 1.8.1 for more detail). Standard errors are clustered at the level of the historical vote shares.
numeric code, to the period 1980–1998. Figure D2 replicates the main results in this sample.
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1.5 Survey Results
1.5.1 Data and Empirical Setup
So far, we have documented that municipalities with stronger support for the Nazi party in 1933
now have a stronger vote base for the AfD. Our interpretation of this finding is that the AfD,
by expanding the electoral platform and representing a respectable and viable political option,
has “activated” an existing demand for right-wing ideology and channeled it into manifest voting
actions. An alternative to this supply-side interpretation would be that an overall rightward shift
in public sentiment, i.e. a shift in attitudes, led to the persistence we find.
To generate the same patterns that we have observed so far — little or no correlation between
Nazi voting and AfD/right-wing support in 2013 and before, and a positive correlation in 2017 —
such a demand-side interpretation would require that municipalities with a past history of Nazi
support have turned more righ-wing between 2013 and 2017. For example, it could be that these
municipalities are “bellwether” regions, turning to the extreme earlier or more strongly than others
when confronted with shocks such as the Great Depression in the 1930s, or the influx of refugees in
2015. We thus ask: did a simultaneous change in attitudes occur in areas with historically strong
Nazi support between 2013 and 2017?
We analyze this question using the German General Social Survey (allbus) from the Leibniz
Institute for the Social Sciences (gesis). The allbus survey provides rich data on attitudes and
political opinions in Germany, and is conducted every two years as a repeated cross-section. To
link our historical electoral results with the allbus data, we obtained access to the restriced-use
allbus with municipality indicators. We successfully matched 1,273 municipalities in the survey
sample, with a total of 39,449 individual observations (across all waves from 1996 until 2016).
The allbus is a very extensive survey with scores of different questions. At the same time, right-
wing ideology might comprise a large spectrum of different attitudes. We therefore want to capture
broad changes in attitudes that are only imperfectly measured by any single survey question, while
addressing concerns about multiple hypothesis testing. For this purpose, we construct standardized
indices for different categories of attitudes pertaining broadly to right-wing ideology.
We first identify all pertinent questions and categorize them into seven broad categories: (i)
xenophobia, (ii) attitudes toward Islam, (iii) antisemitism, (iv) disenchantment with politicians,
(v) gender attitudes, (vi) pride to be German, and (vii) left-right self-evaluation. As not every
question in the allbus is asked in every wave and to every participant, we split up the categories
xenophobic attitudes and gender attitudes into two subcategories, based on the survey cycle in
which the questions are asked.33
In a second step, we recode all questions into variables between 0 and 1, with higher values
indicating more right-wing attitudes. Within every (sub)category, we create an index following
33. Appendix 1.8.5 provides a detailed overview of the questions used for the indices.
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Anderson (2008): each component is standardized, and then all z-scores are added up to a summary
index (which is, in turn, standardized), weighting each component by the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the standardized components.34 When a category consists of only one survey question
(disenchantment with politicians, pride to be German, and left-right self-evaluation) we simply
standardize the outcome. Finally, we also construct a summary index of all our outcome indices,
again following the procedure by Anderson (2008).35
We analyze changes in attitudes through a simple regression setup:
Attitude𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜑𝑠(𝑖) + 𝛽 ⋅ NSDAP𝑗 + 𝛾 ⋅ NSDAP𝑗 ⋅ 1𝑡=2016 + 𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝜉 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (1.4)
where Attitude𝑖𝑗𝑡 are index values (or standardized responses) as described above, pertaining to
individual 𝑖 in municipality 𝑗, in wave 𝑡. NSDAP𝑗 is the municipal-level Nazi vote share in 1933,
𝜃𝑡 are year fixed effects and 1𝑡=2016 is an indicator for the year 2016. To account for the differences
between states, all regressions include a full set of state fixed effects 𝜑𝑠(𝑖). Standard errors are
clustered at the level of variation of NSDAP𝑗.36
If municipalities that supported the Nazi party in 1933 exhibit persistent right-wing ideology,
this will be reflected by a positive point estimate on 𝛽.37 Crucially for our hypothesis, we expect
the interaction coefficient 𝛾 to be indistinguishable from zero, suggesting that no significant shift in
attitudes occurred between 2014 and 2016 in those municipalities with a history of Nazi support.
1.5.2 Results: Right-Wing Attitudes
Table 1.5 summarizes our results. First, we focus on the estimates of 𝛽, i.e. the time-invariant effect
of past NSDAP support. Throughout the (sub)categories, we find that a history of Nazi support is
positively, sometimes significantly, correlated with more right-wing attitudes today, after more than
half a century. The effect is particularly pronounced for attitudes towards immigration, towards
islamic religious teaching in public schools, and disenchantment with politicians. Consistently with
the evidence in Section 1.4.3, we find a positive but small and insignificant effect on antisemitic
attitudes (column 5).38 Higher levels of Nazi support are also only weakly correlated with attitudes
towards women, national pride, or a generic left-right self-evaluation (columns 7–10).
34. Since the resulting index is standardized as well, it allows for easy comparison of the estimated magnitudes.
This weighting maximizes the amount of information captured by the z-score index. We show that our results are
robust to using an equally-weighted index in Appendix Table E3 and Table E4.
35. Appendix Table E5 shows that these indices are correlated with stated voting intentions for the AfD. In Table E6,
we focus on the question about left-right self-evaluation (which is asked regularly in every wave), and show that a
more right-wing self-evaluation in the allbus is predictive of AfD voting intentions in 2016, but not in 2014.
36. Alternatively, one can aggregate responses to the municipal level, 𝑗. We show the corresponding analysis in
Appendix Table E1.
37. To the extent that some sensitive questions, such as those about antisemitic or xenophobic attitudes, will be
affected by social desirability bias, our estimates will be biased downward.
38. Note that our finding complements Voigtländer and Voth (2015), who find that anti-Semitic attitudes are
particularly pronounced only for allbus respondents who grew up under the Nazi regime.
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Our summary index of the indices (column 11) captures the broad thrust of findings: people
living in historically Nazi supporting areas have more right-wing attitudes today. In panel B, we
introduce individual-level controls such as age, gender, education, income levels, or citizenship.
The inclusion of controls reduces magnitude and significance of most estimates; yet all cases, 𝛽
remains non-negative. The estimate on the global index of column 11 suggests that an increase
in historical NSDAP support by one standard deviation is associated with approximately 5% of a
standard deviation more right-wing attitudes.
We now consider the estimates of 𝛾, i.e. the interaction term between NSDAP voting and a
2016 indicator, to investigate whether there is a shift in attitudes in 2016 for those municipalities
with strong Nazi support in 1933. Our evidence in Table 1.5 shows that all interaction terms
are insignificant and often negative. There is a positive, marginally significant effect in the case of
disenchantment with politicians (column 6), which however is not robust to the inclusion of controls.
The only consistent effect is a negative estimate in column 3, suggesting that individuals in former
NSDAP-supporting municipalities became more open to foreigners as neighbors or relatives in
2016. The global index in column 11 suggests, too, that if anything those municipalities turned
less right-wing in recent years, although the estimate is not significant.
To conclude, we find no evidence of a sharp and localized demand-side shift that could explain
our findings on electoral outcomes. Historical Nazi support is positively associated with all cate-





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.6 Mechanisms and Interpretation
Our findings have important implications about the intergenerational transmission of political pref-
erences, and how these preferences are translated into political outcomes. These results can be
validated further.
First, our results speak to the existing literature on cultural persistence. To explain cultural
persistence, social scientists have often relied on models of from evolutionary biology, studying the
vertical transmission of traits from parents to children (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). Our results show
an instance in which political inclinations are persistent across generations: places that voted for
the Nazi party in 1933 tend to vote more for the AfD in 2017, and exhibit more right-wing attitudes
in survey questions.
This raises the question whether this inclination was transmitted vertically from parents to chil-
dren, over 80 years. Appendix Table F1 provides evidence in support of this hypothesis: using the
German Longitudinal Election Study (gles), we show that in Germany the left-right self-evaluation
of children is highly correlated with that one of their parents. This correlation is even stronger in
small communities, consistent with our results in Table 1.4. Related to this, an important literature
in political science has studied the intergenerational transmission of political preferences (Beck and
Jennings, 1991; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009), also specifically for the context of right-wing
ideology (Avdeenko and Siedler, 2017).39
Second, an important conclusion is that, even as underlying attitudes are stable or move only
slowly, electoral results can change suddenly and sharply when the political landscape experiences
idiosyncratic shocks, such as the creation of a new party or the emergence of a new, charismatic
leader. Political systems and institutions — such as the impediments posed by the German con-
stitution to the rise of extremist parties — play an important role in mediating and translating
shifts in attitudes into electoral successes. Our finding rationalizes the observation by political
scientists that it is hard to square the recent “wave” of right-wing populism with a concurrent shift
in attitudes (Bartels, 2017; Bonikowski, 2017).40
We corroborate this observation by expanding our attention to five Western European countries
that have witnessed the success of populist right-wing movements in recent years: Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, Netherlands, and Sweden. For each of these countries, we calculate the vote
shares going to far-right parties in national elections, from 1997 until today. From Eurobarometer
surveys, we calculate the average left-right self-placement of individuals. We then add up results
across five countries, weighting by population.
The results in Figure 1.7 show how the aggregate share of votes going to far-right parties picks
up in 2010 and rises continuously, with every national election, until 2017. Major jumps in the
39. Another literature considers the genetic origins of political ideology: see Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005),
Hatemi and McDermott (2012).
40. See also Hatton (2016). In emphasizing the interaction between demand and supply factors explaining the rise of
right-wing populism, our research is in line with the theoretical framework by Mudde (2007b) and Arzheimer (2009).
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aggregate share of votes for the far right are mostly caused either by entry of new parties (such
as the AfD) or of new political leaders skilled in changing the terms of political communication
(e.g., Geert Wilders in the Netherlands). In contrast to this steady increase, the time series of the
average left-right self-placement of the population is remarkably stable, and jumps upwards only
towards the end of the time period observed.








































Votes for Far−Right Parties Avg. Left−Right Self−Placement
Notes: The graph shows average left-right self-evaluation and votes for far right parties, 1997–2018, for five European
countries: Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and the Netherlands (population-weighted average).
Left-right self-evaluation is from Eurobarometer. Electoral data data are from the Parlgov database, http://www.
parlgov.org/. We classified parties with a score of 7.8 or above as “far-right”. This includes, among others, UKIP,
AfD, Front National, Sweden Democrats, and the Dutch Party for Freedom (Geert Wilders), in the category.
1.7 Conclusion
We have argued that a hitherto unexplored historical persistence of right-wing ideology is a de-
terminant of electoral outcomes in Germany. As an existing party, the Alternative for Germany,
moved to the right end of the political spectrum and espoused a nationalist, xenophobic platform, a
historical pattern emerged: municipalities that supported the NSDAP during the Weimar republic
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voted proportionally more for the AfD. This historical correlation is positive, significant, and large:
in our baseline specification, a one standard deviation increase in Nazi support during the Weimar
era is associated with 0.06 standard deviations more support for the AfD in recent elections.
We show that this cultural persistence factor is not confounded by other factors associated with
the rise of right-wing populist parties, such as unemployment, exposure to trade shocks, or the
presence of refugees. Whereas cultural persistence in other domains has been extensively studied
in the economics literature, ours is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to link historical
far-right voting from before 1945 to present-day electoral outcomes.
Cultural persistence of far-right voting in Germany, in our view, has been “activated” by an ex-
pansion of the supply of (respectable) political platforms. We rule out an alternative interpretation
of our findings as stemming from a demand-side shift, i.e. a shift in attitudes, occurring at the same
time in municipalities with higher support for the Nazis in 1933. The experience of Germany — we
argue —is representative for many other European countries, where populist right-wing parties




Table A1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs.
Panel A: Voting outcomes
AfD vote share, 2017 (gross) 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.39 10957
AfD vote share, 2013 (gross) 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.19 10957
AfD vote share, Δ 2017-2013 (gross) 0.07 0.05 -0.10 0.33 10957
NSDAP vote share, March 1933 0.50 0.14 0.03 0.93 10957
NSDAP vote share, Sept. 1930 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.78 10944
NSDAP vote share, May 1928 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.63 10906
DVFP vote share, April 1925 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.59 10740
DNVP vote share, April 1925 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.81 10740
Panel B: Control Variables
Log population, 1933 10.06 0.91 7.36 13.59 10889
Log population, 2015 7.52 1.51 2.83 14.19 10957
Share employed in industry and manufacturing, 1925 0.30 0.13 0.04 0.90 8960
Share employed in trade and commerce, 1925 0.10 0.05 0.02 0.52 8960
Share employed in administration, 1925 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.43 8960
Share unemployed, 1925 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.22 8536
Share unemployed, 2016 (gross) 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.14 10847
Share Catholic, 1925 0.41 0.41 0.00 1.00 10263
Share Jewish, 1925 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.14 10263
Share Catholic, 2011 0.35 0.31 0.00 1.00 10155
Share other/no religion, 2011 0.30 0.21 0.00 0.95 10143
Share refugees, 2016 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 10872
Share unemployed, Δ 2017-2007 -0.02 0.02 -0.17 0.07 10957
Trade exposure, Δ 2008-1998 -0.95 1.75 -16.11 12.94 10930
Population growth rate, 2015-1930 (logs difference) 0.25 0.68 -3.49 4.08 10889
Share expellees, 1940-50s 0.21 0.12 0.02 0.54 10931
Share workers with tertiary education, 2015 0.10 0.03 0.05 0.40 10957
Notes: Sample includes German municipalities in 2015, except city states and the Saarland. Gross vote shares are
votes cast divided by the total of eligible voters. See 1.8.1 for more detail on sources and definitions of the variables.
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Sources and definitions of Variables
Variable Description and source
AfD vote share, 2017 (gross) AfD vote share in 2017 federal election, relative to eligible
voters. Municipalities of 2017 matched to borders of 2015.
Source: destatis (German Federal Statistical Office).
AfD vote share, 2013 (gross) AfD vote share in 2013 federal election, relative to eligible
voters. Municipalities of 2013 matched to borders of 2015.
Source: destatis.
AfD vote share, Δ 2017-2013 (gross) Difference in AfD vote shares in 2013 and 2017 federal
elections (matched to 2015 municipality borders), relative
to eligible voters. Source: destatis.
NSDAP vote share, March 1933 NSDAP vote share, March 1933. Data matched to mu-
nicipality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch
(1990)
NSDAP vote share, Sept. 1930 NSDAP vote share, September 1930. Data matched to
municipality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch
(1990)
NSDAP vote share, May 1928 NSDAP vote share, May 1928. Data matched to munici-
pality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
DVFP vote share, April 1925 DVFP vote share, April 1925. Data matched to munici-
pality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
DNVP vote share, April 1925 DNVP vote share, April 1925. Data matched to munici-
pality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Log population, 1933 Logarithm of population in 1933, if missing 1925. Munic-
ipalities in the ”remainder of the county” are assigned the
population count of that remainder divided by the number
of modern municipalities assigned to it. Data matched to
municipality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch
(1990) and destatis.
Log population, 2015 Logarithm of the 2015 population count. Source:
destatis.
Share employed in industry and
manufacturing, 1925
Share employed in industry and manufacturing, 1925.
Data matched to municipality borders of 2015. Source:
Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Continued on next page
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Variable Description and source
Share employed in trade and com-
merce, 1925
Share employed in trade and commerce, 1925. Data
matched to municipality borders of 2015. Source: Fal-
ter and Hänisch (1990)
Share employed in administration,
1925
Share employed in administration, 1925. Data matched to
municipality borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch
(1990)
Share unemployed, 1925 Share unemployed, 1925. Data matched to municipality
borders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Share unemployed, 2016 (gross) Total of unemployed people in 2016 projected on 2015
municipalities, and divided by 2015 population. Data
matched to municipality borders of 2015. Source:
destatis.
Share of white collar workers, 1933 Share of white collar workers (“Angestellte” and
“Beamte”) amongst working population, 1933. If missing,
replaced by 1925 share of white collar workers among pop-
ulation. Data matched to municipality borders of 2015.
Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Share of workers with university de-
gree, 2015
Share of workers with university degrees. Variable defined
at Kreis (county) level. Data matched to municipality
borders of 2015. Source: INKAR
Share Catholic, 1925 Share Catholic, 1925. Data matched to municipality bor-
ders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Share Jewish, 1925 Share Jewish, 1925. Data matched to municipality bor-
ders of 2015. Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990)
Share Catholic, 2011 Share Catholic, 2011. Data matched to municipality bor-
ders of 2015. Source: destatis.
Share other/no religion, 2011 Share other/no religion, 2011. Data matched to munici-
pality borders of 2015. Source: destatis.
Share refugees, 2016 Share of people eligible to benefits in the context of
flight and migration (“Erwerbsfähige Leistungsberechtigte
im Kontext von Flucht und Migration”), 2016. Source:
Federal Employment Agency.
Share unemployed, Δ 2017-2007 Total of people unemployed in 2017 and 2007 matched on
2015 municipality borders, and divided by 2015 popula-
tion. Source: Federal Employment Agency.
Continued on next page
38
Variable Description and source
Trade exposure, Δ 2008-1998 Import Competition minus export competition. Variable
defined at Kreis (county) level. Data matched to munic-
ipality borders of 2015. Source: Dauth, Findeisen, and
Südekum (2014)
Population growth rate, 2015-1930 Growth rate of population 2015 - 1933 (1925 if miss-
ing), both periods matched to 2015 municipality borders.
Source: Falter and Hänisch (1990) and destatis.
Share expellees, 1940-50s Share of expellees in 1940-50s. Variable defined at Kreis
(county) level. Data matched to municipality borders of
2015. Source: Data for Eastern Germany stems from:
Seraphim (1954); Western Germany: Braun and Kvas-
nicka (2014)
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Matching electoral data to 2015 municipality borders
We generate transition matrices to trace population shares within changing municipalities’ borders.
Each matrix uses 2015 as reference year, and represents the population of a municipality in year
2015 as a sum of shares of populations of municpalities existing in year 𝑡.
Step 1: First, we approximate the spatial distribution of the population in municipalities based
on a raster dataset (100m grid) of the 2011 Census41, using shapefiles for German municipalities
between 1998 and 2017 from the Service Center of the Federal Government for Geo-Information
and Geodesy (Dienstleistungszentrum des Bundes für Geoinformation und Geodäsie).42
Step 2: In the next step, we overlay administrative borders for both timestamps and calculate
population in areas which changed municipalities. Based on those values we generate a transi-
tion matrix, which indicates to what degree the population from a given municipality in the first
comparison year contributes to the population residing in municipalities in 2015.
Step 3: Finally, we multiply the (transposed) transition matrix with the respective data for the




Matching contemporary and historical election data
We match present-day electoral outcomes to the Weimar era party support in two steps:
Step 1: First, we identify the boundary of each county with electoral data in the Falter and
Hänisch (1990) dataset, using the county name to match counties to polygons in the shapefile
provided by the Census Mosaic project43. We then identify coordinates for each Weimar era mu-
nicipality (to the best of our knowledge, no shapefiles of municipalities in the period are available):
for each municipality, we first use OpenStreetMap’s Nominatim API to search for modern admin-
istrative centers, villages, towns, cities or suburbs sharing a name with the historic municipality.
We overlay the returned coordinates on the county map and discard any results which lie outside
the boundary of the county to which the historic municipality belongs, according to the Falter and
Hänisch (1990) data. In this way, we obtain valid latitude and longitude coordinates for around
two thirds of the Weimar era municipalities. For municipalities which return no valid matches,
for example because of name changes between the Weimar era and today, we manually search for
coordinates. To do so, we use a combination of sources including gov.genealogy.net, a database of
historic geographies, and Wikipedia. We check the manual lookups for validity by ensuring that
the coordinates lie within the boundaries of the county to which the municipality belongs, again
according to the Falter and Hänisch (1990) data.
Step 2: In this step, we match contemporary municipalities to a Weimar era geography for
which the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset provides electoral data. If a modern municipality’s
coordinates (provided by DESTATIS) are within 2.5 kilometers of the coordinates of a municipality
identified in Step 1, we match the contemporary district to the electoral data from that historical
municipality. Otherwise, we overlay the coordinates of the modern municipality on top of the
shapefile of counties and assign the electoral results for the “remainder of the county” to the
modern municipality. Because electoral geography is not constant between 1924 and 1932, a modern
municipality can be matched to different entities for different election years.
43. Electoral geography changes between the years 1924 and 1932, the result of counties being merged or split and
other boundary changes. We thus match counties to boundaries separately for each of the 1924, 1928, 1930 and 1932
elections. In a very small number of cases, we make changes to the county shapefiles in order to better match the
county/municipality hierarchy provided by the Falter and Hänisch (1990) dataset
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1.8.2 Electoral maps
The following three maps show electoral results in 1933, in 2017, and a visual representation of
persistence patterns for all 10,963 municipalities in our analysis. Cf. the description of Figure 1.3
for further detail. Note that the state of Rhineland-Palatinate (in the far West of Germany) is







































1.8.3 Evidence on Semantic Change
Language data sources
We analyze the language used by the AfD and other major German parties by considering a variety
of sources. Besides the AfD, we consider the following parties: CDU/CSU44 (Christian democratic,
moderately conservative), SPD (social democratic, moderately left-wing), Grüne (green party),
FDP (free democrats, economic/socially liberal), and the NPD (nationalistic, starkly right-wing,
only represented in a few state legislatures).
First, we look at all party manifestos, official documents setting out the parties political plat-
forms in advance of major elections (federal, state, and European Parliament elections), published
from 2013 onwards. These manifestos are usually published a few months ahead of the election,
and contain variously detailed statements of political objectives and policy proposals. We obtained
the full text (as PDF) of 74 manifestos from the respective party websites; the median manifesto
is 56 pages long and encompasses approximately 19,500 words. Table C5 provides an overview of
the manifestos used.
Second, we consider the content of major political speeches held at party congresses, at national-
level party meetings (e.g., the traditional Epiphany meeting of the FDP on 6 January), or so-called
“Ash Wednesday” speeches45 by major political leaders (usually the party secretaries or the main
candidates), from 2013 until today. If the speeches are not available in a transcribed version, we
resort to online videos of these speeches and transcribe them with speech recognition software or
manually. Our final dataset contains 112 speeches; the median length of a speech is 27 minutes.
Third, we analyze tweets posted from the official Twitter accounts of those six major parties
(we restrict ourselves to the main/national account of the party, not of its regional branches and
candidates). We scrape all tweets from April 2008 (when the first party, the CDU, opened a twitter
account) until the end of June 2017, obtaining a total of 66,422 tweets (the most prolific party
is the NPD, with 18,057 tweets, followed by the SPD, with 10,580 tweets; the AFD posted 4,119
tweets). Table C6 provides an overview of timing and quantity of tweets for each party.
Finally, we also scrape posts from the official Facebook pages of the major parties (again re-
stricting ourselves to the federal-level party organization, not to its local branches). We obtain
36,089 posts from November 2008 until May 2017; 12,794 of these posts pertain to the NPD page,
2,881 to the AFD. Table C7 provides an overview of the Facebook posts included.
44. For speeches and party manifestos, we consider the CDU and the CSU as one party (among other reasons,
because of the low number of observations). For tweets and Facebook posts, we look at the CDU and the CSU
accounts separately.
45. On Ash Wednesday, all major political parties in Germany hold speeches, often in beer halls, which are typically
more polemical and more directly targeted against opponents.
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Analysis
Figure C3 gives a first quantitative impression of the nationalistic turn imparted on the AfD starting
in mid-2015. We classify Facebook posts (looking at trimmed word stems) depending on whether
they contain a word that is related to the Euro, to Greece (likely in the context of the bailout
talks), to Islam/Muslims, or to Germany/the nation. Up until 2015, about 20% of posts refer, on
average, to the Euro, and approximately the same amount refer to Germany/the nation. There
is, however, already a slight downward trend in references to the Euro before 2015, which suggests
that, as the base expanded, the party’s outlook widened beyond its initial narrow focus on economic
topics. 2015 witnesses two major changes. First, as the Greek crisis approached a new zenith (the
infamous “bailout” referendum was held on July 5), Greece and the Euro reach a short-lived peak
in frequencies. At the same time, after the party congress in Essen, the AfD turns rightward: posts
referring to Germany or the nation steadily increase in frequency, and so do posts referring to Islam
or the Muslim world. Note that the latter change only occurs in mid-2016, well after the peak of
the refugee crisis in September 2015.
However, these suggestive trends may also be misleading, and merely capture an overall change
in topics relevant to German politics. It is plausible that other parties in Germany, in the context
of the dramatic political and economic crises of the past years, have readjusted their rhetoric and
the focus of their policy proposals. For this purpose, in Table C1 we look at the overall text body
that we collected in manifestos, speeches, tweets, and Facebook posts, for seven major parties in
Germany: the AfD, as well as the CDU/CSU, SPD, Greens, FDP, Linke, and (as a benchmark of a
more radical, right-wing party) the ultra-nationalist NPD. With this body of data we can estimate
a full differences-in-differences specification as follows:
𝑓(stem = 𝑠)𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽 ⋅ 1{party = AfD} ⋅Post𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡, (1.5)
where the dependent variable 𝑓(stem = 𝑠) is the frequency (mention per 100 words) of stem 𝑠
in document 𝑖 (party manifesto, speech), of party 𝑝 at time 𝑡. For shorter pieces of text (tweets,
Facebook post), we use the following variant specification:
1{(stem = 𝑠) ∈ 𝑖}𝑖𝑝𝑡 = 𝛾𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝛽 ⋅ 1{party = AfD} ⋅Post𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡, (1.6)
where 1{(stem = 𝑠) ∈ 𝑖} is a dummy indicating whether stem 𝑠 is contained in document 𝑖 (tweet,
post) of party 𝑝 at time 𝑡. In all specifications, we include a full set of party fixed effects (𝛾𝑝) and
time fixed effects (𝛿𝑡): these are year fixed effects for speeches and manifestos, and month×year fixed
effects for tweets and Facebook posts. Post𝑡 is a dummy for all periods after the Erfurt Resolution
(March 2015). Standard errors 𝜀𝑖𝑝𝑡 are clustered at the party×year cell level (for manifestos and
speeches) or at the party×year×month level (for tweets and Facebook posts).
The crucial difference-in-differences parameter of interest is 𝛽, indicating the increase in fre-
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quency (or mentions) of a given stem in documents of the AfD, after the Erfurt Resolution, con-
ditional on state and time fixed effects. Table C1 reports the estimates of 𝛽 across four media
(manifestos, speeches, tweets, and Facebook posts, in Panels A through D, respectively), and for
five outcome stems of interest: Greece, the Euro, Islam, migration, and nation.46 Every cell in that
table reports the estimate of the difference-in-differences parameter for one regression, defined by
a dyad of medium and stem.
Across all text media, we see consistent results. Even when viewed in relation to the language
used by the other political parties in Germany, the AfD notably reduces the mentions of Greece
and the Euro in its rhetoric, and increases the usage of words related to Islam, to migration, and
to Germany/the nation. For example, the estimate in panel B, column 2, suggests that after 2015,
the reduction of mentions of stems relating to the Euro in speeches by AfD members is 0.546 per
100 words (significant at <1% level). This compares to a mean of the dependent variable of 0.703
(for AfD speeches, before 2015); it is thus a very sizable decrease.47
By converse, the estimate in panel D, column 4, suggests that after March 2015, the share of
Facebook posts mentioning a stem related to the migration context increases by 11.2 percentage
points (significant at <1% level). Again, this is sizable if compared to a pre-March 2015 mean of
the outcome variable of 5.8 percent (for the AfD).
Arguably, the five word stems shown in Table C1 have been arbitrarily chosen, based on our
priors regarding which words should witness the starkest changes following the rightward turn
imparted on the AfD after the Erfurt Resolution. To avoid our subjective bias, and to validate the
stems chosen in Table C1, in Figure C4 we follow a different approach. Here, we repeat the standard
differences-in-differences estimations of Equation 1.5 above, applying this regression setup to each
of the 645 most frequent word stems that we identified in our entire body of Facebook posts.48
Figure C4 presents the distribution of the 𝛽 coefficients estimated from Equation 1.5, across 645
stems. First, it is noticeable that the distribution of point estimates is skewed to the right of zero:
this indicates that the language used by the AfD, after March 2015, becomes more varied. Second,
vertical dashed lines in the figure show the positioning of the point estimates relating to key words
used so far. Confirming the results of Table C1, we see that “Euro” and “Greece” are to the left
of zero, whereas the usage of words such as “Islam”, “asylum”, and especially “Germany” increases
dramatically for the AfD after March 2015, relative to other parties. Third, it is also noticeable
that a traditional mainstay of conservative political ideology, the “family”, does not move into the
46. More precisely, the stem “Greece” encompasses all German words including *griech*; “Euro” all words that start
with euro*, but not europ*, and also the acronym EZB (European Central Bank, in German); the stem “Islam” all
words including *islam* and *muslim*; the stem “migration” all words including *migration*, *wander*, *flüchtling*,
and *asyl*; the stem “nation” all words including *nation* and *deutsch*. Table C4 reports the 10 most frequent
words identified by this algorithm for each stem.
47. Table C2 provides (conditional) means for all dependent variables.
48. To be more precise, we consider the universe of words in the body of Facebook posts we collected. We remove
numbers, punctuation, and stopwords, and then stem the resulting words using the tm package for R. We keep all
stems that are used at least 200 times. This results in 645 word stems.
48
focus of the AfD’s rhetoric: the point estimate is very close to zero. We see this as suggestive of
the fact that the post-March 2015 turn experienced by the AfD was explicitly nationalistic and
xenophobic (anti-Muslim), not merely conservative.
49
Figure C1: AfD Electoral Poster, 2013
Notes: Electoral poster for the federal election of September 2013. It reads: “Greeks are desperate. Germans are
paying. Banks are cashing in. Stop this.”
Figure C2: AfD Electoral Poster, 2016
Notes: Electoral poster for the state election in Baden-Württemberg in March 2016. It reads: “For our state – for
our values. Immigration needs clear rules.”
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Notes: The graph shows the frequency of Facebook posts containing one of four, selected word stems/families. 90-day
moving averages displayed.
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Notes: The graph shows the empirical distribution of estimated difference-in-difference coefficients, resulting from
the empirical setup in equation (1.6), relating to 645 frequent word stems on Facebook, together with the location of
six selected word stems.
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Table C1: AfD’s Language Change: Diff-in-diff Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
Panel A: Mentions per 100 words in manifestos
AfD × After March 2015 -0.011 -0.780∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ -0.041
(0.021) (0.193) (0.013) (0.050) (0.237)
Panel B: Mentions per 100 words in speeches
AfD × After March 2015 -0.183∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ 0.063∗ -0.028 0.112
(0.070) (0.099) (0.034) (0.097) (0.100)
Panel C: Mentioned in Twitter posts
AfD × After March 2015 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.023∗∗ -0.098∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.018)
Panel D: Mentioned in Facebook posts
AfD × After March 2015 -0.017 -0.055∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.021) (0.011) (0.023) (0.030)
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) from OLS regressions. In panel A the unit
of observation is a manifesto, in panel B a speech, in panel C a Twitter post and in panel D a
Facebook post. All regressions include party (AFD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Grüne, Die Linke, NPD,
SPD) fixed effects. Panels A and B include year fixed effects, panels C and D month fixed effects.
Number of observations: 70 (panel A), 113 (panel B), 66,422 (panel C) and 40,118 (panel D). One,
two and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table C2: AfD’s Language Change: Means of Dependent Variables (Table C1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
Panel A: Mentions per 100 words in manifestos
Mean (overall) 0.005 0.140 0.030 0.264 0.610
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.013 0.292 0.013 0.170 1.028
Mean (AfD) 0.015 0.401 0.046 0.405 0.963
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.031 1.043 0.000 0.199 1.406
Panel B: Mentions per 100 words in speeches
Mean (overall) 0.055 0.145 0.033 0.126 0.556
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.088 0.235 0.023 0.074 0.498
Mean (AfD) 0.102 0.367 0.028 0.128 0.789
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.216 0.703 0.000 0.105 0.697
Panel C: Mentioned in Twitter posts
Mean (overall) 0.011 0.021 0.010 0.043 0.086
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.012 0.027 0.009 0.022 0.089
Mean (AfD) 0.053 0.133 0.009 0.027 0.113
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.069 0.175 0.002 0.016 0.133
Panel D: Mentioned in Facebook posts
Mean (overall) 0.019 0.055 0.024 0.088 0.230
Mean (all parties, pre-March 2015) 0.017 0.059 0.017 0.040 0.200
Mean (AfD) 0.064 0.184 0.044 0.166 0.371
Mean (AfD, pre-March 2015) 0.068 0.214 0.015 0.058 0.231
Notes: Table reports means for five groups of words. These are the dependent variables in the
diff-in-diff regressions of Table C1. Overall means (first row in each panel) and conditional means
reported.
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Table C3: AfD’s Language Change: Diff-in-diff Estimates
Negative Binomial Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
Panel A: Mentions per 100 words in manifestos
AfD × After March 2015 1.781 -0.882 17.266 0.850 0.429
(8.309) (1.393) (10998.819) (1.563) (0.721)
Panel B: Mentions per 100 words in Speeches
AfD × After March 2015 -16.738 -1.517 16.537 0.475 0.119
(3485.886) (1.544) (3176.458) (1.976) (0.643)
Panel C: Mentions in Facebook Posts
AfD × After March 2015 -0.712∗∗∗ -0.305∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.161) (0.108) (0.239) (0.128) (0.059)
Panel D: Mentions in Tweets
AfD × After March 2015 -2.014∗∗∗ -2.228∗∗∗ 2.571∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗ -0.046
(0.376) (0.189) (0.473) (0.168) (0.069)
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) from negative binomial regressions. In panel A
the unit of observation is a manifesto, in panel B a speech, in panel C a Twitter post and in panel D a
Facebook post. All regressions include party (AFD, CDU, CSU, FDP, Grüne, Die Linke, NPD, SPD)
fixed effects. Panels A and B include year fixed effects, panels C and D month fixed effects. Number of
observations: 70 (panel A), 113 (panel B), 66,422 (panel C) and 40,118 (panel D). One, two and three
stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table C4: Most Frequent Words (Stems in Table C1)
Greece Euro Islam Migration Nation
griechenland euro islamischen zuwanderung deutschlands
griechische eurokrise muslime flüchtlingen deutsche
griechischen euroraum islam asyl deutscher
griechen ezb islamistische migration deutsch
griechenlands eurostaaten islamistischen einwanderung nationale
grieche eurozone islamische flüchtlingspolitik national
griechisch eurorettung islamisten asylverfahren nationalen
griechenlandanleihen euros islamischer zuwanderer deutschen
griechischer eurobonds muslimen asylsuchende deutsches
griechenlandkrise eurojust muslimischen einwanderer nationaler
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Table C5: List of Political Manifestos
Year Manifesto type Party # of words # of pages
2013 Federal election AfD 3923 12
2013 Federal election CDU/CSU 41367 81
2013 Federal election FDP 38040 104
2013 Federal election Grüne 86557 337
2013 Federal election Linke 39011 100
2013 Federal election NPD 3585 52
2013 Federal election SPD 41003 120
2014 European Parliament election AfD 8974 25
2014 European Parliament election CDU/CSU 22020 84
2014 European Parliament election FDP 10778 28
2014 European Parliament election Grüne 22223 57
2014 European Parliament election Linke 12971 76
2014 European Parliament election SPD 6383 14
2014 Party platform AfD 3143 14
2015 Resolution FDP 6520 13
2015 Erfurter Resolution AfD 630 3
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg AfD 19474 64
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg CDU/CSU 33658 156
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg FDP 20213 63
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg Grüne 50632 249
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg Linke 25084 44
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg NPD 6310 26
2016 State election, Baden-Württemberg SPD 25232 41
2016 Guidelines CDU/CSU 18117 47
2016 Guidelines AfD 23846 96
2016 Guidelines AfD 21892 78
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania AfD 6744 22
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania CDU/CSU 8464 27
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania FDP 21439 86
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania Grüne 21702 28
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania Linke 22124 54
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania NPD 2978 7
2016 State election, Mecklenburg-A. Pomerania SPD 17426 48
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Year Manifesto type Party # of words # of pages
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate AfD 7784 17
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate CDU/CSU 1815 8
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate FDP 31497 83
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate Grüne 39389 57
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate Linke 18830 57
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate NPD 1506 3
2016 State election, Rhineland-Palatinate SPD 16737 56
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt AfD 4867 68
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt CDU/CSU 19715 64
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt FDP 2705 12
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt Grüne 27260 76
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt Linke 19222 44
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt NPD 1750 6
2016 State election, Saxony-Anhalt SPD 19070 53
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia AfD 12091 39
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia CDU/CSU 38115 120
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia FDP 24188 49
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia Grüne 82836 131
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia Linke 44709 132
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia NPD 8182 52
2017 State election, North Rhine-Westfalia SPD 38163 116
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein AfD 18053 56
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein FDP 28952 117
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein Grüne 34612 94
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein CDU/CSU 23827 96
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein Linke 24669 70
2017 State election, Schleswig-Holstein SPD 21670 66
2017 State election, Saarland AfD 9654 43
2017 State election, Saarland CDU/CSU 25816 72
2017 State election, Saarland FDP 6462 19
2017 State election, Saarland Grüne 23263 70
2017 State election, Saarland Linke 15468 34
2017 State election, Saarland NPD 1895 8
2017 State election, Saarland SPD 19303 52
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Table C6: Number of Tweets












2009–03 38 30 48 22
2009–04 25 79 54 18 78
2009–05 53 74 1 150 86 105
2009–06 84 72 307 191 47 94
2009–07 30 88 129 28 77
2009–08 27 49 88 32 168
2009–09 118 69 329 373 34 201
2009–10 21 22 53 18 25
2009–11 23 17 36 21 60
2009–12 13 15 21 1 11 32
2010–01 25 17 27 1 20 47
2010–02 26 26 36 12 45 55
2010–03 27 23 50 10 63 46
2010–04 20 19 53 1 46 52
2010–05 25 23 35 56 156 66 38
2010–06 34 28 61 77 11 67 55
2010–07 30 19 45 27 10 56 44
2010–08 23 27 44 26 3 98 22
2010–09 38 17 71 56 7 110 130
2010–10 36 42 70 49 10 140 153
2010–11 63 22 54 75 21 153 173
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2010–12 25 17 43 29 4 136 151
2011–01 46 29 90 43 28 199 123
2011–02 35 42 111 70 16 179 146
2011–03 50 69 52 77 26 200 155
2011–04 25 28 39 34 151 73
2011–05 50 67 133 63 1 154 171
2011–06 36 42 26 78 3 163 118
2011–07 26 31 27 41 170 118
2011–08 31 30 24 27 208 128
2011–09 45 58 22 57 5 222 179
2011–10 43 46 22 58 271 222 133
2011–11 154 23 50 67 18 235 91
2011–12 27 26 17 21 16 309 205
2012–01 39 52 10 31 38 398 137
2012–02 28 77 3 49 37 461 103
2012–03 32 93 16 71 48 346 171
2012–04 24 27 18 54 29 268 101
2012–05 71 102 12 108 34 274 99
2012–06 40 93 8 118 286 232 81
2012–07 31 54 6 72 22 313 71
2012–08 33 33 12 33 39 167 78
2012–09 86 40 17 137 27 270 83
2012–10 137 37 150 24 61 13 184 171
2012–11 263 21 36 21 140 92 176 147
2012–12 159 108 32 8 18 18 243 125
2013–01 109 82 23 16 68 65 237 116
2013–02 105 21 43 14 60 139 184 45
2013–03 266 18 59 53 88 46 275 72
2013–04 133 15 29 28 444 19 273 93
2013–05 200 74 49 56 96 30 260 132
2013–06 73 115 30 15 148 281 222 123
2013–07 76 48 50 21 144 46 174 37
2013–08 172 42 30 43 158 92 311 173
2013–09 189 305 127 95 494 187 406 306
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2013–10 111 17 1 9 222 21 239 42
2013–11 126 20 10 19 58 2 212 73
2013–12 84 50 1 126 25 223 40
2014–01 86 37 2 98 90 2 263 55
2014–02 73 29 1 9 247 365 207 32
2014–03 76 70 32 4 53 47 283 84
2014–04 90 113 33 3 59 44 269 37
2014–05 94 206 36 127 193 234 273 184
2014–06 80 29 20 2 23 29 165 48
2014–07 67 44 33 10 14 24 235 45
2014–08 78 47 28 16 22 115 211 33
2014–09 66 140 83 4 30 100 194 108
2014–10 49 155 143 6 29 18 171 163
2014–11 29 139 121 10 129 9 220 117
2014–12 12 230 162 20 24 6 187 97
2015–01 14 67 131 26 19 47 246 107
2015–02 10 40 124 35 39 19 184 210
2015–03 23 36 148 38 23 54 174 105
2015–04 1 21 134 39 56 212 163 108
2015–05 4 44 103 249 37 79 138 109
2015–06 5 107 119 74 71 507 206 108
2015–07 3 91 177 30 35 156 151 41
2015–08 6 51 73 56 16 40 149 79
2015–09 12 125 119 53 42 52 206 107
2015–10 13 99 172 44 56 54 230 164
2015–11 5 53 184 62 135 56 263 72
2015–12 2 211 85 46 15 42 151 94
2016–01 3 48 121 55 22 86 175 63
2016–02 5 70 105 47 21 133 217 84
2016–03 4 109 89 83 38 263 227 131
2016–04 4 36 127 252 17 98 228 71
2016–05 2 56 128 63 24 331 164 125
2016–06 1 99 95 53 52 134 180 134
2016–07 1 65 161 32 33 83 198 92
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2016–08 14 63 50 20 12 51 191 83
2016–09 9 114 148 52 53 104 138 237
2016–10 7 60 174 99 87 46 129 126
2016–11 13 90 249 85 108 81 145 140
2016–12 11 99 99 84 17 107 160 142
2017–01 6 94 115 86 60 127 215 169
2017–02 13 86 104 66 34 77 142 124
2017–03 7 149 179 60 88 168 183 156
2017–04 120 115 94 144 64 53 144 84
2017–05 508 224 190 80 77 163 150 147
2017–06 295 108 88 66 162 394 133 173
2017–07 340 121 218 101 80 105 161 125
2017–08 329 382 210 162 174 184 139 276
2017–09 302 963 445 760 484 468 182 700
Table C7: Number of Facebook Posts




2009–02 4 14 4
2009–03 16 11 12
2009–04 14 15 12 24
2009–05 4 30 42 18 19
2009–06 1 12 33 14 15
2009–07 2 6 22 8 12
2009–08 4 22 23 9 55
2009–09 26 10 34 56 105 46
2009–10 21 1 22 13 8
2009–11 25 5 7 12 2 36
2009–12 20 2 3 9 5 31
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2010–01 21 2 10 13 5 48
2010–02 16 25 10 8 29 9 61
2010–03 12 12 14 26 18 50 69
2010–04 10 13 8 26 6 27 72
2010–05 11 12 13 27 164 51 53
2010–06 15 10 18 32 19 53 60
2010–07 15 11 15 11 10 47 49
2010–08 24 12 12 9 8 69 26
2010–09 35 9 13 31 23 92 44
2010–10 36 37 19 29 14 124 66
2010–11 65 10 16 32 23 145 61
2010–12 24 12 13 16 3 123 51
2011–01 55 12 19 25 25 177 48
2011–02 39 18 21 51 21 158 64
2011–03 57 28 17 77 39 174 102
2011–04 25 3 24 37 9 124 53
2011–05 52 16 42 63 18 112 121
2011–06 40 11 16 63 14 132 86
2011–07 29 6 18 42 35 146 82
2011–08 23 7 19 27 62 152 81
2011–09 53 28 22 54 14 163 98
2011–10 47 32 32 45 61 182 124
2011–11 64 41 42 59 26 164 69
2011–12 26 32 40 24 24 182 95
2012–01 30 23 46 33 34 263 103
2012–02 28 29 39 34 34 293 99
2012–03 35 55 47 54 46 197 124
2012–04 32 18 40 31 20 195 85
2012–05 40 19 29 51 32 231 95
2012–06 38 34 32 52 242 165 82
2012–07 27 43 31 44 30 202 68
2012–08 32 6 29 37 23 108 77
2012–09 39 12 33 55 19 177 83
2012–10 41 21 38 57 14 155 138
(Continued on next page)
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(Continued from previous page)
Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2012–11 29 18 35 66 30 102 146
2012–12 42 18 24 26 19 170 77
2013–01 43 39 43 46 33 177 109
2013–02 18 35 30 47 28 139 63
2013–03 91 23 20 56 68 32 180 43
2013–04 89 19 22 32 70 29 197 37
2013–05 66 51 12 49 74 27 168 63
2013–06 83 50 33 36 81 168 139 68
2013–07 88 45 40 50 82 36 113 48
2013–08 74 49 34 60 95 49 222 85
2013–09 78 129 41 76 146 70 265 204
2013–10 60 16 2 39 39 15 154 27
2013–11 62 26 10 39 58 18 129 52
2013–12 57 38 2 59 30 14 132 45
2014–01 63 30 3 66 67 12 156 23
2014–02 67 29 6 49 35 80 133 48
2014–03 57 39 43 61 38 18 186 101
2014–04 59 52 29 46 22 22 169 80
2014–05 76 88 43 71 32 66 182 150
2014–06 62 27 12 44 14 13 131 31
2014–07 51 30 21 55 9 21 177 39
2014–08 61 36 18 65 14 23 202 52
2014–09 52 59 46 56 16 52 141 71
2014–10 46 55 45 56 14 26 131 76
2014–11 38 48 47 50 18 23 163 81
2014–12 36 65 55 50 14 18 153 68
2015–01 68 54 56 54 17 47 174 70
2015–02 43 31 61 52 16 19 130 93
2015–03 39 29 62 61 20 38 139 69
2015–04 43 23 60 70 19 34 132 71
2015–05 43 21 60 79 18 27 115 68
2015–06 53 46 74 54 20 59 153 63
2015–07 65 36 69 57 10 31 117 52
2015–08 37 21 56 59 7 20 113 58
(Continued on next page)
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Month AfD CDU CSU FDP Grüne Linke NPD SPD
2015–09 39 33 75 68 13 38 179 70
2015–10 55 46 66 53 12 26 185 69
2015–11 48 29 66 57 20 23 220 41
2015–12 26 39 50 59 14 15 121 44
2016–01 43 28 59 67 16 25 145 39
2016–02 44 30 53 61 11 30 163 63
2016–03 57 34 55 68 21 39 165 77
2016–04 47 35 48 90 7 27 184 48
2016–05 45 28 59 59 14 40 109 59
2016–06 50 54 55 57 18 34 117 56
2016–07 57 27 72 68 10 28 127 55
2016–08 59 30 48 68 11 29 125 45
2016–09 67 38 64 66 26 31 88 54
2016–10 74 30 52 65 23 21 97 49
2016–11 65 27 74 69 28 23 101 46
2016–12 50 29 71 70 25 27 111 48
2017–01 48 43 60 64 32 27 188 64
2017–02 58 44 59 72 35 34 126 39
2017–03 73 55 73 79 44 41 155 54
2017–04 74 47 59 80 32 26 106 47
2017–05 87 53 78 79 37 32 109 53
2017–06 79 50 61 67 54 44 118 64
2017–06 1
2017–07 4 2 1 3 2
2017–08 12 14 6 11 8 6 4 12
2017–09 21 18 9 16 18 13 3 21
Notes: After 2017–06, the number of facebook posts goes down because Facebook limited ability to
scrape page histories.
65
1.8.4 Additional Results, Electoral Analysis
In this section we conduct additional analyses regarding our electoral results. In Table D1, we
compare our finding to the correlations between AfD vote shares in 2017 and four other variables:
unemployment levels, the change in unemployment level from before the great recession until today,
the increase in trade exposure (the difference between import competition and export competition),
and the allocation of refugees in municipalities. These correlations are presented in columns 1–4
of Table D1 in terms of standardized beta coefficients; it is important to emphasize that these
coefficients should not be seen as causal estimates of the effects, as clearly there is no claim to the
exogeneity of the spatial variation of these variables with respect to AfD support.
For three variables — unemployment change, trade exposure, and allocation of refugees — we
find a negative point estimate: surprisingly, AfD support is higher in regions where unemployment
or trade exposure decreased in the last decade, or where there is a lower share of refugees. In the
case of unemployment levels (column 1), the correlation is positive, as one would have plausibly
expected. The beta coefficients in Table D1 are in a similar range of magnitude (2–10% in absolute
terms) as the beta coefficient relating to the NSDAP vote share (5.6%, reported in column 5 for
reference). Our magnitudes are also comparable to the effect of import competition on far right
voting in France in 2007–2012, estimated at 8.98% as a standardized beta coefficient (Malgouyres,
2017).
A comparison of the partial 𝑅2 values of these explanatory factors (bottom of Table D1) leads
to similar conclusions: the cultural persistence factor “explains” a comparable share of the variance
of the outcome (about 0.7%) as the other factors (whose partial 𝑅2 vary between 0.2% and 1.6%).
This simple variance decomposition thus suggests that, while historical persistence clearly is only
one among many factors associated with the rise of populist right-wing parties, the magnitude of
the correlation is comparable to other factors often mentioned in the literature.
Table D2 shows robustness of these results to the use of the differenced dependent variable,
AfD vote shares Δ 2017–2013, instead of absolute vote shares in 2017.
In Table D3 we show that results from including controls carry through when the number of
observations is held constant throughout all specifications. In Table D4 we show that the patterns
investigated through the simple cross-sectional regressions of Figure 1.6 also hold when aggregating
the data to a municipality-level panel. We regress far-right electoral shares for all federal election
years on the standardized measure of 1933 NSDAP votes, and on the 1933 NSDAP votes interacted
with an indicator for the 2017 elections. Note that the inclusion of municipality fixed effects in even-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table D3: Results Including Controls
- Identical Number of Observations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Population Employment Education Religion
Panel A: With historical controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0709∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0530∗ 0.0087
(0.0261) (0.0263) (0.0260) (0.0290) (0.0243)
Observations 7652 7652 7652 7652 7652
Panel B: With contemporary controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0592∗∗ 0.0663∗∗∗ 0.0633∗∗ 0.0370
(0.0261) (0.0280) (0.0253) (0.0279) (0.0254)
Observations 7652 7652 7652 7652 7652
Panel C: With historical and contemporary controls
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0682∗∗∗ 0.0619∗∗ 0.0619∗∗ 0.0524∗ 0.0078
(0.0261) (0.0281) (0.0250) (0.0299) (0.0263)
Observations 7652 7652 7652 7652 7652
Notes: The dependent variable is the (standardized) change in vote share for the AfD (relative to
eligible voters) from 2013 to 2017. Each column adds a different set of control variables. However,
sample is restricted to observations where all control variables are non-missing. The explanatory
variable across all columns is the 1933 NSDAP vote share (standardized). Population controls are:
[historical] log population size (1933); [contemporary] log population size in 2015 and urbanization
code dummies (3 categories). Employment controls are: [historical] shares of employed in industry
and manufacturing, employed in trade and commerce, and employed in administration (agriculture
and “other sectors” is the omitted category), all measured in 1925, as well as the unemployment share
in 1933; [contemporary] the unemployment rate in 2015. Education controls are: [historical] share
of white collar workers (“Angestellte und Beamte”); [contemporary] share of workers with university
degree in 2015. Religion controls are: [historical] the share of Catholics and Jews; [contemporary]
the share of Catholics and “Others” (i.e., Muslims, other religions, and no religion). Sample includes
municipalities in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the
Saarland. All regressions contain a full set of state fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
level of historic municipalities/counties. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table D4: Persistence of Far Right Vote Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute Standardised
far-right vote share far-right vote share
NSDAP 1933 [std.] 0.0862∗ 0.9861∗
(0.0491) (0.5622)
NSDAP × 2017 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗ 0.0675∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0242) (0.0259)
𝑅2 0.903 0.933 0.903 0.933
Observations 65843 65843 65843 65843
NSDAP × Year Trend ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State-Year FEs ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Municipal FEs ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variables are vote shares for far-right parties (NPD, DVU, Re-
publikaner, Die Rechte, and AfD in 2017). The sample includes modern municipalities
in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the
Saarland. Municipalities are projected to 2015 borders using population-weighted raster
techniques (cf. Appendix Section 1.8.1 for more detail). Standard errors are clustered
at the level of the historical vote shares. One, two and three stars represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Figure D1: Persistence For Major Parties




Notes: The graph shows regressions coefficients and confidence intervals. Each coefficient stems from a single regres-
sion in a specific year. The dependent variable is the standardized gross vote share of the respective party (where the
far-right includes NPD, DVU, Republikaner, Die Rechte, and AfD in 2017). All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the historical vote shares. The sample includes modern municipalities
in all German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the Saarland. Municipalities are
projected to 2015 borders using population-weighted raster techniques.
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Figure D2: Persistence For Major Parties




Notes: The graph shows regressions coefficients and confidence intervals. Each coefficient stems from a single regres-
sion in a specific year. The dependent variable is the standardized gross vote share of the respective party (where the
far-right includes NPD, DVU, Republikaner, Die Rechte, and AfD in 2017). All regressions include state fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the level of the historical vote shares. The sample includes modern municipalities in
all Western German states apart from city states (Berlin, Hamburg, and Bremen), and the Saarland. Municipalities
are matched on the basis of the eight digit municipal identity code. Only municipalities which could be tracked
through 10 out of 11 federal election years are included (roughly matched panel).
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1.8.5 Additional Results, Survey Evidence from ALLBUS
In this section we conduct additional analyses regarding our survey results from the Allbus data. In
Table E1 we show that results are robust to collapsing the individual-level data at the municipality
level and using residualized on individual-level controls. Table E2 adds the share of expellees to
show robustness. Table E3 uses equal weights for the indices. Table E4 both uses municipalities as
unit of observation and equal weights in indices. Table E5 shows the relationship between indices
and voting intention for the AfD in 2016. In Table E6 we show that left-right self-evaluation predicts
AfD voting intention positively and significantly in 2016, but negatively in 2014. This change does
not occur for the NPD, a more extreme far-right party. Finally, Table 1.8.5 provides a detailed























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table E6: Left-Right Self-Evaluation and AfD Voting Intention, 2014-2016
(1) (2)
AfD NPD
Left-Right Self-Evaluation -0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0025)
Left-right self-evaluation × 2016 0.1516∗∗∗ 0.0021
(0.0104) (0.0039)
Observations 41445 41445
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator of voting intention for the AfD
(column 1) and the NPD (column 2). Individual survey data from Allbus
(panel for 2014 and 2016). All regressions contain a full set of state fixed
effects. Controls include a dummy for former East Germany, age, marriage
status, gender, and income categories. Robust standard errors are used in
all specifications. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Questions in Indices from Allbus Survey
A: XENOPHOBIA (IMMIGRATION)
Question set 1: Opinions on Immigration B49 N50 I51
Preamble: The next question is about the immigration of various
groups of people to Germany. What is your opinion about
this?
Possible Answers: Immigration should be unrestricted (= 0); Immigration
should be restricted (= 0); Immigration should be stopped
completely (= 1)
A.1.1 What about ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe? ✓
A.1.2 Asylum Seekers? ✓
A.1.3 People from EU countries coming to work here? ✓
A.1.4 People from non-EU countries, e.g. Turkey, coming to work
here?
✓
Question set 2: German citizenship B N I
Preamble: I will tell you a few things which may play a role in the
decision whether or not to grant German citizenship. Using
the scale, please tell me how important these things should
be in your opinion.
Possible Answers: Scale (1 to 7): not at all important – very important
A.2.1 Whether the person was born in Germany ✓
A.2.2 Whether the person is of German origin ✓
A.2.3 Whether the person is fluent in German ✓
A.2.4 Whether the person has lived in Germany a long time ✓
A.2.5 Whether the person is prepared to adapt to the German way
of life
✓
A.2.6 Whether the person belongs to a Christian denomination ✓
A.2.7 Whether the person has committed any crimes ✓
A.2.8 Whether the person can support himself or herself ✓
Question 3: Stranger in one’s own country B N I
Preamble: To what extent do you agree with the following statements?
Continued on next page
49. Binarized: answers have been binarized as indicated in the Possible Answers row.
50. Normalized: initial scale has been normalized to a 0-1 range.
51. Inverted: initial scale has been inverted.
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Possible Answers: Scale (1 to 7): completely disagree – completely agree
A.3.1 With so many foreigners in Germany, one feels increasingly
like a stranger in one’s own country.
✓
B: XENOPHOBIA (EQUAL RIGHTS)
Question set 1: Opinions on foreigners’ rights B N I
Preamble: This question is about foreigners who live in Germany.
Please tell me for each statement to what extent you agree
with it.
Possible Answers: Scale (1 to 7): completely disagree – completely agree
B.1.1 Foreigners living in Germany should be able to acquire Ger-
man citizenship without having to give up their own citizen-
ship, i.e. dual citizenship should be possible.
✓ ✓
B.1.2 Foreigners living in Germany should be entitled to the same
welfare benefits and other social entitlements as Germans.
✓ ✓
B.1.3 Italians living in Germany should have the same rights as
Germans in every respect.
✓ ✓
B.1.4 Ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe living in Germany
should have the same rights as Germans in every respect.
✓ ✓
B.1.5 Asylum-seekers living in Germany should have the same
rights as Germans in every respect.
✓ ✓
B.1.6 Turkish people living in Germany should have the same
rights as Germans in every respect.
✓ ✓
C: XENOPHOBIA (MARRIAGE/ NEIGHBOUR)
Question set 1: Opinions on foreigners as neighbours B N I
Preamble: How pleasant or unpleasant would it be for you to have
members of these groups as neighbours?
Possible Answers: Scale (-3 to +3): would be very unpleasant for me – would
be very pleasant for me
C.1.1 …an Italian person as a neighbour? ✓ ✓
C.1.2 …an ethnic German from Eastern Europe as a neighbour? ✓ ✓
C.1.3 …an asylum-seeker as a neighbour? ✓ ✓
C.1.4 …a Turkish person as a neighbour? ✓ ✓
Continued on next page
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Question set 2: Opinions on foreigners marrying into family B N I
Preamble: And what if a member of one of these groups married into
your family? To what extent would it be pleasant or un-
pleasant for you…
Possible Answers: Scale (-3 to +3): would be very unpleasant – would be very
pleasant
C.2.1 …if an Italian person married into your family? ✓ ✓
C.2.2 …if an ethnic German from Eastern Europe married into
your family?
✓ ✓
C.2.3 …if an asylum-seeker married into your family? ✓ ✓
C.2.4 …if a Turkish person married into your family? ✓ ✓
D: ISLAM AT SCHOOL
Question set 1: Opinions on Islam at school B N I
Preamble: It is being debated whether there should be Islamic religious
instruction for Muslim children in state schools.
Possible Answers: Islamic religious instruction too (= 0); Only Christian re-
ligious instruction (= 1); No religious instruction at all (=
0)
D.1.1 What is your opinion about this: In state schools in Ger-
many, there should be ...
✓
E: ANTISEMITISM
Question set 1: Opinions on Jewish people B N I
Preamble: Every now and then, one hears different opinions about Jew-
ish people. Would you please tell me to what extent you
agree or disagree with these statements?
Possible Answers: Scale (1 to 7): completely disagree - completely agree
E.1.1 As a result of their behaviour, Jewish people are not entirely
without blame for being persecuted.
✓
E.1.2 Jewish people have too much influence in the world. ✓
E.1.3 Many Jewish people try to take personal advantage today
of what happened during the Nazi era and make Germans
pay for it.
✓
Continued on next page
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E.1.4 Jewish people living in Germany should have the same rights
as other Germans in every respect.
✓ ✓
E.1.5 I’m ashamed that Germans have committed so many crimes
against Jewish people.
✓ ✓
Question 2: Opinions on Jewish people as neighbours B N I
Preamble: How pleasant or unpleasant would it be for you to have
members of these groups as neighbours?
Possible Answers: Scale (-3 to +3): would be very unpleasant for me – would
be very pleasant for me
E.2.1 A Jewish person as a neighbour? ✓ ✓
F: DISENCHANTMENT WITH POLITICIANS
Question set 1: Politicians’ interest in ordinary people B N I
Preamble: I’m going to read you some statements now. Please tell
me after each one whether you have the same or a different
opinion.
Possible Answers: Have the same opinion (= 1); have a different opinion (= 0);
don’t know
F.1.1 Most politicians are not really interested at all in the prob-
lems of ordinary people.
✓
G: GENDER ATTITUDES INDEX 1
Question set 1: Role of mothers and fathers B N I
Preamble: People have different opinions about the role of mothers and
fathers. For each of the following statements please tell me
whether you -
Possible Answers: completely agree (= 1); tend to agree (= 1); tend to disagree
(= 0); completely disagree (= 0)
G.1.1 Even if both parents work, it is still better if the mother has
main responsibility for looking after the home and children.
✓
G.1.2 The best way to organise family and work life is for both
partners to work full-time and to look after the home and
children equally.
✓ ✓
Continued on next page
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G.1.3 A full-time working mother can normally establish just as
close a relationship with her small child as a mother who
doesn’t work.
✓ ✓
H: GENDER ATTITUDES INDEX 2
Question set 1: Role of women in the family B N I
Preamble: People have different opinions about the role of women in
the family and in bringing up children. For each of the
statements on the card, please tell me whether you -
Possible Answers: completely agree (= 1); tend to agree (= 1); tend to disagree
(= 0); completely disagree (= 0)
H.1.1 A working mother can establish just as loving and secure a
relationship with her children as a mother who doesn’t work.
✓ ✓
H.1.2 It’s more important for a wife to help her husband with his
career than to pursue her own career.
✓
H.1.3 A married woman should not work if there are not enough




Question set 1: Left-right self-evaluation B N I
Preamble: Many people use the terms ‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’ when they
want to describe different political views. Here we have a
scale which runs from left to right.
Possible Answers: Scale (1 to 10)
I.1.1 Thinking of your own political views, where would you place
these on this scale?
✓
J: PRIDE TO BE GERMAN
Question set 1: Pride to be German B N I
Possible Answers: very proud (= 1); fairly proud (= 1); not very proud (= 0);
not at all proud (= 0)
J.1.1 Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very
proud or not at all proud to be German?
✓
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Notes: We coded answers into variables ranging from 0 to 1, with “1” corre-
sponding to more right-wing/conservative responses.
85
1.8.6 Additional Results, Survey Evidence from GLES
In this section we provide detail on our analyses based on survey data from GLES. Figure F1
shows histograms for the evaluation of the AfD on a left-right scale for all years between 2013-
2017. Figure F2 shows similar histograms for all other main German parties for comparison.
Figure F3 displays “relative stigma” levels for parties from 2009 until 2017: we define stigma as the
(relative) difference between a party’s actual electoral success and stated voted intentions. A value
of 0 indicates exact correspondence between stated voted intentions in polls and actual electoral
shares. A value of 1 indicates that no survey respondents declare support for the party, and that
actual electoral support is entirely in excess of the expected share calcluated from polls. Table F1
shows that left-right self-evaluation of children is highly correlated to that of their parents. This
correlation is even higher in small communities.
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Left   9.9Right
Left-Right Scale
AfD
Notes: The graphs show where GLES survey respondents placed the AfD on the left-right spectrum. The graphs
plot histograms for all years during 2013-2017. Red lines in the graph represent means.
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Left   4.3 Right
Left-Right Scale
GRUENE
Notes: The graphs show where GLES survey respondents placed different political parties on the left-right spectrum.
The graphs plot histograms for all main German political parties during 2013-2017. Red lines in the graph represent
means.
88



















Notes: Graph plots means of “relative stigma” values for nine German parties in German election districts across
time. Relative stigma is defined as difference between the actual vote share and the mean of voting intentions, divided
by the actual vote share, for a given party in a given year.
Table F1: Correlations Between the Political Attitudes of Children and Parents
Dependent Variable: Imputed Left-Right Self-Placement
Both Mother Father
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Parent(s) 0.612∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.556∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.054) (0.018) (0.051) (0.019) (0.049)
Parent(s) 0.124∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.039
× Small Town (0.065) (0.060) (0.059)
Small Town −0.389 −0.415 0.146
(0.340) (0.311) (0.305)
Observations 2,893 1,351 3,270 1,514 3,410 1,613
Adjusted R2 0.265 0.275 0.246 0.249 0.207 0.211
Notes: The table shows the results of regressing an individual’s political attitude on the political attitude of her parent(s),
interacted with an indicator for neighbourhood size. Political attitude is measured as imputed value on a left-right scale: based
on the underlying party identification as indicated by the interviewee in the GLES, the party’s corresponding left-right value
(taken from Parlgov.org) is assigned. In columns (1) and (2), the independent variable is the mean value of the political attitudes
of the mother and the father; in columns (3) and (4), the independent variable is the mother’s political attitude; in columns (5)
and (6), it is the father’s political attitude. Small Town is an indicator variable for whether the individual lives in a rural area,
village, or small or medium-sized town. All regressions include an intercept (not shown). Robust White standard errors are in




Populism and Propagation of
Far-Right Extremism
2.1 Introduction
Recent work in economics has found that beliefs and information play a crucial role for individual
decision-making. Building on early publications by Elster (1989) and Akerlof (1980), the notion of
social norms as important drivers of individual behaviour has been developed further. Social norms
derive from beliefs about other people’s attitudes. Thus, social norms can change when new infor-
mation about others becomes available, for example after elections. As a consequence, information
shocks can have impacts on various dimensions. This paper examines how electoral information
shocks about the success of a xenophobic populist party can propagate far-right protests.
When it comes to protest behaviour, beliefs about other people’s attitudes can be pivotal for
protests to take place, or not to take place at all (Aidt, Leon, and Satchell, 2017; Cantoni et al.,
2019). Information shocks which lead to updates of such beliefs could impede or induce protest
behaviour, for example by overcoming pluralistic ignorance (Kuran, 1991; Enikolopov, Makarin,
and Petrova, 2019; González, 2020; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020). In an experiment, Bursztyn,
Egorov, and Fiorin (2019) show that xenophobic individuals are empowered after a surprising
populist electoral success and act more openly upon their beliefs and attitudes. Some studies
have documented this empowerment effect in non-experimental settings (Schilter, 2018; Müller
and Schwarz, 2018; 2019; Kuipers, Nellis, and Weaver, 2019). However, more work is needed
to better understand under which conditions an empowerment effect manifests itself. This paper
contributes to this young literature using novel data on far-right extremist protest marches (“far-
right protests”) from the German Bundestag. In particular, it extends the literature by showing
how the empowerment effect depends on an element of surprise.
I find that populist electoral success leads to more far-right protests when the success is surpris-
ing. My interpretation is that if populists win unexpectedly, the resulting decrease in social stigma
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attached to far-right protests will be higher. In this paper, I employ three strategies to capture
surprise. First, populist success is more surprising if polling institutes severely underestimate the
populist party’s vote share. Vote shares of Germany’s recently established right-wing populist AfD
party (“Alternative für Deutschland”) were underestimated by more than 20 percent in six state
elections between 2014 and 2016. Second, surprise could be captured by the difference between
populist support in a federal state and populist support in a single municipality. The underlying
assumption is that individuals might have more precise knowledge about other people’s attitudes
in their municipality than about other people’s attitudes in the broader society.
When success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist
vote share 10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean
likelihood of an additional far-right protest. The effect materializes only after the rightward shift
of the AfD and vanishes when polling institutes correctly estimate the populist party’s success.
Including municipality, month, and election date-relative month fixed effects allows me to rule out
that the effect is driven by unobserved heterogeneity with respect to each of these dimensions.
My data also allows me to proxy for time-varying presence of refugees at the municipal level
and to exploit the staggered timing of state elections to come closer to a causal estimate of the
empowerment effect. A placebo regression before 2013, i.e. before the AfD was founded, suggests
that I do not pick up general patterns of far-right protests around elections, but rather the effect
of a populist party’s surprising success.
A third way to capture an element of surprise is through the polarisation or fractionalisation of
the political party landscape in a municipality. Individuals in municipalities with highly polarised
vote shares and few successful marginal parties can be expected to be more surprised by the rise of a
new xenophobic party. The reason is that more homogeneous communities probably do not reflect
the more heterogeneous political landscape of the broader society well. To test this hypothesis, I
construct indices of polarisation and fractionalisation following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).
I find that, indeed, the empowerment effect is close to zero and insignificant if fractionalisation is
high and polarisation low.
The association between surprising populist success and far-right protests would be spurious if
organizers of far-right protests strategically target municipalities with below-average populist vote
shares. Moreover, were organizers more inclined to do so when polling institutes underestimated
the populist vote share, strategic targeting would be able to explain my results. To rule out this
alternative explanation, I test whether the additional far-right protests after surprising elections
tend to be initiated by formal or non-formal organizers. The intuition is that strategic targeting
would be used by formal organizers, if at all. I find that bottom-up far-right protests initiated by
non-formal organizers respond more heavily to the information shock, suggesting that the effect is
not due to strategic targeting.
I leverage restricted-use survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES)
to explore potential mechanisms of the empowerment effect (GLES, 2019). I hypothesize that
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the mechanism at work is a reduction in social stigma attached to far-right protests, and not a
change in attitudes. A priori, both mechanisms could explain my results. On the one hand, several
studies show that attitudes can change after certain information shocks (Sunstein et al., 2016;
Dinas and Fouka, 2018; Giani and Méon, 2019; Gerling and Kellermann, 2019; Grigorieff, Roth,
and Ubfal, 2020). On the other hand, many studies document that attitudes can remain stable for
long periods (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Becker et al., 2016; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2016).
To distinguish between these competing mechanisms, I investigate whether attitudes changed after
state elections in municipalities with different levels of information shocks. I find that attitudes
towards cultural adaptation of immigrants – arguably a proxy for right-wing ideology – are not
affected differentially in municipalities with more surprising information shocks after elections. If
anything, surprisingly high populist success leads individuals in areas with lower AfD support to
regard the AfD as more right-wing.
A valid question concerning the empowerment effect is about its reach. Can information shocks
from elections in other states impact behaviour? Further, is the effect specific to far-right extremism,
or does it also impact antisemitic incidents? I shed light on these questions by leveraging data on
antisemitic incidents and attacks against refugees from the Amadeu Antonio Foundation1. Although
there have been some individual cases of antisemitism within the AfD, the party’s main political
target does not seem to be the Jewish population, but rather Islam in general and asylum seekers
in particular (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019). Consistent with this observation, I find no effect of
surprisingly high populist vote shares on antisemitic incidents, but significant effects for attacks
against refugees. I find no evidence that electoral information shocks translate into more far-right
protests in other states.
To substantiate my interpretation that the empowerment effect works through reduced social
stigma, I test whether patterns of heterogeneity associated with this interpretation hold. According
to my interpretation, the information shock induces far-right protests because xenophobic individ-
uals realise that more people share or at least tolerate their views than previously thought. If this
is the case, one can expect that the following patterns of heterogeneity arise. First, the propagation
effect should be more pronounced in areas where people care more about other people’s opinions.
Second, the effect should come from politically informed far-right extremists. Third, the effect
should be strong in areas where attitudes associated with the support for the AfD are weak. I
obtain restricted-use access to the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) and present evidence
that these patterns of heterogeneity seem to hold.
A relevant question is the role of social media in propagation of far-right protests. An emerg-
ing literature documents how social media influences political outcomes (Müller and Schwarz,
2019; Enikolopov, Makarin, and Petrova, 2019; Bursztyn et al., 2019; Müller and Schwarz, 2018;
Theocharis et al., 2015). I obtain the universe of tweets geolocalised in Germany between the
2013 and 2017 federal elections which contain the hashtag #AfD to address this question. First, I
1. www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/chronik/
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classify the tweets into anti- and pro-AfD using both manual and machine learning methods. Cross-
validation with the universe of tweets from German political parties confirms that most tweets are
directed against the AfD. Political tweets might be a mediating outcome. On the one hand, tweets
might react to electoral information shocks. On the other hand, tweets itself could fuel or impede
far-right protests. I examine both potential roles. It turns out that – as in the case of far-right
protests – the element of surprise is again a key factor that influences twitter responses.
I find that in response to surprisingly high populist success, anti-AfD tweets tend to increase in
areas with lower populist support. When polling institutes correctly estimate the populist party’s
success, the effect vanishes. Further, I provide suggestive evidence that municipalities where pro-
AfD tweets originate from exhibit higher probabilities of far-right protests before and after the
tweets. Anti-AfD tweets do not seem to be associated with higher or lower probabilities of far-right
protests. Note that this evidence should not be seen as causal because tweets are likely to be
endogenous to factors also determining far-right protests. However, the geolocalised nature of the
tweets allow for the inclusion of municipality and month fixed effects, thus mitigating the bias from
time-constant confounders or macroeconomic shocks.
One might argue that polling forecasts for the populist party could also be information shocks.
If polls report higher support of the populist party, people might update beliefs about social accept-
ability and act accordingly. I compare the effect of polling releases with the effect of state election
results. To this end, I collect polling data on the AfD from 21 different polling institutes covering
the time between September 2013 and September 2017. Consistent with an interpretation of in-
creased social acceptability I find that polling releases increase pro-AfD tweets in the same month
as the release. Polling releases seem to impact the number of far-right protests only with a lag of
two months, and with roughly half the effect size in terms of standard deviation as information
shocks from state elections.
This paper contributes to the literature in several respects. While existing research into the
origin of populism is abundant, less attention has been paid to the implications of populism (Guriev
and Papaioannou, 2020). Several studies point to a simultaneous increase in populist success
and occurrences of hate crime (Jäckle and König, 2017; Bursztyn et al., 2019; Rees et al., 2019).
However, despite these studies, the impact of populist success on far-right protests remains unclear.
Work on the consequences of populist success often has remained purely correlational and unable to
address identification challenges of reverse causality and endogeneity. Protests could – in theory –
be both cause and consequence of populist success. Staggered state election results in Germany
between 2014 and 2017 allow me to exploit a unique quasi-natural experiment and address these
challenges.
Previous literature evaluating the consequences of populist electoral success has almost exclu-
sively focused on the nexus of populism and hate crime: Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (2019, p.5)
note that, after Donald Trump’s election, reports about hate crimes against immigrants increased.2
2. The authors postulate that populist electoral success might facilitate coordination for large-scale actions, such
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In another paper, Bursztyn et al. (2019) establish a link between votes for a nationalistic party
in Russia and hate crime in areas with higher social media usage. Schilter (2018) and Albornoz,
Bradley, and Sonderegger (2020) study the relationship between the Brexit vote and hate crimes.
Müller and Schwarz (2018) examine how tweets from Donald Trump spur increases in hate crime
against Muslims. Romarri (2019) shows that the presence of extreme right-wing mayors is asso-
ciated with more hate crimes in Italy. Finally, in the German context, Jäckle and König (2017)
document a correlation between the AfD’s vote share in German districts and the number of at-
tacks against refugees. More relatedly, Müller and Schwarz (2019) provide empirical evidence of a
relationship between anti-refugee Facebook posts from AfD and hate crime in Germany.
Previous literature has also found a link between unexpectedly high populist vote shares and
changes in reported attitudes. Gerling and Kellermann (2019) show that high AfD vote shares
reduced social desirability bias and increased individuals’ likelihood to report intending to vote for
the AfD. In a similar vein, Giani and Méon (2019) show that reported racist attitudes increased
after Donald Trump’s election.
Twitter data has been the object of study for many scholars both in economics and political
science. However, most studies using digital trace data have stopped short of analysing causal links
and seldomly go beyond illustration of usage patterns (Jungherr and Theocharis, 2017). In fact,
the analysis of digital trace data such as twitter might have big potentials, but come with serious
challenges such as contextualisation, data quality, methodology, and interdisciplinarity. As I use
geolocalised tweets, I have the advantage that I can use both geographical and time variation to
come much closer to causal analysis of digital trace data than previous studies did. A final concern
might be that tweets in general do not reflect the political reality perfectly and are themselves
influenced by political reality, user characteristics, and twitter technology (Jungherr, Schoen, and
Jürgens, 2015). I mitigate these issues by restraining my analysis to inherently political tweets –
those with the hashtag #AfD.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 provides a brief overview of the right-wing pop-
ulist AfD party and far-right protests in Germany. section 2.3 outlines the data, and Section 2.4 the
econometric setting. Section 2.5 presents and discusses the results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Populism in Germany: The AfD Party
Founded only months before the 2013 federal election as a Eurosceptic and socially conservative
party, the AfD (“Alternative für Deutschland”) attracted various stripes of right-wingers as mem-
bers from the beginning on (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019). With a remarkable success for a newly
founded party, the party started to embrace xenophobic attitudes more openly after March 2015
as demonstrations and movements, but postpone empirical analysis of this question to future work.
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- when the “Erfurter Resolution”, a right-wing manifesto of the party base, was published. Only
a few months later, the AfD’s former leadership was ousted and exited the party. The party rad-
icalised quickly in early July 2015, which can be seen as the definite right-wing shift of the AfD
(Arzheimer and Berning, 2019). As it happened, another few months later hundreds of thousands
of asylum seekers arrived in Germany, and the party gained substantial support in the following
state elections (see Appendix Figure G1). At the same time, the number of far-right extremist
protest marches increased in Germany. In the more recent past, scholars have argued that “the
AfD are enablers of right-wing terror” (Funke, 2019).
Despite the AfD’s success, there are reasons to believe that the stigma attached to voting for the
new populist right-wing party in Germany was high: Bergmann and Diermeier (2017) argue that
the social stigma and undesirability of the AfD party prevented forecasters to accurately predict
the AfD’s vote share. They show that two major forecasting institutions severely understated its
vote shares in the first eight state elections after 2013. Further, the AfD is regarded as much more
moderate by its supporters than by non-AfD voters (Bergmann and Diermeier, 2017).
2.2.2 Far-Right Protests
Articles five and eight of the German Basic Law stipulate the right to freedom of assembly and
freedom of expression. Protest marches in general do not need legal approval and are allowed take
place as long as the local authority is notified within 48 hours before the protest begins.3 Thus,
far-right protest marches could, in theory, take place in any municipality in Germany at any point
in time. Appendix Figure G2 illustrates two examples of far-right extremist protest marches.
How are far-right protests organized? My data allow me to differentiate between formal and non-
formal organizers of far-right protests. Appendix Figure G3 shows a breakdown of far-right protests
by organization and month. Formal organizers include organizations such as “Der III. Weg” (“The
Third Way”, in reference to the so-called “Third Reich”), the far-right “NPD” party (“Nationale
Partei Deutschlands”) or “Die Rechte” (“The Right”). Non-formal organizers are not affiliated with
a far-right group or movement.4 Appendix Figure G4 shows a word cloud of slogans for far-right
protests since 2005. Typical slogans under which far-right protest marches are reported at the local
authority include the following: “Gegen Überfremdung und Asylmissbrauch” (“Against foreign
infiltration and asylum misuse”), “Tag der deutschen Heimattreue” (“Day of German Loyalty”),
and “Das Boot ist voll - Asylbetrüger abschieben” (“The boat is full - expel asylum cheaters”).
Far-right protests are of high political concern as can be seen by regular parliamentary enquiries
about their occurrences and even mass media coverage like in the case of the far-right protests in
Chemnitz on 27th August 2018.
It is not exaggerated to see these far-right extremist protest marches as a serious threat to
3. The only exception is the case of immediate threat of public security, which enables local authorities to cancel
the protest march as a last resort.
4. The data attributes the far-right protest organization in this case to “neo-Nazis” in general or “Other”.
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liberal democracy. As Madestam et al. (2013) argue, protests can build political movements that
ultimately affect policymaking. They do so by influencing political views rather than solely through
the revelation of existing political preferences. Further, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court
pronounces the following judgement about the NPD – one of the main organizers of the far-right
protest marches:
“The National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) advocates a concept aimed at
abolishing the existing free democratic basic order. The NPD intends to replace the
existing constitutional system with an authoritarian national state that adheres to the
idea of an ethnically defined ‘people’s community’ (Volksgemeinschaft). Its political
concept disrespects human dignity and is incompatible with the principle of democracy.”
(Federal Constitutional Court, 2017)
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Main Outcome: Far-Right Protests
I digitize and geocode responses to parliamentary enquiries about 1,249 far-right extremist protest
marches (“far-right protests”) between 22nd September 2013 and 24th September 2017, the dates
of federal elections and period in which the newly emerging right-wing populist party gained consid-
erable success at various state elections.5 For a placebo regression, I also use observations between
2009-2013, comprising an additional 513 far-right protests.
Figure 2.1 shows the geographic dispersion of the far-right protest marches across the 16 federal
states. Far-right protests seem to occur more frequently in the East, but also in various areas
in West Germany. For most of my analysis I will focus on observations within the shaded states
that held a state election between the 2013-2017 federal elections. Appendix Figure G5 illustrates
that far-right protests peak at the end of 2015 during the height of the so-called refugee crisis. In
addition to the affiliations of organizers, I also digitize the slogans under which far-right protests are
reported to the authorities. Appendix Figure G6 shows that the total of far-right-protest marches
varies substantially by state.
2.3.2 Further Outcomes: Attacks Against Refugees and Antisemitic Incidents
I use data on attacks against refugees from the Amadeu Antonio Foundation.6 The data covers
3,335 incidents in the period between January 2015 and early 2017. All attacks against refugees
5. According to §104 of Germany’s parliamentary rules of procedure, members of parliament can request informa-
tion from the government using so-called ”small enquiry”. The answers to these requests are made public. A group
of mostly left-wing members of parliament has posed the following question to the government every quarter since
2005: How many far-right demonstrations or other public events by right-wing extremist took place in the quarter?
6. The data is publicly available in the Harvard dataverse
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Figure 2.1: Map: Far-Right Protest Marches
between 2013 and 2017 federal elections
Notes: The shaded area indicates states with state elections between the 2013-2017 federal elections that are not city
states. Black dots represent occurrences of far-right protests. Digitized data from the German Parliament.
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feature a brief description. For example, it is noted that at 3rd January 2017, in a municipality
called Alsbach-Hänlein in the state of Hesse,
“unknown people threw a Molotov cocktail on an asylum seekers’ hotel. The residents
managed to extinguish the fire before the firefighters arrived. The building took damage
from the fire, but nobody was injured.”
In general, attacks against refugees comprise five categories of incidents: Property damage to
refugee homes (2,226 incidents), assault (534), anti-refugee demonstrations (339), and arson (225).
11 incidents are classified as suspected cases still under investigation. I use the geolocations provided
for each incident to geographically link the incidents to German municipalities. Figure G7 in the
appendix provides a geographic overview of the data which covers anti-refugee incidents from 1st
January 2015 until 13th February 2017. As in the case of far-right protests, the number of attacks
against refugees culminates at the end of 2015 and declines afterwards (see Appendix Figure G5
and Figure G6).
Finally, I web-scrape and digitize entries in the chronicle of antisemitic incidents from the
Amadeu Antonio foundation’s website.7 The chronicle reports 423 antisemitic incidents between the
2013 and 2017 federal elections. Incidents include violent assaults, verbal insults, and antisemitic
scribbling that were reported in local newspapers. The peak around July 2014 coincides with
demonstrations in Germany in the context of Israel’s military offensive in the Gaza Strip (see
Appendix Figure G5 and Figure G6).
2.3.3 Treatment: AfD Shock Variable
I exploit data from a quasi-natural experiment: between the federal elections in 2013 and 2017,
13 out of 16 German states held elections (see Appendix Figure G1). Starting from 4.7 percent
in the federal election of 2013, the AfD gained up to 24.4 percent in Saxony-Anhalt in 2016 and
became the third largest force in the German parliament in the federal election of 2017. I restrict
my sample to monthly observations of those 7,620 municipalities in states with state elections, and
omit the single-municipality city states of Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin. There are two reasons
for ignoring city states. One is that they are administratively only single municipalities. Another
is that, even if one wanted to perform an analysis of far-right protests at the level of constituencies
within city states, far-right protests would probably be held at certain locations within the city
states for reasons of visibility. Easy access of these locations via public transport is likely to render
any eventual association between vote shares at constituencies and far-right activism insignificant.
I use the difference of the state-level AfD result to a municipality’s AfD result as a measure of
the information shock of populist success. Note that I construct the variable to be time-constant
7. The chronicle is publicly available on www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/chronik/
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and defined at the point in time directly after a state election. As municipalities with below state-
average AfD vote share receive the populist information shock positively, I call this variable “AfD
Shock”. It is defined as follows:
AfD Shock𝑖 = Δ(AfD𝑠(𝑖) −AfD𝑖)
where AfD is the AfD vote share, 𝑖 indexes a municipality, an 𝑠(𝑖) a state.
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics. The mean of the AfD Shock variable is -0.002 and not
exactly zero because – apart from averaging over municipalities and not over the population – some
municipalities have very high AfD support. As negative vote shares are impossible, there are no
equivalent municipalities with equally low AfD vote shares to upset the impact on the mean of the
state-municipality difference. Figure 2.2 maps the AfD shock variable for German municipalities.
Each hexagon represents one municipality and blank states are states without state elections in the
period between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections.
What are correlates of the AfD Shock variable? Table 2.2 presents means of various socioeco-
nomic characteristics for municipalities with negative and positive AfD Shock. It turns out that
municipalities above and below their state-average populist vote show some differences. More liberal
places with below-average AfD support tend to have fewer inhabitants, less refugees, and slightly
higher trade exposure. However, they do not differ significantly from the municipalities with above
state-average populist support in these respects. Significant differences are found in employment
and human capital characteristics. For example, 2.8 percent of people in the average municipality
with populist support above state average were unemployed in 2016, compared to 2.3 percent in
more liberal municipalities, amounting to roughly a fourth of a standard deviation in difference.8
Further, there is some persistence in voting for the AfD despite the party’s rightward shift after
July 2015. Municipalities with below-average AfD support at a state election have already been
voting on average 1.6 percentage points less for the AfD in the 2013 federal election. The persis-
tence holds also with regard to relative AfD support of municipalities within states: municipalities
with positive AfD Shock at state elections were on average already 1.5 percentage points below the
state average AfD vote share in the 2013 federal election.






















































































Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs.
Panel A: Voting Variables
Municipal AfD vote share, state election 0.126 0.066 0.000 0.482 373,380
State-Average AfD vote share, state election 0.124 0.045 0.059 0.243 373,380
AfD Shock: Δ State-Municipal AfD, state election -0.002 0.041 -0.274 0.137 373,380
Panel B: Outcome Variables
Far-right protests 0.003 0.067 0 8 373,380
Attacks against refugees 0.011 0.120 0 5 198,120
Antisemitic incidents 0.001 0.026 0 2 373,380
#AfD Tweets 0.020 0.525 0 121 373,380
Pro-AfD #AfD Tweets, manually classified 0.001 0.034 0 7 373,380
Anti-AfD #AfD Tweets, manually classified 0.002 0.066 0 10 373,380
Panel C: Control Variables
Δ Unemployment, 2017-2007 -0.017 0.027 -0.167 0.069 373,380
Unemployment, 2016 0.026 0.015 0.000 0.138 371,910
Trade exposure -1.011 1.409 -6.390 12.940 372,057
Share people with university degree 0.097 0.029 0.055 0.400 373,380
Municipal AfD vote share, 2013 federal election 0.051 0.022 0.000 0.278 373,331
Refugees 17 236 0 11,997 259,391
Population, 2015 6,461 28,089 9 1,060,582 373,380
Notes: Sample includes monthly observations for German municipalities in states with state elections between the 2013 and
2017 federal elections, where 𝑇 = 49 (months) and 𝑁 = 7, 620 (municipalities in states with state election in 2013-2017,
except city states). Voting outcomes for each municipality are time-constant and defined at the time of the state election. The
AfD Shock variable is defined as time-constant difference of a state election AfD result with the municipal AfD result (positive
values denoting higher state averages than municipal AfD vote shares at state elections).
2.3.4 Asymmetric Information Assumption
The above section has shown the construction of the AfD Shock variable as the difference between
state average and municipal populist vote shares. This variable captures the information shock of
populist electoral success on individual beliefs if the following assumption holds:
• Assumption 1.1: People generally hold quite accurate beliefs about the attitudes of other
people in their immediate surroundings (i.e. in their municipality). In particular, they have
a good feeling of how many people are extremist or xenophobe.
• Assumption 1.2: People generally hold quite imprecise or erroneous beliefs about the at-
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Table 2.2: Correlates of AfD Shock
(1) (2) (3)
Negative Shock Positive Shock Diff(2)-(1)
Population, 2015 6679.3 6271.6 -407.7
[26170.5] [29652.6] [645.4]
Refugees 30.1 26.8 -3.35
[335.3] [320.0] [9.39]
Share people with university degree 0.10 0.094 -0.0063***
[0.026] [0.031] [0.00067]
Δ Unemployment, 2017-2007 -0.021 -0.014 0.0066***
[0.030] [0.025] [0.00063]
Unemployment, 2016 0.028 0.023 -0.0049***
[0.016] [0.013] [0.00034]
Trade exposure -1.04 -0.99 0.045
[1.48] [1.35] [0.032]
Municipal AfD vote share, 2013 federal election 0.059 0.043 -0.016***
[0.024] [0.018] [0.00048]
AfD Shock at 2013 federal election -0.0068 0.0077 0.015***
[0.022] [0.017] [0.00044]
Observations 3,532 4,088 7,620
Notes: Sample includes a cross-section of German municipalities at state elections between the 2013 and 2017 federal
elections, except city states. The AfD Shock variable is defined as time-constant difference of a state election AfD result
with the municipal AfD result (positive values denoting higher state averages than municipal AfD vote shares at state
elections). Standard deviations in parentheses. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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titudes of other people in the broader society (i.e. in the federal state). In particular, they
lack a good feeling of how many people in the broader society are extremist or xenophobe.
I argue that this assumption is credible. First, there is secondary literature that supports both
parts of the assumption. In particular, several papers find a “neighbourhood effect” when it comes
to attitudes at a very local level (Tolsma, Van der Meer, and Gesthuizen, 2009; Gundelach and
Freitag, 2014). Gundelach and Freitag (2014) argue that “individuals generally spend a lot of time
in their neighbourhood, so that trusting attitudes are thought to be most affected by this immediate
social context and less so by larger regional or even national contexts.” Further, several studies
document effects which are present at the local level, but not at a broader level (Hooghe et al.,
2009; Quillian, 1995).
Second, assumption 1.2 is supported by the fact that leading German polling institutes often
failed to predict AfD outcomes (Bergmann and Diermeier, 2017). Figure 2.3 presents deviations
between polling and actual AfD vote shares for state elections between the 2013 and 2017 federal
elections, excluding city states. Until late 2016, the actual state-level AfD vote shares were severely
underestimated in all state elections by roughly 20 percent. After the election in Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania, polling results tend to reflect the actual AfD vote shares well.
One might object that AfD vote shares of the 2013 federal election seem to have at least some
explanatory power for the information shock. However, Table G1 in the appendix shows that –
consistent with the AfD’s shift to the right after July 2015 – correlations of 2013 AfD vote shares,
as well as their deviations from state averages, are less correlated with both AfD vote shares and
information shocks in later state elections. This is in line with my finding that the effect of populist
success is most pronounced in the period after the AfD’s turn into a right-wing populist party.9
2.3.5 Twitter Data
Purchasing a twitter premium API account and using python scraping allowed me to obtain geolo-
cated tweets in German municipalities for the period between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections10.
Similarly to how Müller and Schwarz (2019) handle Facebook posts, I restrict tweets to those con-
taining the hashtag #AfD (about 22,000). I geographically match tweets to the AfD Shock variable
of the respective municipality (see previous section).
As Jungherr and Theocharis (2017) point out, it is important to consider the context of dig-
ital trace data in order to ask meaningful questions because, as shown by Posegga and Jungherr
9. Fourth, even if one takes the “pure” municipal specification instead of a municipality’s difference to the state
average, the findings remain very similar. Appendix Table G2 shows regression results where the municipal AfD
support is used instead of the AfD Shock variable.
10. Note that about 1 percent of all tweets in Germany are geolocalisable (Scheffler, 2014). Several studies show
that geolocalisable tweets are good predictors of various kinds of social phenomena, ranging from park visitation
(Hamstead et al., 2018) and unhealthy food consumption (Widener and Li, 2014) to crimes (Ristea, Andresen, and
Leitner, 2018) and illnesses (Young et al., 2018). However, users of geoservices on Twitter have been found to exhibit
different characteristics than Twitter users who do not enable geoservices (Sloan and Morgan, 2015).
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Figure 2.3: Deviation of Polling from AfD Vote Shares – Absolute and in Percent
Notes: Graphs plot deviations (absolute and in percent) of two different polling institutes from actual AfD vote share
for the 10 state elections between 2013 and 2017 federal elections, except city states. Own calculations based on data
from wahlrecht.de. Polling forecasts are taken from the last polling result before the respective election.
(2019), tweets might not necessarily reflect political agendas. To cross-validate the content of the
geolocalised #AfD tweets, I thus also obtain the (non-geolocalised) universe of tweets from German
political parties.
2.3.6 Control Variables and Additional Data
The arguably most salient political event between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections is the so-
called “Syrian refugee crisis”. As most far-right protests seem to be linked to immigration topics
according to their slogans, I purchase data on the number of refugees in each municipality for
every month in my sample from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). As
refugees are not directly observable, I compose a proxy following the Federal Employment Agency’s
instructions in which asylum seekers should be classified as refugees if they come from one of the
so-called “asylum countries” Afghanistan, Eritrea, Irak, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, or Syria.
Two often debated factors behind the occurrence of far-right protest marches are unemployment
and job losses. I obtain municipality-level data on levels of and 10-year changes in unemployment
rates from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). A municipality’s pop-
ulation in 2015 is added to my set of controls from the Federal Bureau for Statistics (destatis).
Additionally, to account for the losses in manufacturing jobs as studied by Dauth, Findeisen, and
Suedekum (2014), I match a time-constant variable on trade exposure from the county level to the
municipalities, defined as the difference between import and export exposure. Finally, I use the
share of people with tertiary education in a given county as a proxy for human capital, obtained
from destatis.
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I complement my data with the restricted-use data from the German Longitudinal Election
Study (GLES) to examine how attitudes might change as result of information shocks from pop-
ulist electoral success.11 I also obtain restricted-use access to the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) to study patterns of heterogeneity. Finally, I compile data on polling forecasts from
wahlrecht.de.
2.4 Econometric Setting
To study the local impact of populist electoral results on far-right protests, I set up a simple
difference-in-difference design as follows:
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿 (AfD Shock𝑖 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡) + 𝛽1AfD Shock𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡
+𝛽3AfD 2013𝑖 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + 𝜓𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁𝑠(𝑖) + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑟(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 are far-right protests in municipality 𝑖 in state 𝑠(𝑖) at month 𝑡, and at relative-
to-election month 𝑟(𝑡). The variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 is a dummy for after a state election, AfD Shock𝑖
is a measure of information shock from populist electoral success at the time of state election,
AfD 2013𝑖 is the AfD vote share of the municipality at the 2013 federal election, 𝑋𝑖 and 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 are
time-constant and time-varying control variables. 𝜁𝑠(𝑖), 𝜉𝑡, and 𝜂𝑟(𝑡) are fixed effects with respect to
geography (state, county, or municipality), with respect to time (calendar month) and with respect
to distance to state election (month before or after state election). The coefficient of interest judging
the difference in outcomes due to information shocks about populist success after an election is 𝛿.
Note that time-constant variables will be omitted when municipality fixed effects are included.
In this way, any idiosyncratic time-constant difference between municipalities is accounted for by
municipality fixed effects. Moreover, macroeconomic shocks affecting all geographic entities – such
as the influx of refugees around 2015 – are captured by the month fixed effects. The relative
month fixed effects account for differences in outcomes specific to certain months before or after
state elections. In addition to fixed effects specifications, I also use an event study design. Here, I
normalize my data to include 2-year windows around state elections. I show that the result is robust
to different choices of time windows, though. I employ OLS regressions to ease interpretation, but
also show robustness to poisson estimation.12
11. The data is available without municipality identifiers on www.gesis.org.
12. Poisson estimation takes into account the fact that number of far-right protests is a count variable and exhibits
many zero values, which leads to bias in OLS. Moreover, Table 2.1 shows that the mean and variance of far-right
protests are not extremely different, making poisson regressions a natural choice. The sample size in Poisson es-
timations with high dimensional fixed effects is greatly reduced because observations are dropped which are either
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Result: Far-Right Protests
Table 2.3 presents the main result. Column 1 of Panel A reports a simple difference in difference
estimate of the coefficient 𝛿 from the regression model in section 2.4. Here, the effect of the
AfD Shock after state elections on the number of far-right protests is estimated without any fixed
effect or control variables. In this first specification, the likelihood of an additional far-right protest
incresases by 0.253 percentage points on average if a municipality has an AfD support 10 percentage
points below state average. This is a sizeable effect and amounts to an 84 percent (0.00253/0.003)
increase of the mean of far-right protests.
Including different combinations of state, month, relative month, and even county or municipal-
ity fixed effects reduces the coefficient size by about 50 percent. Notably, the coefficient of interest
retains significance at the five percent level in all specifications - even in the most demanding spec-
ification using month, relative month, and municipality fixed effects. When control variables are
added in panel B, the magnitude of the coefficient is reduced only slightly: an 0.1 increase in the
AfD Shock is related to a roughly 0.1 percentage points higher likelihood of an additional far-right
protest, i.e. increases the mean of far-right protests by roughly a third (0.001/0.003). With ex-
ception of column 6, all specifications with controls retain significance at the five percent level.13
14
So far, the linear models might have failed to adequately deal with the presence of many zeros
of the right-skewed count variable of far-right protests. Adding to the results from linear models,
Appendix Table G4 implements poisson regression. The result again remains robust to various
combinations of state, county, municipality, month, and relative month fixed effects (columns 1, 2,
and 5). It is hence not driven by a specific location or timing of an election. To check whether
the effect is due to outliers with a multitude of far-right protests in a given month, I perform the
same regression as in column 2 with a binary dependent variable (column 3). The result remains
unchanged, lending credence to a general pattern which is not due to outliers.15
Figure 2.4 illustrates the dynamics of this finding. In the left graph, the line represents monthly
interaction coefficients of the AfD Shock variable before and after state elections. The omitted
category is the month of the election as indicated by the vertical blue line. Before an election, the
singletons or separated by the fixed effects. However, even the poisson results with relatively small number of ob-
servations also show significance of the propagation effect, suggesting that the effect does not stem from singleton
observations (Correia, 2015).
13. Appendix Table G3 shows that when restricting the sample to 2-year windows around state elections, the
magnitude of the effect in the linear models remains qualitatively unaffected. Further, Appendix Figure G8 shows
how the coefficient of interest changes when different time windows are employed.
14. Results remain qualitatively unchanged when interaction terms of control variables with the post election dummy
are included. Results are available upon request.
15. Note that the coefficient size is not comparable across columns because of either different number of observations
or binarization of the dependent variables. Further, magnitudes of Poisson coefficients are to be interpreted as
expected increases in log counts, so are not directly comparable to OLS coefficients.
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confidence intervals almost always include zero and no clear pre-treatment trend is observable.16
After state elections, interaction coefficients increase markedly. Appendix Figure G10 shows long-
run dynamics. Following Borusyak and Jaravel (2017), I only include interactions of quarterly
dummies after elections with the AfD Shock variable. This long-run analysis should be interpreted
with caution because bigger time windows around state elections will include other elections, thus
leading to potential bias. However, the graph suggests that the treatment effect becomes smaller
and insignificant after the first three quarters.
Figure 2.4: Event Study: Far-Right Protests
Notes: Graph plots regression coefficients of the interaction of AfD Shock with month dummies relative to state
election. Regressions include state, month, and relative month fixed effects, as well as AfD Shock. Standard errors
are clustered at the state-times-month level. Sample consists of 2-year monthly windows for German municipalities
in states with state elections between the 2013-2017 federal elections, except city states. Omitted category is the
election month.
16. Pre-trends seem to be informative as the number of far-right protests before state elections are not particularly





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.2 The Effect of Polling Underestimation
My main result adds to the existing literature by documenting an empowerment effect in the context
of far-right protests in Germany. In the following two sections I go beyond this contribution and
show that the empowerment effect depends on an element of surprise.
Table 2.4 shows that the propagation effect is heterogeneous with respect to polling underes-
timation (see Figure 2.3 for details on polling underestimation). The idea is that if more severe
underestimation is associated with a stronger information shock and positive updating of beliefs,
the propagation effect should be stronger in state elections with higher underestimation of the
AfD vote share. Column 1 of Table 2.4 repeats my main result. Columns 2-4 split the sample
into three parts according to underestimation by polling institutes and before/after the rightward
shift of the AfD in July 2015. The propagation effect is strong and significant in states with high
underestimation (column 3), regardless of a sample restriction to 2-year windows around elections
(Panel B), or demanding fixed effects specifications (Panel C). In the 2014 period – when the AfD
was a Eurosceptic, but not openly right-wing populist party (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019) – the
effect size is much smaller and insignificant once fixed effects or sample restrictions are employed
(column 1). Column 4 reports results for state elections in which the AfD election was forecasted
with only minor deviations. Here, the effect is negligible and very close to zero (column 4).
These results suggest that the empowerment effect from populist success depends on an element
of surprise, as captured by the underestimation of polling institutes. They shed light on a condition
for manifestation of an empowerment effect as studied in Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (2019).
Social norms, so it seems, change only if information shocks about other people’s attitudes are
unexpected and lead to an update in beliefs.
2.5.3 Heterogeneity: Polarisation and Fractionalisation
I argue that the propagation effect of populism’s success on far-right protests in more liberal
areas depends on an element of surprise. Yet, in what sense are individuals surprised by election
outcomes? So far, my analysis has tried to capture surprising information shocks in two ways.
First, the AfD Shock variable conceptualizes the information shock as the asymmetry between
uncertainty about attitudes at the local and federal state level (see subsection 2.3.4). Second,
surprise is captured by underestimation of the AfD’s results by official polling institutes. Another
possibility is that individuals might be more surprised by the AfD’s success if they live in more
homogeneous communities which do not reflect the more heterogeneous political landscape of the
broader society. Arguably, an unexpectedly high vote share of a marginal party at the state level
could be more surprising in municipalities where marginal parties receive very few or almost no
votes at all. For example, if the local political landscape of a community is dominated by two major
parties (low fractionalisation and high polarisation), high support for a marginal party at the state
level might represent a larger information shock. On the other hand, seeing a marginal party gain
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Table 2.4: Asymmetric Information Effect:
Heterogeneity of Propagation Effect with respect to Underestimation









Panel A: State FEs
AfD Shock × Post 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0039) (0.0063) (0.0059) (0.0060)
Observations 256886 66567 116223 74096
Panel B: Event Study Sample
AfD Shock × Post 0.0151∗∗ 0.0012 0.0299∗∗ 0.0027
(0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0125) (0.0113)
Observations 120808 33100 57868 29840
Panel C: Municipality, Month, and Relative Month FEs
AfD Shock × Post 0.0147∗∗ 0.0013 0.0268∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0133) (0.0083)
Observations 120638 33085 57794 29759
Notes: Table shows coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is
the number of far-right protests. Columns 2-4 restrict the sample to state elections according to
underestimation of AfD vote share by polling institutes (see Figure 2.3) and according to before
and after the rightward shift of the AfD (July 2015): Column 2 includes Saxony, Brandenburg,
Thueringia. Column 3 includes Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, and Saxony-Anhalt.
Column 4 includes Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and North
Rhine-Westphalia. All regressions include controls for refugees, population, unemployment, trade
exposure, and human capital. Panel A regressions include state fixed effects. Panel B uses an
event-study sample that only includes two-year time windows around state elections and includes
state fixed effects. Panel C regressions include municipality fixed effects, as well as month and
relative month fixed effects, and use the event-study sample of two-year windows around state
elections. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level. Mean of dependent variable
in Panel C is 0.0016, 0.0052, 0.0011, and 0.0027 in columns 1 to 4 respectively. One, two and
three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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high vote shares in state elections might not be as surprising for communities with many successful
marginal parties (high fractionalisation, low polarisation).
To assess this hypothesis, I construct indices of polarisation and fractionalisation of party vote
shares at the municipality level following Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005):




















where 𝜋𝑖,𝑝 are vote shares for party 𝑝 in municipality 𝑖. The fractionalisation index in my context
can be interpreted as the probability that two randomly selected votes within one municipality were
not cast for the same party. A high value of the fractionalisation index thus indicates the presence
of small minority groups, such as the AfD before September 2017. The polarisation index shows
how far away the distribution of vote shares is from the highest level of polarisation – a bipolar
50-50 percent split. Higher levels in the polarisation index suggest the presence of large groups –
such as the SPD and CDU – but also hint at the absence of small minority groups.
Appendix Figure G11 presents descriptive statistics of the indices. Note that the indices of
fractionalisation and polarisation are negatively correlated (𝜌 = -0.4354, p<0.01), as shown in the
two graphs at the bottom. This is intuitive as they capture the relative presence and absence of
small minority parties. The top two graphs show their density distributions for the entire sample
and within each state. Both means and distributions of indices vary substantially across federal
states. Therefore, and because I use staggered elections of federal states, I create indicator variables
which turn one if a municipality has a higher value of the fractionalisation or polarisation index
than the median municipality in its state. I expect the coefficient of interest to be particularly high
in municipalities with high polarisation and low fractionalisation. On the other hand, individuals
living in municipalities with low polarisation and high fractionalisation of vote shares might not be
surprised by the AfD’s success.
Figure 2.5 shows that the propagation effect is heterogeneous with respect to polarisation and
fractionalisation of vote shares. The main coefficient of interest – the interaction between AfD
Shock and a dummy for after a state election – is particularly big in the sample of municipalities
with high polarisation and low fractionalisation of vote shares. On the other hand, it is almost
exactly zero for municipalities with low polarisation and high fractionalisation. Note that this
result is not an artefact of unequal sample sizes as the split by median index values within states
ensures almost identical number of observations for high/low polarisation or fractionalisation. Yet,
one has to be cautious with a causal interpretation here as the sample split might be based on an
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endogenous variable.
Figure 2.5: Effect Heterogeneity: Polarisation and Fractionalisation
Polarisation Fractionalisation
Notes: Graph plots interaction coefficients of interest (AfD Shock times after state election) and 95% confidence
intervals from OLS regressions for different samples of municipalities, split within states into above- and below
median value of fractionalisation or polarisation indices. Monthly observations of municipalities in 2-year windows
around state elections between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections. Municipalities are from states with state elections
between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, except city-states. All regressions include municipality, month, and
relative month fixed effects, as well as time-varying controls for refugees. Standard errors are clustered at the state-
times-month level. See Table 2.5 for a regression table with interaction effects.
Table 2.5 presents the results in a regression set-up. Here, the main information shock variable is
interacted with indicators for above or below median values of the fractionalisation and polarisation
index within a given state.17 Column 1 repeats the main result with municipality, month, and
relative month fixed effects using the event study sample. Here, a 0.1 increase in the AfD shock is
related to a 0.147 percentage points higher likelihood of an additional far-right protest after a state
election. Yet, the following columns show that this relationship is much stronger for municipalities
which do not have many marginal parties. The marginal effect of the AfD shock on far-right
protests after state elections is almost doubled in municipalities with low fractionalisation and high
polarisation. Although the indices are highly correlated, column 4 suggests that polarisation is the
key driver of this result. This may be due to the fact that in the polarisation index the size of
the group also enters the weight of the probabilities of two votes being cast for different parties.
The result is that votes for small parties – such as the AfD – contribute proportionally more to
the index of polarisation than their relative size, but less than their relative size to the index of
fractionalisation (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
This evidence sheds additional light on the importance of a surprise element for an empower-
17. Interactions of these polarisation and fractionalisation indicators with the post dummy and AfD Shock variable
are also included.
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Table 2.5: Polarisation and Fractionalisation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AfD Shock × Post 0.0147∗∗ 0.0254∗∗ -0.0016 0.0097
(0.0067) (0.0110) (0.0100) (0.0085)
AfD Shock × Post × High Fractionalisation -0.0266∗ -0.0186
(0.0154) (0.0120)
AfD Shock × Post × High Polarisation 0.0278∗∗ 0.0212∗∗
(0.0138) (0.0099)
Observations 120597 120597 120597 120597
Notes:´Table shows coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the number
of far-right protests. All regressions include municipality, month, and relative month fixed effects, and control
for time-varying number of refugees. Sample consists of German municipalities in states with state elections
between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, except city states. Monthly observations in 2-year windows around
state elections. High Polarisation and High Fractionalisation variables are indicators for above-median values of
polarisation and fractionalisation indices within a given state as explained in subsection 2.5.3. Standard errors
are clustered at the state-times-month level. One, two and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels respectively.
ment effect as described in Bursztyn, Egorov, and Fiorin (2019). However, the heterogeneity of
effects should not be seen as causal because variation in polarisation or fractionalisation might be
endogenous. The analysis is based on the intuition that if polarisation is low and fractionalisation is
high, the success of a marginal party at the state level comes as a bigger surprise. The correlational
evidence points to a much stronger empowerment effect in this case.
2.5.4 Political Targeting vs. Social Acceptability
An alternative interpretation of my finding could be a story of political targeting. For strategical
reasons, formal right-wing extremist organizations might target municipalities with below-average
AfD results more after state elections. The increase in far-right protests in below-average AfD
municipalities after state elections might thus not be due to empowered xenophobes showing their
“true colours”, but due to some supra-regional organizations targeting these areas, maybe in an
effort to gain more voters. Such top-down protests would probably not stem from a reduction in
social stigma, but rather from strategic campaigning. On the other hand, the increase in far-right
protests could be driven by bottom-up protests, organized not by supra-regional organizations, but
in a bottom-up fashion by local far-right extremists.
I examine whether formal organizations tend to organize more far-right protests after elections
at below-average AfD municipalities than people without affiliation to formal organizations. It
is interesting that about half of all far-right protests are organized by people without affiliation
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to a formal movement or party.18 Figure 2.6 shows that propagation effect sizes are somewhat
higher and significant for non-formal protests as outcome variable, even if month and municipality
fixed effects are taken into account. The bottom right plot only considers the 2016 period where
the information shock was biggest. Although far-right protests by formal organizers increase in
more liberal areas after state elections as well, the effect is more pronounced for protests by non-
formal organizers. In summary, an analysis of organizations behind the far-right protests makes an
alternative explanation of political targeting seem less convincing.
Figure 2.6: Formal vs. Non-Formal Organizers of Far-Right Protests
Notes: Graph plots interaction coefficients of interest (AfD Shock times after state election) and 95% confidence
intervals from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a count of formally organized far-right protests (“formal”),
and protests which are organized without attribution to a formal right-wing extremist group (“non-formal”). Formal
right-wing extremist groups include “Der III. Weg”, the far-right party NPD (“Nationale Partei Deutschlands”), “Die
Rechte”, “PEGIDA”, and the“Pro-Movement”. Sample consists of monthly observations of German municipalities in
2-year windows around state elections between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, with exception of the bottom right
graph that includes 2-year windows around states during the 2016 underestimation period (see Figure 2.3). Regression
specifications are as indicated in graph headers. All regressions cluster standard errors at the state-times-month level.
2.5.5 Mechanism: No Change in Attitudes
Which mechanism is at work to generate the increase in far-right protests in municipalities with
information shocks? I argue that the information shock leads to a decrease in social stigma in more
liberal areas, which in turn induces xenophobes to organize far-right protests and take to the streets.
A competing mechanism could be a change in attitudes as a result of the information shock. Several
18. See Appendix Figure G3 for a monthly overview of frequencies and organizers of far-right protests.
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studies show that individuals might change their attitudes when provided with certain information
(Sunstein et al., 2016; Dinas and Fouka, 2018; Giani and Méon, 2019; Gerling and Kellermann,
2019; Grigorieff, Roth, and Ubfal, 2020). However, other studies document that attitudes can
remain stable for long periods (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Becker et al., 2016; Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2016). To distinguish between these competing mechanisms, I obtain access to the
restricted-use German Longitudinal Election Study with postal code geographic indicators (GLES,
2019). I geographically match the municipalities’ AfD Shock values to postal codes using territorial
shares. My goal is to examine whether individuals change their attitudes when confronted with
surprisingly high populist vote shares in the broader society.
Table 2.6 presents the results. I compare responses to three different questions between areas
with higher and lower information shocks before and after state elections. The column headers indi-
cate which states held elections in the respective period (city states in brackets are not represented
in the sample). The evidence suggests that attitudes did not change as a result of the information
shock, but the perceived position of the AfD party did to some extent. Panel A suggests that
attitudes towards integration of immigrants are not systematically different in areas with stronger
information shocks after state elections. Panel B indicates that the number of people leaning to-
wards the AfD did not change with information shocks from state elections. Acknowledge, however,
that measurement error is very likely to be present due to the geographic matching of municipalities
to postal code areas. Yet, if anything, the coefficients in Panels A and B point towards even more
liberal attitudes in more liberal areas after state elections. The only significant difference for areas
with higher information shocks is in the left-right assessment of the AfD (Panel C). The dependent
variable in Panel C is constructed from the question where one would place the AfD on a left-right
spectrum on a scale from 1 (left) to 11 (right). Consistent with the rightward shift of the AfD after
July 2015 (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019) and the high underestimation of AfD results in the first
state elections in 2016 by polling institutes (see Figure 2.3), the AfD is seen as more right-wing
after the first 2016 state elections, and particularly so in places with below average AfD support
(Panel C, column 2).19 This effect seems to be reversed in one state election in East Germany when
the polls correctly estimated the AfD’s success (column 3)
In summary, survey evidence does not seem to support a shift in attitudes as a result of electoral
information shocks about populist success. This is consistent with Cantoni, Hagemeister, and West-
cott (2019) who find that attitudes associated with the rise of the AfD in Germany do not change
much between 2013 and 2017. If anything, the evidence points towards a shift in the perceived
position of the AfD party on a left-right scale after state elections depending on underestimation
by polling institutes.
19. Appendix Figure G12 shows where survey respondents placed the AfD on a left-right spectrum before and after
state results.
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Table 2.6: Mechanism: AfD positioning changes, but attitudes remain constant

















Panel A: Immigrants must adopt German culture
AfD Shock × Post -3.75 -1.34 -1.37 -2.13
(2.58) (1.49) (0.86) (1.76)
Observations 1651 2004 2014 1335
Panel B: AfD identification
AfD Shock × Post -0.58 -0.64 -0.26 -0.22
(0.46) (0.85) (0.25) (0.35)
Observations 1605 1882 1915 1285
Panel C: Left-right positioning AfD
AfD Shock × Post -25.52 9.18∗∗∗ -8.36∗∗ 6.90
(23.46) (2.40) (3.84) (6.39)
Observations 1310 1843 1903 1253
Notes: Table reports coefficients and standard errors from regressions using OLS. Dependent vari-
ables are as indicated in panel headers (see Appendix Table G6 for details). Data from GLES.
Samples consists of PLZ areas before and after state elections (as indicated in column headers). All
regressions use state fixed effects. The columns indicate time periods under consideration, including
the abbreviations of states with state elections in these periods (see Appendix Figure G1). Survey pe-
riods in the respective columns include (1) 09/2013 - 12/2015, (2) 02/2016 - 06/2016, (3) 08(09)/2016
- 12/2016, and (4) 12/2016 - 09/2017. Control Variables include AfD Shock, post, age, age squared,
gender, and a measure of political interest. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. One, two
and three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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2.5.6 Antisemitism and Attacks Against Refugees
A valid question concerning the empowerment effect is about its reach. Are other outcomes beyond
far-right protest marches affected as well, or is the effect specific to far-right extremism? Given the
debate about the AfD’s position towards Israel and the Jewish Community in Germany (Grimm,
2019), an interesting outcome are antisemitic incidents. Although there have been some individual
cases of antisemitism within the AfD, the party’s main political target does not seem to be the
Jewish population, but rather Islam in general and asylum seekers in particular (Arzheimer and
Berning, 2019). One would thus suspect that antisemitic incidents do not experience the same
increase in liberal areas after state elections. Attacks against refugees on the other hand might be
expected to react in a similar pattern as far-right protests.
Table 2.7 shows evidence for this hypothesis. Panel A repeats the main result for far-right
protests equivalent to the last panel in Table 2.4. Panel B uses antisemitic incidents as dependent
variable. Here, the interaction effect is insignificant irrespective of underestimation and, if anything,
points in the opposite direction.20 Panel C in Table 2.7 presents results for attacks against refugees
as dependent variable. As expected, the coefficient is positive and significant in the 2016 period
with high underestimation. Thus, populist electoral success directed against a Muslim minority
and asylum seekers does not seem to induce higher rates of antisemitic incidents. Attacks against
refugees on the other hand show a similar pattern as far-right extremist protest marches.
2.5.7 Spill-over Effects
The results so far suggest that the empowerment effect from populist success depends on an element
of surprise, as captured by the underestimation of polling institutes and polarisation of the political
party options. In addition, one might wonder how the effect depends on many states holding
elections at the same point in time. Indeed, three elections in 2016 in which the AfD’s result
was severely underestimated also happened to be held on the same day (Baden-Württemberg,
Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt). Two elections in 2014, also with high underestimation,
coincided as well (Brandenburg and Thuringia). Could it be that the strong propagation effects
for these state elections are to some extent due to their simultaneity? One answer comes from the
fact that also in the 2017 period without underestimation, two states held elections in the same
month (Schleswig-Holstein and North Rhine-Westphalia). However, as is evident from Table 2.4,
the propagation effect in this period is very close to zero and insignificant.
If simultaneity of elections increases the empowerment effect, one would expect to find strong
spill-over effects of election information shocks to protest behaviour in other states. It could be that
xenophobic individuals in other states perceive populist support in another state as surprisingly
high and update beliefs about acceptability of xenophobic behaviour. Intuitively, the reaction to
20. Appendix Figure G13 illustrates that this average coefficient for the time after the election does not mask any
dynamics related to the information shock.
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Table 2.7: Far-Right Extremism vs. Antisemitism









Panel A: Far-Right Protests
AfD Shock × Post 0.0147∗∗ 0.0013 0.0268∗∗ 0.0004
(0.0067) (0.0063) (0.0133) (0.0083)
Observations 120638 33085 57794 29759
Panel B: Antisemitic Incidents
AfD Shock × Post -0.0013 -0.0028 0.0004 -0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0026) (0.0010) (0.0034)
Observations 120638 33085 57794 29759
Panel C: Attacks against Refugees
AfD Shock × Post 0.0243∗∗ - 0.0246∗ 0.0259
(0.0107) - (0.0128) (0.0180)
Observations 87803 12616 56018 19169
Notes: Table shows coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. Dependent variables
are number of far-right protests (Panel A), antisemitic incidents (Panel B), and attacks against
refugees (Panel C). Columns 2-4 restrict the sample to state elections according to underestima-
tion of AfD vote share by polling institutes (see Figure 2.3) and according to before and after the
rightward shift of the AfD (July 2015): Column 2 includes Saxony, Brandenburg, Thuringia. Col-
umn 3 includes Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatine, and Saxony-Anhalt. Column 4 includes
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and North Rhine-Westphalia. All
regressions include controls for refugees, as well as municipality, month, and relative month fixed
effects, and use the event-study sample of two-year windows around state elections. Standard er-
rors are clustered at the state-times-month level. One, two and three stars represent significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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another state’s electoral information shock might depend on how much individuals regard other
states’ election results as relevant for social acceptability. For example, geographic proximity might
lead to a stronger response. Also, the spill-over effect might again depend on how surprising the
election result is in terms of polling underestimation and the rightward shift of the AfD.
Investigating possible spill-over effects comes with two difficulties. The first difficulty concerns
the creation of an AfD Shock variable at the municipal level, the second the choice of the time
window. In what follows I briefly describe these difficulties and how I aim to solve them.
First, I need to create an AfD Shock variable similar as in subsection 2.3.3 to exploit variation
in information shocks between municipalities in other states without elections. However, as I would
like to test whether other states without state election experience spill-over effects, I cannot rely on
municipal vote shares of these states. The reason is that these states did not hold state elections
between September 2013 and September 2017. Therefore, I impute support for the AfD party in
states without state elections by fitting a linear prediction for each municipality using its 2013 and
2017 federal AfD vote shares. The top left graph of Appendix Figure G14 illustrates the imputation
by the example of Lower Saxony. The solid blue line shows the imputed AfD support for an example
municipality. For each month between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections, municipal support of
the populist party is imputed by a simple linear fit. Vertical shaded lines indicate times of other
states’ elections. To construct an AfD Shock variable for spill-over effects at the municipal level,
I take the difference between the mean of imputed AfD supports to a municipality’s imputed AfD
support in a given state at the point of state election.
I validate the imputed AfD Shock values in other states using the AfD vote shares of actual
state election results. The bottom two graphs in Appendix Figure G14 show binned scatterplots
for the imputed AfD support values and actual vote shares from state elections at the time of the
election. It turns out that the imputed AfD support values can predict the actual AfD support at
state elections very well. The R squared in a regression of actual AfD vote share on imputed AfD
vote share is 59,7 percent without state fixed effects, and 86,1 percent with state fixed effects. The
estimated beta coefficient in the latter case equals 1,05. Thus, the linear fit seems to capture the
true AfD support reasonably well.
The second difficulty for the estimation of spill-over effects is that state elections are often
close to each other in time. As explained in Gerling and Kellermann (2019), one needs to carefully
choose a time window that avoids overlap of untreated and treated periods before and after elections.
The top right graph in Appendix Figure G14 shows how differences in far-right protests between
municipalities with high and low imputed AfD support behave over time. Vertical shaded lines
indicate the timing of state elections. Clearly, it almost seems impossible to find an adequate time
window around the first two state elections without overlap of control and treatment units. To
maximise the information in time windows, I run the analysis on the week-municipality level. I
disregard the first and last two state elections because including them would diminish the time
window substantially. Further, I treat as one election week the week in between the elections of
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Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Berlin (which are in fact two weeks apart from each other).
This procedure allows me to use a time window of five weeks prior and five weeks after elections.
Table 2.8 presents results on spill-over effects. The coefficient of interest is an interaction of
the imputed AfD Shock variable in other states at the time of a state election with a dummy for
after the election. Panels A, B, and C use different definitions of “other states”. A weak definition
(Panel A) includes states which do not hold state elections in the time window around a state
election. A strict definition (Panel B) includes states without state elections between the 2013
and 2017 federal elections (Lower Saxony, Bavaria, and Hessia). Panel C only includes adjacent
states to test whether spill-over effects are particularly strong in states with closer proximity. As in
previous tables, column 1 reports results of all periods and columns 2-4 split the sample according
to polling underestimation and the rightward shift of the AfD. All regressions use municipality,
week, and relative week fixed effects, to account for any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity
across municipalities or macroeconomic conditions affecting all municipalities. A control for the
presence of refugees at the municipality-month level is also included.
Overall, the evidence suggests that electoral information shocks about populist support seem
not to impact far-right protests in other states. All reported coefficients are close to zero and
insignificant. One has to be cautious with this conclusion, though, as it could also be due to
the necessarily narrow time window or measurement error from the imputation of municipal AfD
support. Still, an explanation could be that people care about social acceptability in the state they
live in. Surprisingly high populist vote shares in other states do not seem to empower xenophobes,
particularly so if they do not live in close proximity.
2.5.8 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
To substantiate my interpretation of the propagation effect, I investigate further patterns of het-
erogeneity using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). Using the restricted-use
microdata allows me to aggregate responses to survey questions at the municipal level and merge
survey responses to my data. The main argument of this paper is that with surprisingly high pop-
ulist vote shares, more xenophobes take to the streets because the social stigma attached to far-right
protests declines. If this is the case, one can expect that the following patterns of heterogeneity
arise.
First, the effect can be expected to be more pronounced in areas where people care more
about other people’s opinions. A xenophobic individual who attaches high importance to social
acceptability might be be more willing to participate in a far-right protest after seeing that many
other people share or tolerate her views. On the other hand, a xenophobic individual who does
not care about other people’s opinions will probably not change her likelihood to protest when
new information about other people’s attitudes becomes available. I proxy for importance of social
acceptability by using responses to the question whether recognition by other people was a priority
for choosing one’s job. The assumption is that if people care about other people’s views when they
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Table 2.8: Election Effect on Far-Right Protests in Other States









Panel A: States without elections (weak)
AfD Shock × Post 0.0009 0.0005 0.0028 0.0002
(0.0020) (0.0030) (0.0076) (0.0022)
Observations 347086 170833 51577 130908
Panel B: States without elections (strict)
AfD Shock × Post -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0025 0.0043
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0100) (0.0034)
Observations 95795 108287 19977 81738
Panel C: Adjacent states without elections (weak)
AfD Shock × Post 0.0033 -0.0028 0.0040 0.0035
(0.0043) (0.0034) (0.0083) (0.0028)
Observations 107795 91456 42836 84204
Notes: Dependent variable is the number of far-right protests. Coefficient of interest is the in-
teraction between an indicator for after a state election and the imputed municipal AfD Shock.
Imputation of AfD Shock in other states is based on linear fit between municipal AfD vote shares
in 2013 and 2017 federal elections. The AfD Shock is the difference to the mean of the imputed
AfD vote share in a given state at times of state election. Time window for effect on other states
includes 5 weeks prior and 5 weeks after elections due to election proximity in time. Panel A uses
a sample of municipalities in time windows in states that did not hold the respective state election.
Panel B only includes municipalities in states without state elections between the 2013 and 2017
federal election. Panel C restricts the sample to municipalities in states neighbouring the election
state. All regressions include municipality, week, and relative week fixed effects and cluster stan-
dard errors at the municipal times week level. Columns differentiate between periods of polling
underestimation (2014 and 2016) and right-ward shift of the AfD (after July 2015). One, two and
three stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
122
choose their job, they will probably also care about other people’s views when deciding whether to
participate in a far-right protest.
Second, the effect should come from politically informed far-right extremists. Municipalities
without far-right extremists or municipalities where people are not interested in the results of
state elections can be expected to show a noticeably smaller effect, if at all. I classify as far-right
extremists the 0.7 percent of 40,220 respondents in GSOEP waves 2013 until 2017 who state that
they politically lean towards the far-right NPD party. Further, roughly 32 percent of respondents
say that they are either very interested or moderately interested in politics. I use this information
as a proxy for political informedness.
Third, the effect should be strong in areas where attitudes associated with support for the
AfD are weak. The reason is that with asymmetric information, the information shock from state
elections will be stronger in municipalities with lower AfD support (see subsection 2.3.4). As the
AfD’s central topics concern refugees and foreigners (Arzheimer and Berning, 2019), I examine how
the propagation effect is different if people in municipalities show high support for refugees and if
individuals mistrust foreigners. I hypothesize that the effect will be stronger in municipalities with
high support for refugees and weaker in municipalities with low trust in foreigners.
I test these patterns of heterogeneity with the following econometric specification.
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛿0 (AfD Shock𝑖 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 × 𝑉𝑖) + 𝛿1 (AfD Shock𝑖 × 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡)
+𝛽1 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 × 𝑉𝑖) + 𝜓𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑟(𝑡) + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
where 𝑉𝑖 is a variable measuring the importance of social acceptability, presence of far-right
extremists, or attitudes. 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 are far-right protests in municipality 𝑖 in state 𝑠(𝑖) at month 𝑡, and
at relative-to-election month 𝑟(𝑡). The variable 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 is a dummy for after a state election,
AfD Shock𝑖 is a measure of information shock from populist electoral success at the time of state
election, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 are time-varying control variables. 𝜁𝑖, 𝜉𝑡, and 𝜂𝑟(𝑡) are municipality, month and relative
month fixed effects. The coefficient 𝛿0 indicates how the propagation effect 𝛿1 changes with higher
levels of 𝑉𝑖. All time-constant variables are omitted due to the municipality fixed effects.
Table 2.9 presents results.21 The first column repeats my main finding. On average, a munici-
pality with a 0.1 increase in the AfD Shock faces a roughly 0.146 percentage points higher likelihood
of an additional far-right protest after state elections. This result uses all observations from 2-year
windows around state elections which have not been omitted due to missing values of time-varying
control variables, or municipality, month, and relative month fixed effects. Columns 2-6 also report
coefficients 𝛿0 on interactions of the propagation effect with variables 𝑉𝑖 generated from GSOEP.
21. Appendix Table G5 provides summary statistics of survey question used from GSOEP.
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Although these coefficients offer a meaningful way to report patterns of heterogeneity, one needs to
be cautious with their interpretation. One reason is that the sample size is reduced as respondents
between 2013 and 2017 waves do not cover all municipalities. It is not clear whether the reduction
in sample size preserves representativeness of all municipalities. Secondly, variation in variables 𝑉𝑖
is probably not exogeneous and could be impacted by factors that also impact far-right protests
and AfD Shock. Third, variables 𝑉𝑖 are time-constant aggregated statistics from answers to sur-
veys between 2013 and 2017 and thus might not reflect changes over time. As with all survey data,
problems of measurement error from biased reporting might also be an issue. Therefore, coefficients
𝛿0 shall not be understood as causal effects, but as an empirically enhanced way to gauge patterns
of heterogeneity.
Columns 2-7 of Table 2.9 suggest that the hypothesized patterns of heterogeneity hold. Given
the greatly reduced number of municipalities and the additional interaction terms, the coefficients
are not statistically significant. However, signs and relative magnitudes of coefficients confirm
that social acceptability (column 2), as well as politically informed extremists (columns 3 and 4)
appear to be driving factors for the empowerment effect. The last two columns suggest that, indeed,
information shocks appear to be stronger in areas where attitudes associated with the AfD are weak.
Absolute coefficient sizes vary substantially given the greatly reduced number of municipalities in
the sample. However, the direction of heterogeneity patterns substantiates my interpretation of the
propagation effect: when surprising populist success provides new information about other people’s













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2.5.9 # AfD Tweets
How does the information shock impact social media and what is its role in the propagation of
extremism? I examine geolocated twitter data containing the hashtag #AfD as a mediating outcome
which in turn could influence far-right protests.
An important observation is that #AfD tweets usually seem to express opposition to the AfD’s
agenda or anger about the AfD’s success. The network plot in Figure 2.7 gives reason to believe
that #AfD is heavily used for statements directed against the AfD. In the plot, a thicker connecting
line indicates higher co-occurrence of the top 40 user names and top 50 hashtags in the #AfD tweets
sample. As can be seen, #AfD tweets often clearly reference people, institutions or parties that
can better be described as anti- rather than pro-AfD.22
Figure 2.7: Network Plot: Top-50 Other Hashtags in #AfD Tweets
Notes: Graph shows co-occurrences of the top-50 other hashtags in geolocalisable #AfD tweets between the 2013 and
2017 federal elections. Fatter lines indicate higher frequencies of co-occurrence within #AfD tweets.
I employ several classification methods for #AfD tweets and cross-validate them with the uni-
verse of tweets from the official accounts of German parties. First, I limit the sample of #AfD
tweets to those originating in states with state elections between the 2013 and 2017 federal elec-
22. Hashtags suggesting an anti-AfD content are for example “#nonazis” and “#widerlich”. Appendix Figure H1
also documents that users mentioned in the tweets include both pro-AfD agents (“joerg_meuthen”, “fraukepetry”,
and “afd_bund”) and anti-AfD agents (“cdu”, “spd”, “dielinke”).
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tions. Then, I manually classify the #AfD tweets based on the content of their text and the
self-description of the user. Due to possible irony and context dependence of tweets, this method
was able to classify only 57 percent of #AfD tweets in states with state elections as either pro-AfD
(15 percent) or anti-AfD (42 percent). Figure 2.8 shows word clouds for pro- and anti-AfD tweets.
Frequent words mentioned in anti-AfD tweets include “#noafd”, “#nazis”, as well as angry and
sarcastic emoticons, indicating stark opposition to the AfD. Pro-AfD tweets often mention hasthags
of more established parties and also use a version of the “Iron Cross” - a symbol that was adopted
by Hitler and is often displayed by neo-Nazi groups today. Appendix Table H1 lists the top 15
words in each category, after preprocessing and removal of stop-words23. The #AfD tweets classi-
fied as anti-AfD have higher usage of words that could associate the AfD with the far-right, such as
“#pegida”, “#npd”. or “#nazis”. Thus, the manual classification seems to work reasonably well,
but provide a conservative classification in the sense that about half of the #AfD tweets remain
unclassified. Figure H2 in the appendix presents monthly frequencies of thus classified tweets.
Figure 2.8: Word Cloud: #AfD Tweets
Pro-AfD Anti-AfD
Notes: Word clouds for pro- and anti-AfD tweets, according to manual classification. Size of words indicates frequen-
cies.
In order to further cross-validate my manual classification, I compute cosine similarity measures
of #AfD tweets to the corpora of tweets from German parties. Appendix Figure H3 provides
an overview of how much the AfD emits tweets in comparison to three other German parties.
23. Preprocessing includes conversion to lowercase, removing punctuation and numbers. For calculus of cosine
similarity I also use stemming.
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Starting in October 2012, official tweets from the AfD party see a substantial increase before the
2017 federal election, but generally remain below the frequency of tweets from the CDU, FDP, or
Greens. Given that the rightward shift of the AfD in 2015 changed the content of the tweets as well
(Cantoni, Hagemeister, and Westcott, 2019), I use cosine similarity to AfD party tweets after 2015
to cross-validate the #AfD tweet classification. Figure 2.9 shows the result. #AfD tweets have
higher similarity to tweets from the more moderate parties SPD, CDU, GREENS, and CSU. The
similarity of #AfD tweets to official AfD party tweets or even to extreme right-wing NPD party
tweets is relatively small.
Figure 2.9: Cosine Similarity of #AfD Tweets and Party Tweets
Notes: The graph plots average cosine similarities for political parties’ tweets to #AfD tweets using corpora aggregated
at the month level, and AfD party tweets after 2015 only.
How do #AfD tweets react to information shocks from state elections? Figure 2.10 presents ker-
nel density estimates of manually classified #AfD tweets for municipalities with different strengths
of information shocks. The left graphs show densities for the 2016 period with underestimation,
the graphs on the right for the 2017 period with no underestimation. The solid and dashed lines
indicate densities before and after state elections respectively. The top graphs show results for anti-
AfD tweets (red), the bottom graph for pro-AfD tweets (blue). The general pattern of left-skewed
density distributions illustrates that Twitter is a platform more heavily used in liberal areas with
lower populist vote shares. Interestingly, more liberal municipalities (with higher AfD Shock val-
ues) show more anti-AfD tweets after the 2016 state elections when the AfD’s success was severely
underestimated, and slightly fewer pro-AfD tweets. Without underestimation, the differences in
densities before and after state elections is much smaller, and – if anything – point in the opposite
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direction.24 In summary, it seems that a surprisingly high populist electoral success did not only
induce xenophobic individuals to participate in far-right protest marches, but did also encourage
critics of the AfD to react with anti-AfD tweets.
It seems intuitive that pro-AfD tweets could lower the stigma attached to far-right protests,
whereas anti-AfD tweets might increase it. Further, a pro-AfD tweet might have a lagged effect
and influence the number of protests not in the given, but in the next month. Anti-AfD tweets
could be a reaction to far-right protests, so they might be tweeted in the same month as the far-
right protest is taking place. To make use of the universe of geolocalisable #AfD tweets, I use the
manual classification as training data in a naive bayesian machine learning algorithm and classify
the remaining geolocalisable #AfD tweets. The algorithm performs well with an 85 percent out-
of-sample accuracy (95% CI: 83 and 88 percent). The left graph in Appendix Figure H4 shows
the weekly frequency of the thus classified tweets. The graph on the right presents first suggestive
evidence that the share of pro-AfD tweets is positively correlated with the number of far-right
protests in a given week, and particularly so after July 2015.25 To test a potential mediating
mechanism further, I regress the number of far-right protests on the number of pro- and anti-
AfD tweets, including their first lead and first two lags. I also add municipality and month fixed
effects to control for general time patterns and any time-constant unobserved heterogeneity between
municipalities.
The top left graph of Figure 2.11 shows that the first lead and lag of pro-AfD tweets are signif-
icantly associated with a higher number of far-right protests. In the same month, the association
between pro-AfD tweets and far-right protests is almost exactly zero. However, the coefficient for
anti-AfD tweets is positive and significant, albeit with a much smaller magnitude than the pro-AfD
tweets. When the sample is split across underestimation periods and before/after the rightward
shift of the AfD, the most notable difference is the changing association between pro-AfD tweets and
far-right protests in the same month of the protest. In periods of underestimation – and arguably
high social stigma – the association is negative, and even more so after the rightward shift of the
AfD. Without underestimation and a somewhat higher social acceptance after many successful state
elections (Gerling and Kellermann, 2019), pro-AfD tweets originating from the same municipality
are also positively associated with far-right protests in the month of the far-right protest.
It might be surprising that I do not find a significant negative association between anti-AfD
tweets and far-right protests, particularly not in the months before the protests. However, one has
to keep in mind that the #AfD tweets are geolocalised in the municipality where they originate –
they can be read everywhere else. Anti-AfD tweets could still influence protest behaviour in other
places, but in a given municipality, they do not seem to curb far-right protests.
Note that although I employ a demanding specification with month and municipality fixed
effects, I do not claim causality here. On the one hand, a causal effect from tweets to far-right
24. Appendix Table H2 shows the results more formally.
25. However, the correlation is not statistically significant.
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protests would be conceptually difficult to grasp. At the other hand, I do not exploit exogenous
variation in #AfD tweets to be able to make such a claim. However, my analysis of #AfD tweets
shows that reactions on social media are different when the vote share of the populist party is
surprising as to when it is not. Tweets seem to impact far-right protests depending on content and
timing.
2.5.10 The Effect of Polling Releases
Before a state election takes place, various polling institutes make their forecasts public. The release
of a surprisingly high polling forecast could be an information shock comparable to an election
information shock itself. However, polling forecasts do not receive as much media attention as an
election result and can be imperfect measures of party support (see Figure 2.3). Nevertheless, the
question arises whether and how polling releases impact far-right protests and tweets. Previous
literature has discussed the effects of polling releases in particular with respect to subsequent voting
outcomes and turnout (Bursztyn et al., 2020; Dahlgaard et al., 2016; Sudman, 1986), as well as with
respect to attitudinal changes and persuasion (Moy and Rinke, 2012; Boudreau and McCubbins,
2010). I contribute to this literature by studying the effect of polling releases for populist party
vote shares on far-right protests and #AfD tweets.
I combine polling forecasts from 21 different polling institutes and calculate the mean forecast
for the AfD in each week and state between September 2013 and September 2017. The left graph in
Figure 2.12 depicts these absolute polling forecasts for the AfD. I construct the information shock
from polling as the difference of an AfD forecast to the previous month’s AfD forecast. The result
is shown in the right graph of Figure 2.12.
I run the following regression specification to test for the impact of polling forecast about the
AfD on far-right protests and #AfD tweets.
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1ΔAfD Polling𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 + 𝛽2ΔAfD Polling𝑠(𝑖),𝑡−1 + 𝛽3ΔAfD Polling𝑠(𝑖),𝑡−2
+𝛽4𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 + 𝜁𝑖 + 𝜉𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡
where 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 is the number of far-right protests, all #AfD tweets, anti-AfD tweets, or pro-AfD
tweets. ΔAfD Polling𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 is the difference of the AfD polling forecast to the AfD polling forecast
of the previous month, and 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(𝑖),𝑡 is an indicator variable for an election month of a state
election. 𝜁𝑖 and 𝜉𝑡 are municipality and month fixed effects.
Table 2.10 presents the results. In the same month, higher AfD polling forecasts do not seem
to impact the number of far-right protests or #AfD tweets in general. However, pro-AfD tweets
appear to react to polls that report increased AfD support (column 4). If polling institutes put
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the AfD forecast one percentage point higher than in the previous month, the likelihood of an
additional geolocated pro-AfD tweet is increased by roughly 0.32 percentage points. This amounts
to a 53 percent increase of the mean of pro-AfD tweets (0.0032/0.006). In comparison, the effect on
anti-AfD tweets amounts to only 22 percent in terms of its mean (0.0061/0.028), and is statistically
indistinguishable from zero. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of increased social
acceptability of the AfD through higher polling forecasts. Tweets react much less to increased AfD
polling results from the previous month, and do not seem to show any reaction two months after
a polling release with higher AfD forecast. This is intuitive as twitter is a platform where opinions
are shared and spread in direct response to events and where discussions of a single event usually
do not last for several months.
The coefficient on the second lag of the delta in AfD polling is positive and significant for
far-right protests. In terms of one standard deviation, the effect is about half the size of the prop-
agation effect from state elections.26 Surely, effects from polling releases and state elections are
not directly comparable because the polling release effect uses the entire population of German
municipalities, whereas the propagation effect is specific to municipalities in states with state elec-
tions, and excluding city states. Further, I am able to exploit the exogenously given timing of state
elections to determine the latter effect, but I cannot rely on exogeneity of AfD polling forecasts.
Although I employ month and municipality fixed effects, the variation in AfD polling forecasts is at
the state level and could be driven by time-varying factors that also determine far-right protests.
2.5.11 Robustness: Placebo
Finally, I check my findings using a placebo regression. As the AfD was founded only in 2013, I
examine whether far-right protests in 2009-2013 show similar patterns after state elections in 2009-
2013 – before the AfD party existed. Note that I use the same time-constant municipal AfD Shock
treatment as defined by differences to state average AfD results in 2013-2017 state elections. If my
findings so far reflect a reaction to an information shock of a successful populist party, the same
interaction term should not show a marked difference before and after state elections four years
earlier. Figure 2.13 shows the result of this placebo exercise in an event study graph. Overall, the
interaction coefficients are comparable in size and precision before and after the election month,
confirming my results. It turns out that in 2009-2013, far-right protests before and after election
months had a tendency to take place in municipalities which four years later show below average
populist support. This tendency seems to decrease slightly over time. An exception is the month
prior to the election. Here, far-right protests do not seem to be more frequent in municipalities
with higher information shocks in the future. Nevertheless, the important aspect of the graph is
26. Two weeks after a polling institute increased the AfD’s forecast by one percentage point, far-right protests tend
to go up by 0.000725 on average, amounting to a 28 percent increase over the mean (0.01*0.0725/0.00259). However,
a standard deviation in AfD Shock is 0.041 whereas one standard deviation in Δ AfD Polling is 0.00469. In terms of
one standard deviation, the state election and polling release effects are 0.060 percentage points (0.041*0.0147) and
0.034 percentage points (0.00469*0.0725) respectively.
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Table 2.10: Effect of Polling Release
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Far-Right Protests #AfD tweets Anti-AfD tweets Pro-AfD tweets
Δ AfD Polling -0.0118 0.9329 0.6145 0.3184∗∗
(0.0371) (0.6627) (0.5270) (0.1594)
L.Δ AfD Polling 0.0554 0.6722 0.5945 0.0776
(0.0507) (0.7706) (0.5886) (0.2142)
L2.Δ AfD Polling 0.0725∗∗ -0.0396 0.0028 -0.0424
(0.0326) (0.5370) (0.4198) (0.1370)
Observations 526,812 526,812 526,812 526,812
Mean 0.0026 0.0345 0.0278 0.0068
Std.Dev. 0.0645 1.22 1.004 0.2659
Notes: Dependent variables as indicated by column headers. Table reports coefficients and standard errors from OLS
regressions. All regressions include municipality and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the month
times state level. Delta AfD Polling is the difference in monthly AfD polling values (see Figure 2.12 for details).
Sample includes monthly observations of German municipalities between September 2013 and September 2017. Mean
and standard deviation of the Delta AfD Polling variable are -0.000135 and 0.00469 respectively. One, two and three
stars represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
the absence of a marked difference between interaction coefficients before and after state elections
in 2009-2013. This suggests that I do not pick up general patterns of far-right protests around
elections, but rather the effect of a populist party’s surprising success.
2.6 Conclusion
This study has focused on the nexus between populist electoral success and far-right extremism. I
have argued that populist electoral success can act as an information shock for areas with below-
average populist support. The result is a significant increase in bottom-up far-right protests in more
liberal areas. My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, this study adds to the literature
by documenting an empowerment effect in a new context – far-right protests in Germany. Second,
I show that the empowerment effect manifests itself only under conditions of surprise. I capture
surprise via three strategies, using polling forecasts and differences between vote shares and political
party structures at the municipal and state level.
The empirical analysis validates that far-right protests seem to increase depending on surprise.
If success of the populist party is severely underestimated, a municipality with a populist vote share
10 percentage points below state average faces a roughly 30 percent increase of the mean likelihood
of an additional far-right protest. The effect vanishes when polling institutes correctly estimate
the populist party’s success. The effect is stronger in municipalities without successful marginal
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parties, and negligible in municipalities with highly polarised vote distributions. Further, the effect
materializes only after the rightward shift of the AfD, and is specific to far-right extremism, not
antisemitism.
Consistent with Müller and Schwarz (2019), I find suggestive evidence that social media can
impact the propagation of far-right extremism. In addition, I can show that the effect depends
on content and timing, as well as a municipality’s relative position in the distribution of AfD vote
shares. The response in tweets is different in periods when the populist party is underestimated.
My findings are consistent with a mechanism in which xenophobic individuals hide their attitudes
if they believe that they are not shared by the broader public. Once the broader public’s attitudes
become apparent, xenophobic individuals in more liberal areas update their beliefs and take to the
streets. Anti-AfD tweets increase as a response of unexpectedly high populist success, but do not
seem to influence the number of far-right protests in the municipality they originate from.
Organizers of the far-right protests in my analysis might support more extremist standpoints
than most populist parties do. Still, my analysis suggests that one consequence of the surprising
success of right-wing populist outfits across the world are more open manifestations of far-right
extremist attitudes and behaviour based upon them – particularly in areas that had not seen them
for a long time.
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Notes: Graphs plots kernel density estimates of anti- and pro-AfD tweets for municipalities with different intensity
of information shocks. Solid lines indicate the period before, dotted lines indicate the period after a state election.
Time window is one year around state elections.
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Anti-AfD Tweets Pro-AfD Tweets
Notes: Graph plots regression coefficients from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is the number of far-right
protests. Independent variables are the number of anti- and pro-AfD tweets, their first lead, and their first and
second lags. Sample in the top left graph includes monthly observations in all German municipalities between
September 2013 and September 2017. The remaining three graphs show coefficients split across underestimation
periods (see Figure 2.3 ) and the right-ward shift of the AfD. The top right graph restricts the sample to observations
between September 2013 and July 2015 (right-ward shift of the AfD). The bottom left graph restricts the sample
to the July 2015- March 2016 period (severe underestimation of the AfD by polling institutes). The bottom right
graph restricts the sample to the period between April 2016 and September 2017 (no underestimation). Regressions
include municipality and month fixed effects. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the month and state level.
See Appendix Table H3 for details.
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Figure 2.12: AfD Polling Releases
Absolute Delta
Notes: Graph shows monthly AfD polling forecasts for the federal states in Germany between September 2013 and
September 2017. The left graph shows absolute polling values, the right graph monthly changes in polling forecasts.
Data from wahlrecht.de. Polling institutes include infratest dimap, Forsa, the Allensbach institute, Customer Re-
search 42, Emnid, FGWTelefonfeld, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, GESSPhone & Field, GMS, IM Filed, INSA, Dukath,
Mentefactum, TNS Infratest, Trend Research Hamburg, Universtiät Hamburg, YouGov, aproxima, mafo.de, pollytix,
and uniQma.
Figure 2.13: Placebo: Event Study Graph
Notes: Graphs plot OLS regression coefficients of the interaction of AfD Shock with month dummies relative to state
election for far-right protests in 2009-2013 (before the AfD came into existence). Regressions include state, month,
and relative month fixed effects, as well as AfD shock. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level.
Sample consists of 2-year monthly windows for German municipalities in states with state elections between the




2.7.1 Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure G1: AfD State Elections since 2013
Date Election State AfD Result
24.09.2017 Federal 12.6%
14.05.2017 State North Rhine-Westphalia 7.4%
07.05.2017 State Schleswig-Holstein 5.9%
26.03.2017 State Saarland 6.2%
18.09.2016 City state Berlin 14.2%
04.09.2016 State Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania 20.8%
13.03.2016 State Saxony-Anhalt 24.3%
13.03.2016 State Rhineland-Palatinate 12.6%
13.03.2016 State Baden-Württemberg 15.1%
10.05.2015 City state Bremen 5.5%
15.02.2015 City state Hamburg 6.1%
14.09.2014 State Thuringia 10.6%
14.09.2014 State Brandenburg 12.2%
31.08.2014 State Saxony 9.7%
22.09.2013 Federal 4.7%
Figure G2: Far-Right Extremist Protest Marches in Germany
Notes: Left picture: Far-right extremist protest march in Berlin on 19th August 2017. Some 1000 participants
affiliated with Neo-Nazi and extreme right groups marched through the street of Berlin’s Spandau district in com-
memoration of 30 years to Rudolf Hess’s (deputy “Führer” under Hitler) death. Link to source here.
Right picture: Far-right extremist protest march on 1st May 2016 in the small town of Plauen in Saxony. Link to
source here.
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Figure G3: Organizers of Far-Right Protests
Notes: Graph shows monthly frequencies of far-right protests, split by organizers. Data from the German Bundestag.
Non-formal organizers are “Neonazis” and “other” (top left graph, where other has lower frequencies). Formal
organizers are the right-wing extremist “National Democratic Party of Germany” (NPD), the movement “Patriotic
Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident” (PEGIDA), the right-wing extremist parties “DIE RECHTE”,
and “Dritter Weg”, as well as the “Pro-Movement”.
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Figure G4: Word cloud: Slogans of Far-Right Protests since 2005
Notes: Graph shows word cloud from slogans of far-right protests since 2005. Data from the German Bundestag.
Bigger size indicates higher frequencies of terms in slogans of far-right protests since 2005. Terms have been pre-
processed with rendering to lower case, stemming, removing of numbers, punctuation, and special characters.
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Figure G5: Monthly Frequencies of Far-Right Protests, Attacks against
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Notes: Graph shows monthly frequencies of far-right protests, attacks against refugees, and antisemitic incidents,
between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections in Germany. Data from the German Bundestag and the Amadeu Antonio
Foundation.
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Notes: Graph shows monthly frequencies of far-right protests, attacks against refugees, and antisemitic incidents,
between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections in Germany, split by federal states. Data from the German Bundestag



























































































































Figure G8: Choice of Different Time Windows
Notes: Graph plots coefficients and confidence intervals of OLS regressions with different time windows. The depen-
dent variable is the number of far-right protests. Coefficients are on the interaction of AfD Shock and a dummy for
after state elections. The AfD Shock is defined as the difference between the mean AfD vote share and a municipality’s
AfD vote share at the time of a state election. All regressions include municipality, month, and relative month fixed
effects, as well as a time-varying control for refugees at the municipality level. Blue, dark, and cyan intervals are for
the 10, 5, and 1 percent significance levels respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level.
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Figure G9: Common Trend Assumption:
Number of Far-right Protests for low and high AfD Shock Municipalities
Notes: Graphs plots number of far-right protests in municipalities with above and below state-average AfD results
relative to the election month.
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Figure G10: Long-Run Effect
Notes: Graph plots regression coefficients of the interaction of AfD Shock with month quarterly dummies relative to
state elections. Regressions include municipality, month, and relative month fixed effects, as well as a time-varying
control for refugees at the municipal level. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level. Sample
consists of 4-year monthly windows for German municipalities in states with state elections between the 2013-2017
federal elections, except city states.
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Figure G11: Fractionalisation and Polarisation Indices
Overall State-by-state
Bivariate Scatterplot Binned Scatterplot
Notes: Top graphs plot kernel densities of fractionalisation and polarisation indices. Bottom graphs show bivariate
scatter plots and linear fits of fractionalisation and polarisation indices.
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Figure G12: AfD Positioning on Left-Right Scale
Notes: The graphs show where GLES survey respondents placed the AfD on the left-right spectrum before and after
state elections in different periods of under- and no under-estimation. Red lines in the graph represent means.
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Figure G13: Event Study Graphs of Further Outcomes
Antisemitic Incidents Attacks against Refugees
Notes: Graphs plot OLS regression coefficients of the interaction of AfD Shock with month dummies relative to state
election for antisemitic incidents and attacks against refugees and their homes. Regressions include state, month,
and relative month fixed effects, as well as AfD shock. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level.
Sample consists of 2-year monthly windows for German municipalities in states with state elections between the
2013-2017 federal elections, except city states. Omitted category is the election month.
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Figure G14: AfD Shock Imputation in Non-Election States
Example: Lower Saxony Difference in Means
Prediction Validation With State FEs
Notes: The top left graph illustrates the imputation of municipal AfD support using Lower Saxony as example.
Vertical lines indicate timing of other state elections. Each municipality’s AfD support is imputed by fitting a line
through its 2013 and 2017 AfD vote share at federal elections. The top right graph presents differences in mean of
protests between high and low AfD shock municipalities, i.e. municipalities whose imputed AfD support is below or
above the mean AfD support in a given month and given state. Vertical lines again indicate timing of state elections.
The bottom two graphs objective is to validate the imputation. They show binned scatter plots of AfD vote shares
at state elections and the imputed AfD support using the method illustrated in the top left graph. The bottom right
graph shows the association controlling for state fixed effects.
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Table G1: Correlation AfD vote share and AfD shock at state level election
with 2013 federal AfD vote shares - before and after the rightward shift of the
AfD (July 2015)
Municipal AfD AfD Shock
before after before after
AfD 2013 0.549∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ -0.608∗∗∗ -0.381∗∗∗
Δ AfD 2013 -0.580∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗ 0.363∗∗∗
Observations 1689 5931 1689 5931
Notes: Table reports correlation coefficients with significance stars. AfD
2013 refers to the municipal AfD vote share at the 2013 federal election. Δ
AfD 2013 refers to differences in 2013 federal AfD vote shares from state
averages. Municipal AfD denotes the AfD vote share of a municipality
in a state election between 2013 and 2017. AfD Shock is the difference
between the state average of a state election and the municipal AfD vote
share. Before and after refers to the rightward shift of the AfD, dated at the
party’s congress in Essen in July 2015. One, two and three stars represent














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































AfD Shock × Post 14.3591∗∗ 12.1409∗∗ 14.3997∗∗∗ 16.8953∗∗∗ 13.2434∗∗
(5.5869) (4.8385) (4.9266) (3.9475) (5.7122)
Observations 113676 1086 1086 256886 38705
Notes: Table reports coefficients and standard errors from poisson regressions. Dependent variable is the number of far-right
protests. The AfD Shock variable is defined as the time-constant difference of a state election AfD result with the municipal
AfD result at the time of the election (positive values denote higher state averages than municipal AfD vote shares). Sample
includes monthly observations for German municipalities between the 2013 and 2017 federal elections in 2-year windows around
state elections, and only in states that once had an election (except in column 4 where the full sample is used). All specifications
use controls for AfD results at the 2013 federal election, refugees, population, unemployment, trade exposure, and human capital.
Column 1 uses state, month, and relative month fixed effects. Column 2 uses municipality, month, and relative month fixed effects.
Column 3 uses a binary the dependent variable (extensive margin). The full sample design in column 4 comprises 𝑇 = 49 (months)
and 𝑁 = 7, 620 (municipalities in states with state election in 2013-2017, except city states). Column 5 employs state-times-month
and relative month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month level. One, two and three stars represent
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table G5: Summary Statistics of GSOEP variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Panel A: Individual Variables
Interest in Politics 57,414 0.316 0.287 0 1
Acceptability 21,000 0.285 0.342 0 1
Mistrust Foreigners 6,832 0.454 0.350 0 1
Far-right Extremist 40,220 0.007 0.054 0 1
Pro-Refugees 41,809 0.040 0.131 0 1
Panel B: Aggregated at municipal level
Interest in Politics 4,103 0.322 0.287 0 1
Acceptability 1,538 0.281 0.348 0 1
Mistrust Foreigners 500 0.467 0.359 0 1
Far-right Extremist 2,836 0.007 0.058 0 1
Pro-Refugees 2,928 0.041 0.135 0 1
Notes: Table reports number of observations, means, standard deviations,
minimum and maximum of variables from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP) used in Table 2.9. Panel A reports statistics for variables at the
individual level, panel B for the aggregated municipality level.
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Table G6: Question used from GLES
Question 1: Immigrants must adopt German culture Variable Name
Preamble: There are different opinions on various topics in society. t308a
What is your opinion on the following statement?
Immigrants should be compelled to adapt to German culture.
Possible Answers: completely disagree (= 0); disagree (= 0);
partly disagree (= 0); moderately agree (=1);
completely agree (= 1)
Question 2: AfD identification
Preamble: Generally speaking, do you have an inclination t46
for a specific political party?
Possible Answers: CDU (= 0); CSU (= 0); SPD (= 0); DIE LINKE (= 0);
GRÜNE (= 0); FDP (= 0); AfD (= 1); other party (= 0)
Question 3: Left-right positioning AfD
Preamble: Where would you position the following party t23a
on a scale from 1 (left) to 11 (right)? AfD
Possible Answers: 1 - 11 (1 - 11)
Notes: Table presents translations of questions used for GLES data.
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Table G7: Question used from GSOEP
Question 1: Acceptability Variable Name
Preamble: Has recognition by others been a priority for choosing your job? plb0530_h
Possible Answers: Yes (= 1); No (= 0)
Question 2: Political Interest
Preamble: Generally speaking, how interested are you in politics? plh0007
Possible Answers: Very interested (= 1); moderately interested (= 1);
Not so interested (= 0); completely disinterested (= 0)
Question 3: Far-Right Extremist
Preamble: Which party did you vote for [...] at the last general election plh0333
(Bundestagswahl) on September 22, 2013?
Possible Answers: SPD (= 0); CDU (= 0); CSU (= 0); FDP (= 0);
Die Grünen (= 0); Die Linke (= 0); AfD (= 0);
NPD/ Republikaner/ Die Rechte (= 1); other party (= 0)
Question 4: Pro-Refugees
Preamble: Have you done that since last year? plj0442
Going to demonstrations or collecting signatures
for initiatives to help refugees
Possible Answers: Yes (= 1); No (= 0)
Question 4: Mistrust Foreigners
Preamble: What is you opinion on the following statement? plm0502i03
It is better to be careful before trusting foreigners.
Possible Answers: Completely agree (= 1); Moderately agree (= 1);
moderately disagree (= 0); disagree completely (= 0)
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2.7.2 Twitter Analysis Appendix Figures and Tables
Figure H1: Network plot: top-40 users mentioned in #AfD tweets
Notes: Graph shows a network plot of top 40 users mentioned in geolocalisable #AfD tweets. Thicker lines indicate
higher co-occurrences of mentions within given tweets. The network plot shows both user names with AfD affiliations
(such as joerg_meuthen and frauke_petry) as well as user names that are clearly anti-AfD (nein_zur_AfD).
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Figure H2: Manually classified Geolocalisable #AfD Tweets
Notes: Graphs plots frequencies of manually classified anti- and pro-AfD geolocalisable Tweets over time. Shaded
vertical lines indicate months of state elections.
Figure H3: Political party tweets
Notes: The graph plots frequencies of tweets from four selected Germany parties.
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Figure H4: Tweets and Protests
Notes: The left graph shows frequency of geo-tagged tweets over time, classified by a naive bayesian algorithm into
pro- and anti-AfD. The right graph plots the share of pro/anti-AfD tweets and the frequency of far-right protests
over time.



















Table H2: Tweets and Underestimation









Panel A: Anti-AfD Tweets
AfD Shock × Post 0.0201∗∗ 0.0060 0.0353∗∗ -0.0016
(0.0086) (0.0060) (0.0159) (0.0112)
Observations 177439 38421 90550 48468
Panel B: Pro-AfD Tweets
AfD Shock × Post 0.0061∗ 0.0000 0.0083 0.0129∗
(0.0032) (.) (0.0052) (0.0077)
Observations 177439 38421 90550 48468
Notes: Table shows coefficients and standard errors from OLS regressions. Dependent variable
is the number of anti-AfD tweets (Panel A) and pro-AfD tweets (Panel B). Columns 2-4 restrict
the sample to state elections according to underestimation of AfD vote share by polling institutes
(see Figure 2.3) and according to before and after the rightward shift of the AfD (July 2015):
Column 2 includes Saxony, Brandenburg, Thuringia. Column 3 includes Baden-Württemberg,
Rhineland-Palatine, and Saxony-Anhalt. Column 4 includes Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the
Saarland, Schleswig-Holstein, and North Rhine-Westphalia. All regressions include municipality
fixed effects, as well as month and relative month fixed effects, and use the event-study sample of
two-year windows around state elections. Standard errors are clustered at the state-times-month






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Impact of Reducing School
Duration on Gap Year Participation
and Trust in the EU
3.1 Introduction
The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union might be seen as symptomatic of
what has been called the “European trust crisis” in recent economics literature (Dustmann et al.,
2017). Low levels of trust not only engender the rise of populist parties (Algan et al., 2017), but also
impede economic growth (Bjørnskov, 2017) and cast doubt on the European project itself (Ciaglia,
Fuest, and Heinemann, 2018). It is, thus, not surprising that the question of how to promote trust
into the European Union and its institutions has recently received substantial attention in both
economics and political science.
Our paper sheds light on an interesting – though unintended – link between a school reform
in Germany and trust levels in European Union institutions. Introduced subsequently in different
German federal states in the early 2000s, the so-called G8 reform lowered school duration by one
year for German academic-track high school students. In comparison to previous cohorts, treated
individuals “gained” one year after graduation. The goal of the reform was to allow for earlier
job market entries by academic-track high school and university graduates and to increase the tax
base in view of demographic change in Germany. Many students, however, opt to delay entry into
university or the labour market and choose to do a gap year abroad. We hypothesise that this
contact with other countries led to a higher trust in EU institutions.
We show that a non-negligible share of treated graduates waits before entering the next career
phase of their life after graduation, such as an apprenticeship, university, or employment. About
half of the individuals in our sample use this time for voluntary services, which is often done abroad.
Thus, the reform indirectly affected international experiences, which then affected attitudes towards
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EU institutions.1 The G8 reform is associated with a 20 percent increase in the probability to show
trust in European Parliament and Commission in our analyses. Differentiating between different
types of trust, we can show that the reform effect did not increase trust in general or trust in
political parties, or political interest.
Our work is related to literature on the importance of trust and especially trust in EU institu-
tions. First, trust has been recognised as a key outcome in the economics literature (e.g. Alesina
and Giuliano, 2015; Algan and Cahuc, 2014). Dustmann et al. (2017) provide an extensive overview
on the roots of distrust in EU institutions. Algan et al. (2017) show how economic insecurity after
the Great Recession has led to both rising vote shares of populist parties and lower levels of trust
in EU institutions. Dotti Sani and Magistro (2016) show that the decline in trust in the European
Parliament after 2009 was most pronounced in countries that were hit hardest by the economic
crisis, and among subjects with low social status.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 provides information on the G8 reform in Germany.
Section 3.3 details the data we use. Section 3.4 specifies our econometric setting. Main results
are presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6 shows that the G8 reform did not generally affect trust
levels and in particular in politics. Section 3.7 discusses further potential channels how the G8
reform may have affected trust in EU institutions, besides increasing gap year uptake. Section 3.8
concludes.
3.2 Background on the G8 Reform
The German G8 reform reduced school duration at academic track high schools from previously nine
to eight years post-reform. The goal of the reform was to achieve younger high school graduates in
order to compensate for demographic change, and increase international competitiveness by earlier
job market entries.2 The reform was never intended to increase gap year participation, volunteering,
or affect trust in institutions, but was specifically labour market oriented.3 Between 2001 and 2008,
1. Research on whether encouraging international exchanges and interactions impacts trust has come to mixed
conclusions. Whereas Stoeckel (2016), for example, argues that social interaction abroad contributes to a European
identity (and thus probably also to higher levels of trust into the EU), Kuhn (2012) argues that the Erasmus
programme as a large exchange program misses its mark by addressing university students who are already very
likely to feel European. On top of this selection and “preaching to the converted”, Sigalas (2010) finds that Erasmus
does not strengthen students’ European identity, but on the contrary can have an adverse effect on it.
2. The Ministry of Education in Saarland (Ministerium für Bildung Kultur und Wissenschaft, 2001), for example
argued: German high school graduates, and thus, also university graduates were at a disadvantage internationally due
to their comparatively old age at graduation. Additionally, earlier job market entries would serve to increase the tax
base to compensate for demographic change in Germany. One can expect the introduction of G8 to be independent
of trust in European institutions. In another example Bavarian Parliament argued: “Germany is one of the countries
with the longest education duration. Our university graduates are on average too old in international comparisons.
[...] The reduction in school duration is furthermore essential on a social level. Long training periods [...] place a
burden on our social security systems and inter-generational consensus.” (Bayerischer Landtag, 2004)
3. Changes in trust in EU institutions were an unintended side-effect of the reform. The increase in gap year
participation, for example, was also part of the public discussion on how the reform failed to produce the younger
university graduates it had originally aimed for. See, for example, Michler (2017), or Meck (2017).
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14 out of 16 German federal states reduced their school duration. It affected students beginning
with school cohorts 1999. Academic track high schools are attended by over 30% of children in
Germany (Hoffmann and Malecki, 2018).4
Figure 3.1 shows the timeline of reform introductions for all federal states.5 The school years
when the G8 reform was introduced are listed here, as well as the school cohorts that were affected
by the reform. The reform was first introduced in Saarland in 2001/2002. The first affected cohorts,
however, started secondary school in 1999 with the introduction of the reform in Saxony-Anhalt in
2003/2004. Altogether, the reform was introduced in 14 federal states, the last being Rhineland-
Palatinate, and Schleswig-Holstein in 2008/2009. Several federal states have announced the re-
introduction of the old G9 system, starting with Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2013. These changes,
however, do not, affect the dataset in this setting, as the last observed cohorts pre-date these
changes. In line with previous G8 literature, we exclude Hesse, Thuringia, Rhineland-Palatinate,
and Saxony from the analysis, as the reform was only partially introduced here or the federal
states always had a shorter schooling system in place.6 Given this stepwise introduction of G8 in
federal states in Germany, the number of treated individuals increases from 1999 until there are
only treated individuals after 2008.
The reduction of school duration was accompanied by an increase in schooling intensity due to
university entry qualifications remaining unchanged.7
Previous study has shown that the G8 reform increased participation in voluntary service or
staying abroad, and decreased university enrolment rates (Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider, 2018;
Marcus and Zambre, 2019; Büttner and Thomsen, 2015). There was no general increase in vol-
unteering, however, as the increase in schooling intensity reduced leisure time and, hence, also
pro-social behaviour at school (Huebner et al., 2017; Meyer and Thomsen, 2015; Krekel, 2017).
Repetition rates have increased due to the reform (Huebener and Marcus, 2017), but graduates are
younger at graduation (Marcus and Zambre, 2019) compared to untreated cohorts.
Our research confirms this research by providing evidence that the probability to engage in a
gap year is substantially increased and that a large share of individuals who take time off after
graduation engage in a voluntary year. We further add to this research by showing that the reform
had an unintended positive effect on trust in European institutions.
4. The majority of participants in a voluntary year are also academic-track high school graduates (BMFSFJ, 2006;
AKLHUE, 2018).
5. Information on reform years and implementation is based on Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder
in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2018).
6. See, for example, Dahmann and Anger (2014) for an early reference.
7. The Standing Conference of Education Ministers specifies that all upper secondary students need to fulfil at
least 265 yearly week hours until graduation, independent of total school duration.
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of introduction of G8 reform in the German federal states
Notes: The graph shows the timeline of school cohorts the G8 reform affected for all German federal states. It lists
the year of reform introduction in parenthesis. Affected cohorts can pre-date the year of introduction as several
federal states introduced the reform for more than just the first secondary school grade. Reform information is based
on Ständige Konferenz der Kultusminister der Länder in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2018).
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3.3 Data
The empirical analysis of this paper is based on two main sources. In order to show that the reform
affected trust in the European Union, we use the German General Social Survey (allbus). We
measure the increase in gap year uptake based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP). Many engage in a voluntary year during this sabbatical. We show that there has
been a substantial increase in volunteering abroad.
3.3.1 Definition of Treatment
We define an individual as treated when she is part of a school cohort for which the reform was
introduced or thereafter. All others are untreated and part of the old G9 system. There are two
special cases of treatment. First, there is a double graduate year, where both the old G9 cohort
and the new G8 cohort graduated during the same year. These cohorts may differ from others.
Post-graduate competition, for example, for university was increased, which may have made these
cohorts particularly likely to engage in a gap year. Second, several federal states introduced the
reform for more than one grade, leading to partially treated cohorts who first experienced the old
schooling system and where then treated. We routinely control for double graduate and partially
treated individuals. Table I1 and Table I2 provide information on the distribution of treated and
untreated individuals in both data sets.
SOEP data allows very accurate treatment assignment, as we often have direct information on
the year, federal state, and type of school individuals enrolled in.8 When information is missing,
we extrapolate the federal state of secondary schooling from the current federal state of residence.
School starting years are based on the year and month of birth taking individual states’ deadlines
for enrolment into account.9 In the German school system it is generally the case that a child
starts attending school if she turns six years before a certain deadline and waits one more year
otherwise.10
Allbus provides information on the federal state where an individual grew up beginning with
surveys in 2004. When this information is missing, we use the current federal state of residence as
in SOEP. The survey further provides information on which type of school degree was achieved,
hence, we can clearly identify academic-track high school students where treatment occurred. In
allbus we fully rely on extrapolated treatment assignment based on the year and month of birth.11
8. Based on the cross-section of first observations for the gap year analysis.
9. We account for changes in deadline regulations across all federal states and across time. The deadline for school
enrolment varies between June and December and was changed at several points in time for most federal states.
10. The extrapolated data shows that 50 percent of individuals started primary school by the age of six in the SOEP
data. The Statistical Office lists 64% of all six-year-old children as enrolled in school in 2018 (Hoffmann and Malecki,
2018). Our number of treated individuals may be increased as having more seven-year-old children impacts school
cohorts when the reform was introduced. These cohorts, however, are also part of the double graduate years when
the last untreated and first treated cohorts graduated together, which we routinely control for.
11. Treatment assignment is, thus, noisier in allbus than in SOEP. When we compare treatment assignment in
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SOEP data is more extensive and includes younger respondents than allbus, thus, our sample
of treated individuals is larger here. Limited to academic-track student, where the reform was
introduced, we have about 40 percent treated in SOEP and a little below 30 percent treated in
allbus.
3.3.2 Trust in the European Union
Our source of data on trust in the European Union is the German General Social Survey (allbus)
of the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences (gesis). The allbus survey provides rich data on
attitudes and political opinions in Germany, and is conducted every two years as a repeated cross-
section amongst a representative sample of on average 3,000 individuals. We restrict our sample
to individuals born after 1980 in order to ensure comparability of cohorts. We have information
on trust in European institutions from survey years 2000, 2008, and 2018. We obtain a sample
with about 330 individuals with a university entry school degree. Given the small sample size, we
additionally include students with other secondary degrees as untreated individuals. This increases
our sample size to 861 individuals. This has the advantage of allowing for more statistical power,
but it only increases the number of untreated individuals in our sample. Table I3 provides summary
statistics for the sample. The number of observations is balanced on basic controls.
For the main outcomes of interest, individuals are asked to rate how much they trust institutions
of the European Union on a scale from one (no trust at all) to seven (trust very much). For the main
analysis, we define each variable of trust as a binary variable that turns one if the individual states
that she trusts EU Parliament or Commission at least on a level of four, and zero if trust is below
this. Figure 3.2 provides a comparison of the share of individuals in treated and untreated cohorts
for these binary variables. In our academic-track high school graduate sample, about 69 percent
trust EU parliament (65 percent in the overall sample) and 70 percent trust EU Commission
(66 percent in the overall sample) at least on a level of four. Both graphs show an increase in
the probability of trusting either EU institution for treated relative to untreated individuals. In
additional robustness checks we test the reform effect on trust measured as discreet variables.
Figure I1 in the appendix provides the same graph distinguished at the seven categories of trust
levels instead of the binary variables.
3.3.3 Gap Year
We propose that a main contributor for the increase in trust in EU institutions is increasing gap
year uptake in treated cohorts. We base this analysis on SOEP long format information from
2018 which provides a wide array of household and individual based information.12 Every year
SOEP based on the “true” year of school enrolment and the fully extrapolated data we see that only 1 out of 900
individuals is re-assigned from the control to the treatment group. We, therefore, consider extrapolated treatment
assignment reliable.
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Figure 3.2: Mean distribution for trust in EU parliament (a) and trust in EU
commission (b) for treated and untreated cohorts
Notes: The graph shows means of different trust. We define trust as one if an individual states she trusts parlia-
ment/the commission at least on a level of four on a scale from one (no trust at all) to seven (high trust). Treated
individuals (in blue) are G8 and untreated individuals (in grey) are G9. The sample is reduced to academic-track
high school graduates.
over 25,000 households are surveyed. The SOEP includes readily usable education and occupation
information. Based on this information we can construct a timeline of the career path for about
2,000 individuals which allows us to identify delays in entering university, a job, or an apprenticeship
after graduating from high school.
We focus the analysis on individuals born after 1980 as above. We also limit the analyses
to students at academic-track high schools for the main analyses, as these were unambiguously
affected by the reform, and the SOEP data base is large enough to still identify a meaningful effect
in this reduced sample.13. In 2000, the pool of participants in SOEP was enlarged beyond the
adult age and includes adolescents at the age of 17. This survey additionally allows identification
of childhood background information, as well as linking individuals to parents’ backgrounds. We
focus the analysis on survey years 2000 to 2017 when this additional information is also available.
Our analysis is based on a cross-section of first observations when individuals are no longer at
school and for whom we could identify the next step in life after graduation. The average age in
our sample is 20.
Participation in a gap year is the main outcome of interest here. Gap year is a binary variable
that turns one if an individual is at least one year older between achieving the high school degree
and the next step. Figure 3.3 shows the mean uptake of a gap year in comparison for treated
and untreated cohorts. In the cross-section based on observations for whom we observe all control
13. Comprehensive schools are, thus, excluded, as well as basic- and middle-track schools of the three-tiered German
high school system
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variables, 40 percent14 of individuals engages in a gap year after graduation.15 On average, treated
individuals are more likely to participate in a sabbatical after graduation compared to untreated
individuals. Table I4 provides descriptive statistic. The results are also confirmed at the intensive











Untreated (G9) Treated (G8)
Figure 3.3: Mean distribution of gap year participation for treated (G8) and
untreated (G9) individuals
Notes: The graph shows share of individuals who take a gap year after graduation for treated individuals (in blue)
and untreated individuals (in grey) for the cross-section of first observations in the SOEP sample.
3.3.4 Further Outcomes
Half of the individuals in a gap year take part in a voluntary year in our sample. We measure
volunteering as a dummy variable that turns one if an individual states that she is engaged in a
voluntary service based on the youth questionnaire or her occupation information. Volunteering
can, for example, be a civic, environmental, or military year. The official state-organised voluntary
year was introduced in 2011 after the abolishment of compulsory military service in all federal
14. In the unbalanced cross section 30 percent show a gap between graduation and the next step. We are aware that
we measure a large percentage of gap year takers. Gap year, may, however, also be generic in the sense that the next
phase in life is simply reported after having turned one year older the same year. Measurement error is possible, but
only of concern if it were correlated with treatment and systematically different for treated and untreated cohorts. We
use the same sources of information for all individuals and only include individuals where we have listed information
on their next phase in life after graduation. Furthermore, the implied increase in gap year participation relative to
the mean in the main analyses of section 3.5 compares well to the increase of voluntary service participation, which
is more precisely measured.
15. Almost 80 percent of gap year takers are one year older at their next phase in life. Voluntary services, for
example, are often for one year up to 24 months.
16. Figure I2 shows a comparison of the age gap between graduation and the next career step for treated (“G8”)
versus untreated (“G9”) cohorts. The figure shows the mean distribution of individuals who are the same age when
graduating school and when continuing with university, an apprenticeship, or employment, individuals who are one
year older, two years older, or three years older.
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states. Before that, there were already vast options via private but state-sanctioned organisations,
such as, through the church or welfare organisations. The Ministry of Family Affairs provides a
list of organisations that offer civic and environmental voluntary year services (BMFSFJ, 2020).
Volunteering, and in particular volunteering abroad, has substantially grown in demand over the
past decade. Since its founding in 2012, for example, state-organised volunteering grew by about
20 percent in 2017 to about 42,000 participants (BAFZA, 2012; 2017). There are ten central offices
organising regional agencies. Seven of these organisations also have specific listings for volunteering
abroad. An evaluation of volunteering abroad lists over 7,000 individuals volunteering abroad in
2017.17 A majority of activity is Europe-based (AKLHUE, 2011; 2018).
In addition to these results we provide further analyses. These are mainly based on SOEP
data. We show that the G8 reform did not affect trust levels in general. We measure trust as
binary variable that turns one if individuals state that they trust people in general at least on
level four out of seven, and zero otherwise. Our sample consists of 1,338 individuals of whom more
than 50 percent show general trust. We further show that the reform did not increase political
interest in general. Political interest is provided on a scale from one (no interest) to four (very high
interest). We measure political interest as a dummy variable for 2,359 individuals that turns one if
an individual states at least being interested (level two), and zero otherwise. About 32 percent if
individuals are interested in politics in general in this sample. Based on allbus we show that trust in
political parties is also not affected by the reform based on 1,517 individuals. Finally, we estimate
whether the G8 reform impacted the probability of individuals going abroad during their school
time in order to show that we do not simply observe a displacement effect of spending time in a
foreign country later in life after the reform. Thirteen percent of our sample of 2,218 individuals
spent time abroad during high school.
3.3.5 Covariates
We routinely control for a rich set of fixed effects at state, cohort, and survey level. In addition, we
include a variety of potentially confounding factors that may be correlated with both the reform
and our outcomes of interest. These include individual level controls for age when answering the
survey, age squared, gender, migration background/German nationality, living in eastern Germany,
and being part of the double graduate cohort or partially treated.
Given the rich background information in SOEP, we can additionally include having lived in the
countryside as a child. We further control for family background by adding parental controls for
having a blue-collar-job working parent, a parent that is married versus single, having a parent with
a tertiary degree, and having at least one sibling. In order to control for the financial background,
we also include household income in additional robustness checks and occupational controls for
17. Information is based on a survey amongst international volunteering organisations from 2017 in cooperation
with the Ministry of Family Affairs. More than 90 percent of volunteers abroad use state-organised programs. Figure
I3 in the appendix shows the development of international volunteering from 2005 to 2017.
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holding a blue-collar job, and being employed. These are not part of our preferred regression
design, however, as this may also be endogenously influenced by the G8 reform. In gap year and
voluntary service analyses we additionally control for past cohort’s participation in the compulsory
military or civic service.
3.4 Econometric Setting
We conduct two separate main analyses. In both these analyses we rely on the sequential intro-
duction of the G8 reform across federal states and use a difference-in-difference design.
We first show that that the reform is connected to higher trust levels towards European Par-
liament and European Commission:
𝑇 𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐺8𝑠,𝑐 + 𝑋′𝑖𝜆 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜖1,𝑖,
with the main coefficient of interest 𝛼1 measuring the impact of the G8 reform in state 𝑠 and
school cohort 𝑐 on the probability of trusting EU Parliament or Commission of individual 𝑖. We
include state level, 𝜇𝑖, and cohort, 𝛾𝑐, fixed effects. This means we are taking out all differences
in trust towards EU institutions that exist between cohorts, for example, because younger people
in general have a more favourable view of the EU. By including state fixed effects we control for
differences in trust between different states that are constant over time. For additional robustness we
also include survey year, 𝜃𝑡, fixed effects here. The number of surveys is fairly low in these analyses,
and we mainly rely on information from 2018. Individual level control variables as described in the
last section are gathered in vector 𝑋𝑖.
We argue that a main contributor for this unintended side-effect of the reform is due to an
increase in probability to take a gap year due to the reform:
𝐺𝑎𝑝𝑌 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺8𝑠,𝑐 + 𝑍′𝑖𝜙 + 𝜇𝑠 + 𝛾𝑐 + 𝜓𝑡 + 𝜂𝑔 + 𝜖2,𝑖,
with the main coefficient of interest 𝛽1 measuring the impact of the G8 reform in state 𝑠 and
school cohort 𝑐 on the probability of participating in a gap year of individual 𝑖. The model includes
state, 𝜇𝑠, and cohort, 𝛾𝑐, fixed effects. The main estimations additionally include survey year fixed
effects, 𝜓𝑡 , in order to account for factors that may have affected answers in a particular survey
year. We also include survey sub-group fixed effects, 𝜂𝑔, in the main specifications as SOEP is
conducted for different focus groups. Individual level control variables are gathered in vector 𝑍𝑖.
Standard errors are clustered at the state level. We account for the low number of clusters by
additionally applying wild bootstrapping according to Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) and
Roodman et al. (2019).
Several concerns arise in this analysis. First, the empirical approach relies on the comparison
of cohorts prior and after the school reform based on students’ school entry dates and on the
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states’ introduction dates of the shorter schooling system relative to individuals in states with
the previous system. Underlying this approach is the assumption that cohorts would not have
developed differently in absence of the reform. Several additional school reforms were introduced
between 2005 and 2014.18 None of these are perfectly collinear with the introduction of the G8
reform. They impacted the schooling system, and may, hence, influence school duration and also
post-graduation decisions, however. These include the introduction of central exit examinations in
eight states instead of individual school exams. The tracking grade at which students first change
from primary to secondary school was changed in three states.19 The secondary schooling choices
outside of academic-track schools were limited in five states through combination of lower and
middle secondary schools into one comprehensive school. Most importantly, seven federal states
first introduced and then retracted university tuition fees. We test robustness of our main results
by including dummy variables that turn one if an individual was affected by these reforms.
Second, and equally important for causal inference is the assumption that no sample selection
occurred. It stands to reason that selection would have generated substantial costs as the G8 reform
was introduced quickly for entire federal states and families would have had to move to different
states in order to select in or out of the G8 treatment. Selection bias, therefore, seems unlikely.
Furthermore, previous research has shown that graduation rates have not been affected by the G8
reform (Huebener and Marcus, 2015; 2017). The total number of grammar school students was not
affected by the reform and has remained high (Hoffmann and Malecki, 2018).20
Third, Goodman-Bacon (2018) amongst others recently stressed the importance of changing
treatment effects through variations in treatment timing. We, therefore, also provide event study
analyses to explore the treatment effect over time.21
Fourth, there naturally might be several channels explaining why the reform may influence
attitudes towards Europe. We consider gap year participation, for example used for volunteering,
a very likely and plausible causal channel. In section 3.7 we survey existing research for alterna-
tive reform effects and present an evaluation of the possibility that these may present alternative
channels for the G8 reform impacting trust in European institutions.
18. See, for example, Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2018) or Huebener and Marcus (2015).
19. The tracking year in Germany varies between 5th and 7th grade.
20. Dahmann and Anger (2014), Andrietti (2015), Huebener, Kuger, and Marcus (2017), or Meyer and Thomsen
(2015), for example, have previously analysed the possibility of selection bias in this treatment and come to the same
conclusion.
21. It is important to note that the event study relies on the assumption that the treatment effect did not vary
for the different federal states introducing the reform. The reform was introduced similarly throughout all federal
states. All states experienced similar discussions after its introduction. Apart from the above discussed additional
school system reforms, such as university fees, which we control for, we could not find evidence for differences in
post-graduation decision processes across treated federal states.
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3.5 Main Results
3.5.1 Trust in European institutions
Table 3.1 shows the first set of main results for the impact of the G8 reform on trust in EU
Parliament in columns (1) to (4) and in the Commission in columns (5) to (8). Columns (4) and
(8) show the effect limited to the sample of academic-track high school graduates where treatment
effect is most accurately assigned, but the sample is small with only about 300 observations. In
all other columns we additionally include non academic-track high school graduates in order to
increase our sample size. We define all non-academic-track high school graduates as untreated.
Panel A includes all cohort fixed effects. We see a positive reform effect on trust in EU Parlia-
ment, which is close to the ten percent significance level. The small sample (in particular of treated
individuals) raises concerns of too little statistical power, however. We have about 300 individuals
at academic-track high school school, of whom 89 are treated. Adding all fixed effects implies we
have over 30 dummy variables in the regression, thus, leaving few observations per independent
variable. In panels B and C we account for this problem in two different ways. First, in Panel B,
we substitute the school cohort fixed effects by a linear trend in order to still account for changes
across these cohorts but reduce the number of covariates in our analysis.22 The results show that
coefficients are increased, whereas standard errors remain mostly very similar. P-values show a
connection that is close to the ten percent significance level in particular for trust in Parliament
in columns (1) to (4). Second, in Panel C, we, again include cohort fixed effects, as we take this
as the most accurate model specification. Here we account for potential over-fitting by omitting
insignificant cohort fixed effects as shown in Figure I4.23
In all panels we see positive coefficients and often close to significant reform effects. Panel C
shows that the reform led to significant increase in trust when accounting for small sample problems.
We see that the probability to trust European Parliament is higher by between 12 to 14 percentage
points. Relative to the sample mean of 0.65 this implies an increase of roughly 19 percent24 when
including individual level controls in column (3).25 The robustness checks in the appendix in Table
I6 show that these results also hold when applying a probit instead of a linear probability model
and when including additional school reform controls.
Trust in EU Commission shows a similar tendency. We see a significant increase in the proba-
bility to trust the Commission in treated cohorts of about 13 to 18 percentage points in Panel C.
This implies an increase by 20 percent relative to the sample mean of 66 percent in column (7).
The bootstrapped p-value is just above the 10 percent level when including individual controls.
The robustness checks in the appendix show that the reform effect is significant here as well at the
22. We test an alternative quadratic trend and results are qualitatively the same.
23. The authors thank Marco Caliendo for pointing this out.
24. Calculated as 0.120.65 = 0.185
25. Table I5 shows the full regression results.
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intensive margin and when including additional reform controls.
Table 3.1: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to trust
EU institutions
Trust Parliament Trust Commission














Panel A. All cohort FE
Reform 0.096 0.100 0.095 0.143 0.058 0.063 0.057 0.098
(0.056) (0.058) (0.065) (0.153) (0.052) (0.055) (0.060) (0.160)
Observations 864 864 864 334 847 847 847 328
WB p-value 0.113 0.111 0.162 0.500 0.310 0.301 0.366 0.644
Panel B. Linear cohort trend
Reform 0.105 0.112 0.112 0.166 0.080 0.088 0.091 0.124
(0.066) (0.069) (0.071) (0.110) (0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.110)
Observations 864 864 864 334 847 847 847 328
WB p-value 0.135 0.128 0.133 0.123 0.218 0.200 0.200 0.288
Panel C. Significant cohort FE
Reform 0.121∗ 0.136∗∗ 0.118∗ 0.145 0.154∗∗ 0.179∗∗ 0.125∗ 0.160
(0.059) (0.062) (0.063) (0.116) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.101)
Observations 864 864 864 334 847 847 847 328
WB p-value 0.048 0.026 0.077 0.232 0.050 0.016 0.112 0.192
Mean 0.653 0.653 0.653 0.692 0.658 0.658 0.658 0.698
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) to (4) is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual trusts EU
Parliament at least on a level of four on a scale up to seven (high trust), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable
in columns (5) to (8) is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual trusts the EU Commission at least on a
level of four out of a scale up to seven (high trust), and zero otherwise. The mean values of the dependent variables
are provided at the bottom of the table as “Mean”. Panel A shows the regression results when including all cohort
fixed effects. Panel B alternatively includes a linear trend variable for school cohorts. Panel C shows the regression
results when including only significant cohort fixed effects in order to avoid over-fitting in this small sample. We
include cohort year FE for: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 which all affect the outcome at a
level of 1 percent significance in columns (1) to (4). We include cohort year FE for: 2002 and 2009 which affect the
outcome at a level of 1 percent significance in columns (5) to (8). The main independent variable, reform, equals one
if the individual was affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal state. Control variables are as indicated. The
number of observations in all regressions is balanced on basic controls. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according to wild-bootstrapping are provided at
the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Thus, the results reveal a significant increase in trust in both EU institutions of about 20
percent amongst treated relative to untreated cohorts. Stability of these results vary due to our
small sample of treated. The event-study analysis in section 3.5.3 adds further evidence to the here
presented results.
As the reform was, clearly, never intended as a means to increase support of European institu-
tions, the reform effect is obviously an indirect one, driven by a different channel. The following
section shows that gap year participation is significantly increased amongst treated cohorts and
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often used for volunteering.
3.5.2 Gap Year Uptake
Our second set of results show that the G8 reform did indeed lead to significant uptake of gap
year participation. Table 3.2, Panel A, presents the results when estimating the G8 reform on the
binary variable indicating that an individual has a career path gap after graduation of at least
one year. We first include cohort and state fixed effects in column (1), and subsequently add
further controls. Column (2) includes survey year and survey sub-group fixed effects. Column (3)
also includes individual level controls as described in the data section above. Column (4) adds
family background controls for parents’ and siblings’ information. Column (5) controls for (past
cohorts’) participation in compulsory military service or its substitution by civic services. This is
our preferred setting. Column (6) adds linear time trend variables interacted with dummy variables
for reform regions as additional controls.26
In all settings we see a significantly higher gap year uptake in treated relative to untreated
cohorts. The coefficient suggests a sizeable increase of about 14.9 percentage points in column (5).
Relative to the mean of gap year participation in this sample of 42 percent, this implies that the
probability to take time off after graduation has increased due to the reform by about 35 percent.
The results are very robust. Table I9 includes income and occupational controls, as well as
additional school reform controls. The coefficient measuring the effect of the G8 reform remains
significant and similar in magnitude throughout. Coefficient magnitude is reduced when controlling
for compulsory military or civic service in column (5), which is natural as it implied a gap by law
for a large part of male graduates before it was discontinued in 2011. The table further shows that
the results also hold in the fully balanced sample, when applying a probit instead of the linear
probability model and at the intensive margin.
We also estimate the reform effect specifically on the probability to engage in voluntary services
after graduation in Panel B of Table 3.2.27 We see a significant increase in the probability to
participate in a voluntary year of 5.6 percentage points.28 Our preferred estimation setting again
includes all fixed effects, individual level controls, family background controls, and controlling for
compulsory military or civic year participation in column (5). Without the reform, about one out
of five graduates volunteered. Due to the reform effect this increased to about one out of four
graduates.29
26. Table I7 in the Appendix provides the full regression results.
27. Table I8 in the Appendix provides the full regression results.
28. Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2018), for example, find an increase of 10 percentage points in the probability
to engage in a voluntary year comparing 2008 (pre reform) graduates to 2012 (post reform).
29. Relative to the sample mean of 0.19, a 5.6 percentage point increase implies a non-negligible increase of about
29 percent due to the decrease in school duration by one year.
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Table 3.2: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to take a
gap year and voluntary year












Panel A. Gap year (mean: 0.4)
Reform 0.175∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.064) (0.058) (0.053) (0.057)
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 1,930 1,930 1,930
WB p-value 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.031 0.039 0.026
Panel B. Voluntary year (mean: 0.19)
Reform 0.156∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.043) (0.036) (0.023) (0.025)
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 1,930 1,930 1,930
WB p-value 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.035 0.021 0.039
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sub-sample FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Family controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Compulsory service ✓ ✓
Linear trend ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual in a gap year as taking time
off after graduation before going to university, starting an apprenticeship, or occupation in Panel A. Results are
balanced on basic controls. The mean value of the dependent variable in Panel A is 0.415. Panel B shows the
regression results in the cross section of first observations balanced on basic controls for the probability to engage
in voluntary military or civic service after graduation. The mean value of the dependent variable is 0.19. The
main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual was affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal
state given school starting year. Control variables are as indicated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according to wild-bootstrapping are provided at
the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.5.3 Event Study Analysis of the Reform Effect
We add further evidence to our findings above in an event study analysis. We change the econo-
metric model from measuring an aggregate reform effect to analysing the effect for the individual
school cohorts in order to show the dynamic of gap year uptake and trust in EU Parliament re-
sponses regarding the introduction of the G8 reform. We expect to see a rise in trust and gap year
participation before the reform is introduced and no trend leading up to the reform.
We introduce lead and lags to our reform variable and replace the aggregate G8 reform coefficient
with a series of dummy variables for whether an individual is part of a school cohort before or after
the reform was introduced.
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖 = 𝛿0 + ∑
𝑦
𝛿𝑦𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑠,𝑐 + Ψ𝑠 + Θ𝑡 + Γ𝑐 + 𝜖3,𝑖,
where 𝑆𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑙𝐸𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 refers to a series of ten dummy variables that turn one if individual 𝑖 started
high school as part of school cohort 𝑐, before or after 𝑦 years of the federal state’s introduction
of the reform. Thus, we have three lag cohort years when individuals are part of the first treated
cohort: start high school the year the reform is introduced, one year later, two years later, or three
years later.30 The series of dummy variables further includes leads for up to six years before the
reform was introduced. Thus, these dummies turn one if an individual started secondary school
six years before the reform was introduced, five years before the reform was introduced, etc. up to
the last G9 cohort, one year before G8 introduction. The last G9 cohort is the omitted category.
𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 is either a dummy variable indicating gap year participation or trusting EU Parliament.31
Otherwise, the regression equations introduced in section 3.4 remain unchanged: we include state,
cohort, and survey fixed effects.
The results are presented in Figure 3.4 confirm the aggregated analyses from above. In Panel
(a) we see mostly positive but small coefficients and no clear trend leading up to the reform. As
coefficients are relative to the excluded year this implies that individuals in school cohorts before
the reform may have been more likely to go on a sabbatical after graduation than the last untreated
cohort. The last G9 year had more pressure continuing on with university as they were immediately
followed by the first G8 cohorts. All coefficients for lead dummies are insignificant, however. 32
After the reform is introduced the first treated cohort shows a significant upwards-movement in
30. We limit our analysis to this time-frame as the number of observations decreases in later cohorts.
31. In the analysis for gap year participation we have at least well over 500 observations per year. The number of
observations for trust in EU Parliament is lower as we focus the analysis on academic-track high school graduates
that are clearly assigned to treatment and control group, but total number of observations is only about 300 here.
Thus, we have between about 50 and 100 observations for each lead and lag year here, except for the last year after
the reform, were the number of observations drops to 29. In order to increase the number of observations in this
last cohort, we also test combining responses for individuals who started three and four years after the reform was
introduced into the category starting three years post-reform introduction. This increases the number of observations
in the last cohort to 53. The presented conclusion remains unchanged by this. Results are available upon request.
32. In order to alleviate concerns of mean reversion, we additionally test using the cohort three years before the
reform is introduced as the omitted category and results remain unchanged. Results are available upon request.
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the probability to engage in a gap year.
A similar picture is presented in Panel (b) for trust in EU Parliament. Leading up to the reform
there is clearly no trend. In fact, coefficients are very close to zero. After the reform is introduced
we see an upward trend indicating higher trust in treated cohorts. None-significance here is most
likely due to the low number of observations per year. When we account for over-fitting as in the
empirical analysis above, we see the same pattern, but stronger reform effects. The results are
presented in Figure I5 in the appendix.
The event study, thus, first of all confirms our aggregate findings. We see that treated cohorts
show different gap year and trust behaviour than untreated cohorts. Both are increased. We also
see, however, that the measured effects seem largely driven by the first treated cohorts and declining
afterwards. We do not see a lasting reform effect. The first treated cohorts were obviously the most
aware of the “additional” time they had gained as they had the direct comparison with untreated
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Trust in EU Parliament extensive
Figure 3.4: Event study and fixed-effects estimates of the G8 treatment on gap
year and trust in EU Parliament
Notes: The graph shows regression coefficients and confidence intervals (90% as dashed line and 95% as dotted line)
for estimating the development of gap year participation in (a) and trust in EU Parliament at least on level four on a
scale from one (no trust) to seven (high trust) in (b) for the sample restricted to upper secondary school graduates.
The last school cohort before the reform is the excluded category. The graph further shows the aggregated effect
through difference-in-difference estimates in short dashed green lines in the given sample. Individuals were included
when they started secondary school up to six years leading up to the reform, and up to three years after the reform.
All regressions control for cohort fixed effects, survey year fixed effects, federal state fixed effects, individuals in
the double graduate cohort, and partially treated individuals. Panel (b) additionally controls for individuals in the
compulsory military or civic service. Standard errors are clustered at the federal state level.
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3.6 The G8 Reform did not increase Trust in general
We analyse the effect of the reform on several further outcomes regarding political interest and
trust in general and see no comparable effect of the reform. The effect of the reform on trust in
EU institutions seems quite singular. The results are presented in Table 3.3.
We test the effect of the reform on general trust in political parties, on political interest, and
on the probability to trust people in general. The G8 reform has no significant positive effect on
any of these outcomes.
In fact, we can even see a significant negative effect of the G8 reform on political interest in
Panel B.33 The coefficient suggests a reduction in the probability to show interest in politics of
about 14 percentage points when including all controls in column (5). Relative to the mean of 0.32
this suggests a large reduction by 43 percent, which is a sizeable effect.
The coefficient measuring the probability to trust political parties in Panel A (based on allbus
data) is not affected by the G8 reform.34. The probability to trust people at least on a level of four
out of seven also reveals a connection to the G8 reform that is very close to zero in Panel C.
We, furthermore, analyse whether the increase in gap year uptake is due to G8 cohorts post-
poning going abroad during their school time until after graduation. Regression results in Panel D
do not show a significant difference between treated and untreated cohorts due to the G8 reform
in the probability to spend time abroad while still at school.35 We take this as evidence that the
increase in sabbaticals after graduation is not due to a substitution effect.
As before, we additionally confirm our findings of this section in event study analyses. The
results are presented in Figure I6. Panel (a) shows the development of trust in political parties
for cohorts up to six years prior to the reform and three years after the reform. There is no clear
trend either before or after the reform. The same holds for trust in people in general, in Panel (d).
Panel (b) confirms the significant drop in political interest as a result of the reform. We see no
trend leading up to the reform, but a sharp drop afterwards which is slow to recover in later treated
cohorts. Panel (c) shows that going abroad during school time has been on a down-ward trend
before the reform. This trend was momentarily stopped after the reform. There is no evidence
that G8 students participate less in going abroad during their school time compared to previous
cohorts.
Clearly, there is no overall increase in trust in general, or specifically in politics. The positive
reform effect we observe for trust in European institutions is not reflected in any of our alternative
trust measures.
33. This is evident when controlling for the share of our sample who are attending high school while answering this
survey question. Our result is in line with previous research, for example, by Krekel (2017).
34. Table I10 shows that this also holds in our alternative model specifications when alternatively using a linear
trend instead of cohort fixed effects and when including only significant cohort fixed effects.
35. A study by weltweiser on student exchange programs, for example, also shows an increase in total number of
pupils going abroad during high school between 2003 and 2010, the main years of early reform impact.
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Table 3.3: The effect of decreasing school duration on trust in political parties,
political interest, trust in people, and going abroad during school time











Panel A. Trust political parties (mean: 0.53)
Reform 0.028 0.032 0.053
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108)
Observations 1,517 1,517 1,448
WB p-value 0.838 0.813 0.695
Panel B. Political interest (mean: 0.32)
Reform -0.139∗∗ -0.141∗∗ -0.148∗∗ -0.139∗∗ -0.137∗∗
(0.050) (0.054) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057)
Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
WB p-value 0.008 0.064 0.083 0.097 0.101
Panel C. Trust people (mean: 0.51)
Reform -0.052 -0.024 -0.026 -0.014 -0.013
(0.054) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.055)
Observations 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340
WB p-value 0.345 0.706 0.676 0.814 0.831
Panel D. School time abroad (mean: 0.13)
Reform 0.050 0.077 0.043 0.056 0.057
(0.065) (0.057) (0.054) (0.053) (0.053)
Observations 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204 2,204
WB p-value 0.638 0.364 0.606 0.482 0.481
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sub-sample FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Family controls ✓ ✓
Income controls ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is trust in political parties measured as a dummy variable that turns
one if an individual shows trust on a level of 4 out of a scale up to 7 (high trust), and zero otherwise in
Panel A. These analyses are based on allbus data. The mean value of the dependent variable is 0.525.
All other panels are based on SOEP data. The dependent variable in Panel B is general political
interest measured as a dummy variable that turns one if an individual is interested in politics at least
on a level of two one a scale of one (no interest) to four (high interest). Panel C shows the results
for the dummy variable that turns one if an individual trusts people at least on a level of four on a
scale of one (no trust) to seven (high trust) in general, and Panel D shows the results for a dummy
variable that turns one if a person spent some time abroad during high school, and zero otherwise.
The mean value of the dependent variable is 0.275 in Panel B, 0.51 in Panel C, and 0.129 in Panel D.
The main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual was affected by the G8 reform
in his or her federal state given school starting year. Control variables are as indicated. Individual
level controls in Panels B to D additionally include being still at high school, as the shown questions
are also answered by individuals who are still at school. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according to wild-bootstrapping
are provided at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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3.7 Further Potential Channels of Reform Impact on Trust in EU
Institutions
Finally, the G8 reform naturally had a variety of effects. We believe that the positive link of the
G8 reform and trust in EU institutions is connected to the increase in gap year participation of
treated cohorts, as this sabbatical is, for example used to volunteer and volunteering abroad has
largely gained in popularity over the past decade.
The following table provides a list of reform effects that have been shown to be relevant in
previous literature. We show the outcome, the effect of the reform, the main source, and our
assessment for whether the alternative outcomes are likely to affect trust in EU Institutions. The
main observed outcomes for effects of the G8 reform focus on student performance, time availability,
and well-being. Recently there has been a larger focus also on post-graduation reform effects.
Table 3.4: G8 reform effects shown in previous literature
Outcome Effect of G8 reform Source Effect on trust
Student performance Lower performance at graduation in mathematics Büttner and Thomsen (2015) ∼
Slightly reduced performance in English Huebner et al. (2017) ↓
Lower final grade point averages Huebener and Marcus (2017) ∼
Grade repetition increased (for boys) Huebener and Marcus (2015), 2017 ∼
Graduation age reduced (stronger for girls) Huebener and Marcus (2015) ↑
No effect on graduation rates Huebener and Marcus (2015), 2017 ∼
PISA test scores for high-performing students improved Huebener, Kuger, and Marcus (2017)andr19 ∼
Reduced performance on intelligence tests Bergold et al. (2017) ↓
Student activities Less time for side-job Meyer and Thomsen (2015) ∼
Less time for voluntary activity Marcus2019; Krekel (2017) ↓
Reduced political interest Krekel (2017) ↓
Student personality More extroverted Dahmann and Anger (2014) ↑
Less emotionally stable Dahmann and Anger (2014) ↓
Student well-being More stressed Marcus2019; Meyer and Thomsen (2015) ∼
Post graduation Women less likely enrolled at university in year of graduation Büttner and Thomsen (2015),Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2018) ↓
University enrolment lower up to three years after graduation Marcus and Zambre (2019) ↓
Increased voluntary service participation Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2018) ↑
More likely to stay abroad after graduation Meyer, Thomsen, and Schneider (2018) ↑
Higher university drop out probability Meyer and Thomsen (2015) ↓
Higher probability to change majors Marcus and Zambre (2019) ∼
Notes: Collection of main significant G8 reform effects established by previous research and evaluation on
potential effects on trust in EU institutions. ∼ indicates neutral effect, ↓ symbolizes a potentially negative
effect, ↑ symbolizes a potentially positive effect.
Much of the previous research has focused on student performance. Overall, performance seems
slightly reduced and increased for high-performing students. Altogether, the reform was successful
in reducing the age of school graduates but increased repetition rates indicating that on average
the reduction is not an entire year. Importantly for our research, however, students still benefit
from extra time after graduation in comparison to untreated cohorts. Students’ grades in several
subjects appear decreased.36 Reduced English skills and intelligence may lead to less trust as it
reduces understanding, but hardly more.
36. Better education in general is related to higher trust (Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011).
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The G8 reform implies increased pressure on students and, hence, activities outside of school
may be reduced (Miehling, 2020). Students’ personalities further indicate that treated cohorts are
more extroverted. We see this in favour of our proposed channel, as this may also increase the
probability to seek inter-cultural exchanges.
Not going to university or dropping out may have a direct negative effect on trust (besides
increasing gap year participation), as education is positively correlated with trust. Our proposed
channel is, furthermore, indirectly supported by previous evidence that university enrolment is
delayed and participation in voluntary services and going abroad are increased due to the reform.
The question naturally arises if volunteering itself may be connected to higher trust in EU
institutions. It is possible, of course, that increased voluntary activity implies that individuals
are more socially oriented and, thus, support the cooperative European project more. This may
encourage higher gap year participation (and international voluntary service) in the first place. The
research also suggest, however, that voluntary activity of students is reduced due to the reform by
almost 20 percent (Miehling, 2020; Krekel, 2017). Thus, it does not appear to be the case that
treated individuals are generally more civic minded.
3.8 Conclusion
Policy makers are asking how to increase trust in the European Union. Our research sheds light
on an interesting unintended effect of a major German school reform which “gifted” students with
an additional year after graduation. Compared to previous cohorts, students of the new G8 system
received the same education but with one year less instructional time. We see that this reform
increased trust in European institutions, in particular, European Parliament. This increase in
trust in European institutions is not due to a general increase in trust through the reform. We see
no reform effect on trust in political parties in general or in people. In fact, we show evidence that
political interest seems to be decreased in treated relative to untreated cohorts. The reform effect
on European institutions appears quite unique.
We argue that a main contributor to this increase is the higher probability to engage in a
gap year by treated cohorts after graduation, which many use to go abroad, for example, through
voluntary services. We show that participation in a gap year is robustly increased due to the reform.
This increase is not due to a substitution effect of postponing going abroad during school to after
graduation.
We, thus, show that increasing international cooperation through higher gap year uptake can
lead to higher trust in EU institutions. Encouraging trust and participation in the European
project is obviously relevant for the effective operation of the European Union. The European
Union actively tries to increase international exchanges and cooperation towards this goal through
a variety of projects. As recently as 2016, for example, the “European Solidarity Corps” was
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announced as a platform for organising and financing volunteering across the European Union.37
For the years 2018 to 2020 a substantial budget of €341.5 million is planned for this endeavour
(European Commission, 2017). The initiative is one of many that enable young graduates to gain
international experience.
We show that the aggregate positive effect of the reform is driven by the early treated cohorts
and the reform effect declines thereafter. Investments in international exchanges can be seen as
fostering trust in EU institutions.
37. “The European Solidarity Corps will create opportunities for young people willing to make a meaningful con-
tribution to society and help show solidarity [...] And those who work as volunteers are living European values each
and every day” (European Commission, 2016a). The 27 Union Members further declared: “We need to improve the
communication with each other [...]. We committed [...] to offer to our citizens in the upcoming months a vision of
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Figure I1: Mean comparison for trust in EU parliament (a) and trust in EU
commission (b) for treated and untreated cohorts measured at the intensive
margin
Notes: The graph shows means of different levels of trust on a scale from 1 (no trust at all) to 7 (trust very much)
on the x-axis for treated individuals (in blue) and untreated individuals (in grey) for the academic-track high school
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Figure I2: Mean comparison of years between high school graduation and next
phase in life for treated (G8) and untreated (G9)
Notes: The graph shows mean years between finishing high school and beginning an apprenticeship, university, or
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Figure I3: Development of total number of volunteers in international programs
2005 to 2017
Notes: The graph shows the total number of German volunteers in international programs from 2005 to 2017. Own
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Figure I4: Cohort Fixed Effects in allbus
Notes: Data from ALLBUS. The graph shows regression coefficients and confidence intervals for school cohort fixed
effects in a regression of trust in EU Parliament and trust in EU Commission on state and cohort fixed effects, as
well as an indicator whether a cohort in a certain state was exposed to G8 and basic controls as described in the data
section of this paper. The omitted category is the school cohorts of 1990. All regressions use robust standard errors
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Trust in EU Commission
Figure I5: Event study and fixed-effects estimates of the G8 treatment on the
trust in EU Parliament and Commission including only significant cohort fixed
effects
Notes: The graph shows regression coefficients and confidence intervals (90% as dashed line and 95% as dotted line)
for estimating the development of trust in EU Parliament (a) and trust in EU Commission (b) at least on level four on
a scale from one (no trust) to seven (high trust) in for the sample restricted to upper secondary school graduates and
including only significant cohort fixed effects in order to avoid over-fitting. We include cohort year FE for: 1997, 1998,
1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 which are all correlated with the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance
in (a). We include cohort year FE for: 2002 and 2009 which are correlated with the outcome at a level of 1 percent
significance in (b). The last year before the reform is the excluded category. The graph further shows the aggregated
effect through difference-in-difference estimates in short dashed green lines in the given sample. Individuals were
included when they started secondary school up to 6 years prior to the reform, and up to 3 years after the reform. All
regressions control for cohort fixed effects, survey year fixed effects, and federal state fixed effects. Standard errors
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Abroad during school time
Figure I6: Event study and fixed-effects estimates of the G8 treatment on trust
in parties, political interest, trust in people, and going abroad during school time
Notes: The graph shows regression coefficients and confidence intervals (90% as dashed line and 95% as dotted line)
for estimating the development of trust in political parties (a) at least on level four on a scale from one (no trust)
to seven (high trust), political interest (b), trust in people in general (c), and the probability to go abroad at school
in (b) for the sample restricted to academic-track students and graduates. The last school cohort before the reform
is the excluded category. The graph further shows the aggregated effect through difference-in-difference estimates in
short dashed green lines in the given sample. Individuals were included when they started secondary school up to six
years leading up to the reform, and up to three years after the reform. All regressions control for cohort fixed effects,
survey year fixed effects, federal state fixed effects, double graduate cohorts and partially treated individuals. Panels




Table I1: Distribution of treated and untreated individuals in allbus
Part of G8 No Yes Total
1 Schleswig - Holstein 6 1 7
2 Hamburg 5 1 6
3 Lower Saxony 23 14 37
4 Bremen 3 1 4
5 North Rhine-Westphalia 72 18 90
8 Baden-Wuerttemberg 45 10 55
9 Bavaria 38 19 57
10 Saarland 3 2 5
11 Berlin 3 6 9
12 Brandenburg 22 5 27
13 Mecklenburg-Pomerania 11 2 13
15 Saxony-Anhalt 14 10 24
Total 245 89 334
Notes: Number of observations per treatment (Yes) and
control (No) group in the considered federal states for
academic-track high school graduates based on avail-
ability of information in trust in European Parliament
in allbus.
Table I2: Distribution of treated and untreated individuals in SOEP
Part of G8 No Yes Total
1 Schleswig - Holstein 75 13 88
2 Hamburg 19 18 37
3 Lower Saxony 118 133 251
4 Bremen 13 10 23
5 North Rhine-Westphalia 368 197 565
8 Baden-Wuerttemberg 215 130 345
9 Bavaria 140 143 283
10 Saarland 4 8 12
11 Berlin 69 26 95
12 Brandenburg 67 19 86
13 Mecklenburg-Pomerania 25 21 46
15 Saxony-Anhalt 50 49 99
Total 1,163 767 1,930
Notes: Number of observations per treatment (Yes) and
control (No) group in the considered federal states in the
cross section of first observations per individuals balanced
on all controls.
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Table I3: Descriptive statistics for balanced allbus data
Mean SD Min Max Number
Reform 0.10 0.30 0.0 1.0 861
Trust EU Parliament 0.65 0.48 0.0 1.0 861
Trust EU Commission 0.66 0.47 0.0 1.0 841
Age 26.63 5.73 19.0 38.0 861
Age squared 741.85 321.11 361.0 1,444.0 861
Female 0.45 0.50 0.0 1.0 861
German nationality 0.96 0.19 0.0 1.0 861
Lives in East 0.24 0.43 0.0 1.0 861
German A-level 0.39 0.49 0.0 1.0 861
Double graduate cohort 0.09 0.29 0.0 1.0 861
Partially treated 0.04 0.20 0.0 1.0 861
Notes: Summary statistics based on the overall sample of individuals balanced on
individual level controls for trust in EU parliament as outcome variable.
Table I4: Descriptive statistics for the cross section of first observations in the
overall sample for gap year balanced on main observables
Mean SD Min Max Number
Reform 0.40 0.49 0.0 1.0 1,930
Years between graduation and next step 0.52 0.69 0.0 3.0 1,930
Gap year 0.42 0.49 0.0 1.0 1,930
Age 19.86 1.25 17.0 26.0 1,930
Age squared 396.08 50.16 289.0 676.0 1,930
Female 0.54 0.50 0.0 1.0 1,930
Migration background 0.24 0.43 0.0 1.0 1,930
Lived in countryside 0.27 0.45 0.0 1.0 1,930
Lives in East 0.14 0.35 0.0 1.0 1,930
Monthly HH income (net) 3,515.30 1,620.19 500.0 7,500.0 1,670
Comp. military/civic year 0.21 0.41 0.0 1.0 1,930
Double graduate cohort 0.13 0.34 0.0 1.0 1,930
Partially treated 0.04 0.18 0.0 1.0 1,930
Parent: Blue collar 0.30 0.46 0.0 1.0 1,930
Parent: Married 0.81 0.39 0.0 1.0 1,930
Parent: Tertiary 0.41 0.49 0.0 1.0 1,930
Dummy for siblings 0.88 0.32 0.0 1.0 1,930
Notes: Summary statistics based on the cross-section of the first answer in the overall sample of individuals
balanced on individual level and parental background controls.
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Table I5: The effect of decreasing school duration on trust towards EU
Parliament and Commission full regression results for individual controls
Trust Parliament Trust Commission













Reform 0.095 0.112 0.118∗ 0.057 0.091 0.125∗
(0.065) (0.071) (0.063) (0.060) (0.064) (0.065)
Age -0.038 -0.027 -0.028 0.063 0.056 0.013
(0.053) (0.042) (0.020) (0.045) (0.038) (0.018)
Age squared 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Female 0.037 0.043 0.043 0.029 0.031 0.032
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
German nationality -0.017 -0.008 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.016
(0.080) (0.069) (0.070) (0.050) (0.040) (0.043)
Double graduate cohort 0.007 -0.040 -0.012 -0.019 -0.042 -0.036
(0.061) (0.055) (0.063) (0.059) (0.055) (0.057)
Partially treated 0.035 -0.030 -0.023 0.018 -0.035 -0.043
(0.046) (0.050) (0.051) (0.045) (0.054) (0.057)
Observations 864 864 864 847 847 847
WB p-value 0.162 0.133 0.077 0.366 0.200 0.112
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: In columns (1) to (3) the dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one
if an individual trusts EU Parliament at least on a level of 4 out of a scale up to 7 (high
trust), and zero otherwise. Columns (4) to (6) show the results for the dependent variable
measured as a dummy variable that turns one if an individual engages trusts EU Commission
at least on a level of 4 out of a scale up to 7 (high trust), and zero otherwise. Columns
(1) and (4) include all cohort fixed effects. Columns (2) and (5) include a linear cohort
trend. Columns (3) and (6) only include significant cohort fixed effects in order to avoid
over-fitting. We include cohort year FE for: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008,
2009 which are all correlated with the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance in column
(3). We include cohort year FE for: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009
which are all correlated with the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance in column
(6). The main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual was affected by
the G8 reform in his or her federal state given school starting year. Control variables are
as indicated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at federal state level. The p-
value when correcting standard errors according to wild-bootstrapping are provided at the
bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table I6: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to trust
EU institutions in probit, at the intensive margin, and adding further controls
Trust Parliament Trust Commission


















Panel A1. Probit margins - all FE
Reform 0.115 0.119 0.114 0.103 0.158 0.068 0.072 0.069 0.061 0.115
(0.072) (0.073) (0.082) (0.081) (0.145) (0.064) (0.067) (0.072) (0.072) (0.153)
Panel A2. Probit margins - linear trend
Reform 0.125 0.131 0.134 0.133∗ 0.177 0.093 0.100 0.106 0.088 0.130
(0.081) (0.084) (0.088) (0.079) (0.108) (0.074) (0.076) (0.078) (0.069) (0.110)
Panel A3. Probit margins - significant FE
Reform 0.138∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.136∗ 0.134∗ 0.156 0.110 0.131∗ 0.098 0.100 0.178
(0.075) (0.077) (0.082) (0.079) (0.116) (0.070) (0.070) (0.072) (0.071) (0.115)
Panel B1. Intensive - all FE
Reform 0.042 0.058 0.078 0.064 0.106 0.003 0.020 0.060 0.049 0.027
(0.147) (0.158) (0.163) (0.161) (0.379) (0.142) (0.156) (0.174) (0.175) (0.348)
WB p-value 0.799 0.747 0.662 0.723 0.811 0.983 0.909 0.755 0.803 0.948
Panel B2. Intensive - linear trend
Reform 0.159 0.183 0.201 0.194 0.318 0.092 0.117 0.151 0.154 0.091
(0.165) (0.175) (0.180) (0.184) (0.291) (0.141) (0.150) (0.156) (0.165) (0.245)
WB p-value 0.366 0.315 0.274 0.331 0.279 0.566 0.488 0.367 0.399 0.745
Panel B3. Intensive - significant FE
Reform 0.227 0.290 0.226 0.205 0.435 0.378∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.304∗ 0.314∗∗ 0.375
(0.184) (0.194) (0.186) (0.179) (0.356) (0.147) (0.147) (0.141) (0.141) (0.215)
WB p-value 0.241 0.134 0.246 0.266 0.241 0.028 0.004 0.053 0.035 0.149
Observations 864 864 864 864 334 847 847 847 847 328
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reform controls ✓ ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1) to (5) is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual trusts EU Parliament at least on a level of
four on a scale up to seven (high trust), and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in columns (6) to (10) is a dummy variable that turns one if
an individual trusts the EU Commission at least on a level of four out of a scale up to seven (high trust), and zero otherwise. Columns (5) and (10)
show regression results in the reduced sample limited to academic-track high school students. Panel A1 to A3 shows the regression results in a probit
instead of a linear probability model. Panel B1 to B3 show the results measuring trust at the intensive instead of the extensive margin. In both
sets of Panels, the first Panel includes all cohort fixed effects. The second Panel includes a linear school cohort trend. The third variable includes
only significant cohort fixed effects. We include cohort year FE for: 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 which are all correlated
with the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance in columns (1) to (5). We include cohort year FE for: 2002 and 2009 which are correlated with
the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance in columns (6) to (10). The main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual was
affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal state. Control variables are as indicated. The number of observations in all regressions is balanced
on basic controls. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according to
wild-bootstrapping are provided at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table I7: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to take a
gap year full results












Reform 0.175∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.166∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.064) (0.058) (0.053) (0.057)
Age 0.331∗∗ 0.313∗ 0.190 0.185
(0.144) (0.162) (0.135) (0.134)
Age squared -0.008∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.005 -0.005
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.151∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗∗ -0.020 -0.021
(0.023) (0.026) (0.014) (0.015)
Migration background -0.038 -0.009 0.005 0.005
(0.025) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Lives in East 0.059 0.049 -0.011 -0.006
(0.087) (0.104) (0.065) (0.066)
Double graduate cohort -0.025 -0.014 0.018 0.013
(0.036) (0.036) (0.030) (0.030)
Partially treated -0.032 -0.002 -0.053 -0.062
(0.090) (0.074) (0.065) (0.067)
Parent: Blue collar -0.036 -0.033∗∗ -0.034∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.013)
Parent: Married 0.006 0.001 0.002
(0.032) (0.019) (0.019)
Parent: Tertiary 0.001 -0.025 -0.025
(0.028) (0.016) (0.017)
Dummy for siblings 0.047 0.036 0.035
(0.033) (0.024) (0.024)
Comp. military/civic year 0.663∗∗∗ 0.661∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.020)
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 1,930 1,930 1,930
WB p-value 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.031 0.039 0.026
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sub-sample FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Family controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Compulsory service ✓ ✓
Linear trend ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual engages in a gap year
as taking time off after graduation before going to university, starting an apprenticeship, or occupation.
Results are balanced on basic controls. The mean value of the dependent variable in Panel A is 0.415.
The main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual was affected by the G8 reform in
his or her federal state given school starting year. Control variables are as indicated. Standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according to
wild-bootstrapping are provided at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table I8: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to take a
voluntary service full results












Reform 0.156∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗ 0.064∗∗
(0.023) (0.021) (0.043) (0.036) (0.023) (0.025)
Age 0.128 0.083 -0.069 -0.070
(0.108) (0.107) (0.087) (0.090)
Age squared -0.003 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female -0.166∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗ -0.004 -0.004
(0.015) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005)
Migration background -0.056∗∗∗ -0.032 -0.015 -0.015
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.014)
Lives in East 0.085 0.082 0.007 0.003
(0.060) (0.077) (0.019) (0.019)
Double graduate cohort -0.047∗ -0.042∗ -0.003 -0.002
(0.024) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Partially treated 0.037 0.097 0.035 0.028
(0.067) (0.057) (0.043) (0.043)
Parent: Blue collar -0.044 -0.039∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.012) (0.012)
Parent: Married 0.020 0.014 0.013
(0.029) (0.016) (0.016)
Parent: Tertiary 0.047 0.015 0.015
(0.032) (0.012) (0.012)
Dummy for siblings 0.023 0.009 0.009
(0.030) (0.010) (0.010)
Comp. military/civic year 0.820∗∗∗ 0.821∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.016)
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 1,930 1,930 1,930
WB p-value 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.035 0.021 0.039
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sub-sample FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Family controls ✓ ✓ ✓
Compulsory service ✓ ✓
Linear trend ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual engages in in voluntary
military or civic service after graduation. Results are balanced on basic controls. The mean value of the
dependent variable in Panel A is 0.19. The main independent variable, reform, equals one if the individual
was affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal state given school starting year. Control variables are as
indicated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at federal state level. The p-value when correcting
standard errors according to wild-bootstrapping are provided at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table I9: The effect of decreasing school duration on gap year participation

















Panel A. Extensive margin
Reform 0.175∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.220∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗
(0.025) (0.026) (0.064) (0.058) (0.053) (0.057) (0.064) (0.066)
Observations 2,196 2,196 2,196 1,930 1,930 1,669 1,930 2,196
WB p-value 0.000 0.000 0.042 0.033 0.038 0.024 0.036 0.036
Panel B. Fully balanced sample
Reform 0.175∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗ 0.160∗∗ 0.118∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗
(0.030) (0.033) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.057) (0.053) (0.059)
WB p-value 0.000 0.001 0.018 0.022 0.031 0.024 0.014 0.015
Panel C. Margins of probit
Reform 0.178∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.033) (0.052) (0.053) (0.049) (0.056) (0.053) (0.058)
Panel D. Intensive margin
Reform 0.228∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.245∗∗ 0.280∗∗ 0.286∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.095) (0.095) (0.090) (0.099) (0.094) (0.103)
Observations 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669 1,669
WB p-value 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.024 0.026 0.027 0.018 0.020
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Sub-sample FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Family controls ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Compulsory service ✓
Additional controls ✓
School reform controls ✓
Linear trend ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one if an individual engages in a gap year as taking time off after
graduation before going to university, starting an apprenticeship, or occupation. Panel A shows the regression results in the cross
section of first observations balanced on basic controls. The mean value of the dependent variable in Panel A is 0.415. Panel B
shows the same regression results in the cross section of observations balanced on all controls. The mean value of the dependent
variable is 0.417. Panel C shows the fully balanced cross-sectional regression results as margins based on a Probit instead of LPM
model. Panel D shows the fully balanced intensive margin analysis, using the number of years between graduation and the next
phase in life as dependent variable. The mean of the dependent variable here is 0.5. The main independent variable, reform,
equals one if the individual was affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal state given school starting year. Control variables
are as indicated. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at federal state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors
according to wild-bootstrapping are provided at the bottom of the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
196
Table I10: The effect of decreasing school duration on the probability to trust
in political parties in general








Panel A. All cohort FE
Reform 0.028 0.032 0.053 0.012
(0.108) (0.107) (0.108) (0.112)
WB p-value 0.838 0.813 0.695 0.931
Panel B. Linear trend
Reform 0.024 0.034 0.029 -0.027
(0.094) (0.091) (0.087) (0.093)
WB p-value 0.834 0.760 0.792 0.806
Panel C. Significant FE
Reform 0.092 0.095 0.050 0.081
(0.084) (0.083) (0.086) (0.051)
WB p-value 0.348 0.310 0.644 0.150
Observations 1,448 1,448 1,448 544
Cohort FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
State FE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Survey year FE ✓ ✓ ✓
Basic controls ✓
Clustered SE ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy variable that turns one
if an individual trusts political parties in general on a level of 4
out of a scale up to 7 (high trust), and zero otherwise. The mean
value of the dependent variable is 0.547 in the small academic-
track high school sample and 0.525 in the overall sample. Panel B
shows the regression results for the probability to show trust when
including a linear cohort trend. Panel C shows the results when
only significant cohort fixed effects in order to avoid over-fitting
in this small sample. We include cohort year FE for: 2008 and
2009 which affect the outcome at a level of 1 percent significance
in Panel C. The main independent variable, reform, equals one if
the individual was affected by the G8 reform in his or her federal
state given school starting year. Control variables are as indicated.
Individual level controls additionally include preference for right-
wing parties. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at federal
state level. The p-value when correcting standard errors according
to wild-bootstrapping are provided at the bottom of the table. ***
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